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ABSTRACT 
A governor’s role as chief legislator is based on his ability to recommend 
legislation and then use his powers to have his proposals enacted and implemented as 
public policies. Many gubernatorial scholars contend that this legislative role allows 
governors to exert greater influence than other political actors on state public policies 
(Bernick and Wiggins 1991; Herzik 1991; Sanford 1967). Other scholars argue that the 
ability of governors to exercise policy leadership may be overstated, because factors 
outside of a governor’s direct control may constrain his policy choices (DiLeo 1997; 
Gross 1991). In this study, I assess the influence of these constraints by analyzing the 
economic development policies that governors of all fifty states proposed in their major 
legislative addresses from 1997 through 2006. My central research question is: Why is 
there variation in the types of legislative proposals that are developed by governors?  
I find that governors are rational actors who behave strategically when 
recommending economic development policies to state legislatures. For example, 
governors are more likely to include economic development policies on their legislative 
agendas when their states lag the rest of the nation in economic performance. Similarly, 
my results show that governors recommend more entrepreneurial policies to stimulate 
business creation when their states are deficient in resources for business creation or are 
experiencing lagging business formation rates. 
Governors also respond strategically to constraints that are imposed on them by 
the political environment. For example, I find that Republican governors have a stronger 
preference for traditional economic development policies than Democratic governors. 
iii 
During periods of divided government, however, Republican governors tend to 
recommend fewer of these policies, which indicates that governors recognize that they 
need legislative cooperation to enact their policies. 
In short, I find that the relationship between the executive and legislative branches 
of government at the state level is similar to the relationship between the two branches at 
the federal level. Policymaking relies primarily on the joint exercise of their shared 
powers, rather than their independent powers (Fisher 1998). At the state level, as at the 
federal level, we do not have a government of separated powers. Instead, we have what 
Neustadt (1990) refers to as a “government of separated institutions sharing powers” (p. 
29). My findings do not support claims by some gubernatorial scholars and former 
governors that governors are necessarily the most influential political actors in a state 
(Bernick and Wiggins 1991; Herzik 1991; Sanford 1967). My findings are more 
supportive of Rosenthal’s (1990) contention that in most states the executive and 
legislative branches are roughly coequal and make policy through a process that relies 
heavily on bargaining and negotiation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the American political system, state governments have separate legislative and 
executive institutions. The state legislature is responsible for making laws and the 
governor is responsible for executing them. The powers of these two institutions are not 
strictly separated because a system of checks and balances requires each branch to share 
its authority with the other (Rosenthal 1990, p. 2-3). As a result, governors possess 
legislative as well as executive authority. They exercise their legislative authority not 
only by using their veto power, but also by proposing legislation and then using their 
influence to have it enacted into law (Beyle 2004, p. 221-22; Rosenthal 1990, p. 5-7). 
Because the governor has a statewide constituency and is the most visible state 
official, the media and public pay close attention to his legislative proposals. This 
combination of high visibility with a statewide constituency also creates an expectation 
that the governor will serve as “chief legislator” and take a lead role in shaping the state’s 
legislative agenda (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 75; Herzik 1991, p. 29; Rosenthal 
1990, p. 5; Sanford 1967, p. 184-85). Because his legislative role is so prominent, the 
success of a governor’s administration often depends on the success of his legislative 
program. Media and public evaluations of a governor’s accomplishments are largely 
based on his success in getting legislation enacted (Beyle 2004, p. 221; Rosenthal 1990, 
p. 40-41). A governor’s legislative efforts actually begin, however, with the selection of 
policy issues and the development of proposals to address them. 
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My central research question is: Why is there variation in the types of legislative 
proposals that are developed by governors? In this study, I examine governors’ legislative 
proposals in all fifty states regarding economic development policy. I focus my inquiry at 
the state level because the fifty states exhibit different combinations of political, 
institutional, and economic conditions. This diversity allows me to investigate whether 
any of these factors influence gubernatorial policy preferences. I focus my study on 
governors’ economic development proposals because economic development is a policy 
domain in which states and their governors have a long history of activity (Brace 2002, p. 
164; Eisinger 1988, p. 32, 258, 292, and 304-5; Grady 1991, p 106). This long history 
allows me to examine gubernatorial policy proposals over a period of many years.  
Key studies of executive-legislative relations have focused primarily on those 
factors that contribute to presidential success within the United States Congress or 
gubernatorial success within state legislatures (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989; 
Ferguson 2003; Morehouse 1973, 1996, and 1998). These studies measure success and 
influence by comparing a president’s or a governor’s publicly expressed positions on 
policy issues to eventual legislative outcomes (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 66-71; 
Edwards 1989, 16-25; Ferguson 2003, p. 166-67; Morehouse 1973, p. 59-60; 1996, p. 
365-66; 1998, p. 215-16). These studies, however, pay only scant attention to how chief 
executives develop their policy positions. Bond and Fleisher (1990) assume that 
presidents rarely modify their positions in anticipation of legislative reaction to their 
proposals (p. 41). Edwards (1989) acknowledges that presidents may modify their 
positions in order to increase their chances of legislative success, but assumes that there 
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are no systematic differences between presidents in this regard (p. 21). Morehouse (1996 
and 1998) suggests that governors will modify their proposals during periods of divided 
government, because they find it necessary to compromise with the opposition party in 
order to get their legislative proposals enacted (Morehouse 1996, p. 362; 1998, p. 218-
19). She infers from her findings that governors make these compromises, but does not 
examine how governors modify the content of their legislative proposals to achieve 
success (Morehouse 1996, p. 379; 1998, p. 220). Unfortunately, these studies examine 
only a single important dimension of influence: the ability of the chief executive to obtain 
support for his proposals in the legislature. I examine an equally important dimension of 
influence by assessing the process by which a governor chooses the issues and policies 
that he promotes within the legislative arena 
Both gubernatorial scholars and former governors claim that one of a governor’s 
primary roles is to solve a state’s important problems by developing proposals to address 
them and then using his gubernatorial powers to have them enacted and implemented 
(Beyle 2004, p. 219-20; Ransone 1982, p. 120; Sanford 1967, p. 184-85). According to 
this view, governors have greater influence over state public policies than other political 
actors (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 73-74; Herzik 1991, p. 25-26; Sanford 1967, p. 
184). Beyle (1988) suggests that a governor’s influence may extend beyond the borders 
of his own state, because gubernatorial proposals are often a source of innovation that 
influences politics and public policy nationwide (p. 134).  
Other scholars argue that the extent of gubernatorial policy leadership and 
innovation is overstated. They contend that factors outside of a governor’s direct control, 
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such as public opinion, partisan balance in the legislature, and state and national 
economic conditions influence the types of policies that a governor proposes to the 
legislature. According to this view, a governor may fail not only because the legislature 
does not enact his proposals, but also because factors outside of his control constrain or 
deter him from proposing the policies that he prefers (DiLeo 1997, p. 106-7; Gross 1991, 
p. 15). The effect of these constraints on gubernatorial agenda decisions has been the 
focus of relatively little empirical analysis (Coffey 2006, p. 1).  
Governors have wide latitude in choosing the policies that they recommend as 
part of their legislative program. These choices provide them with opportunities to 
influence their chances of success in the legislature and to pursue their other political 
goals, such as reelection or building an historical legacy. This study will examine the 
extent to which governors exercise the ability to make these choices and the factors that 
influence the choices they make when formulating their legislative programs. 
This study will also examine the role played by governors in formulating their 
states’ economic development strategies. State economic development efforts have 
traditionally focused on stimulating economic growth by attracting large-scale 
manufacturing plants that employ many workers (Eisinger 1988, p. 129; Fosler 1992, p. 
3; Gray and Lowery 1990, p. 4; Isserman 1994, p. 66-72; Leicht and Jenkins 1994, p. 
256; Peretz 1986, p. 624; Tietz 1994, p. 101). States using this approach attract business 
investment by providing tax and financial incentives that reduce the cost of operating a 
business within the state. Other aspects of this traditional approach include maintaining 
generally low business tax rates, relatively lax environmental regulations, and business-
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friendly labor regulations (Brace 2002, p. 164; Eisinger 1988, p. 130; Fosler 1992, p. 4; 
Isserman 1994, p. 69; Leicht and Jenkins 1994, p. 257; Saiz 2001a, p. 204; Spindler and 
Forrester 1993, p. 30). 
In the 1980s, scholars began to notice the emergence of a new variety of state 
economic development policies. Eisinger (1988) refers to these newer policies as 
entrepreneurial because they require a more active role for state and local governments in 
stimulating economic growth (p. 7). Entrepreneurial policies are intended to stimulate the 
creation and expansion of local firms, rather than merely attracting businesses from other 
locations. These policies include using state venture capital funds to aid new small 
businesses, helping local businesses promote their products in foreign markets, and 
supporting the research and development of technology that can be commercialized by 
local firms (Brace 2002, p. 164-65; Bradshaw and Blakely 1999, p. 229-30; Eisinger 
1988, p. 240, 1990, p. 513; Gray and Lowery 1990, p. 4; Isserman 1994, p. 73-78; 
Lowery and Gray 1992, p. 484-85; Tietz 1994, p. 102-3). 
However, the emergence of entrepreneurial policies in the 1980s did not signal 
the abandonment of traditional economic development policies by states. States vary in 
the extent to which they have shifted from traditional to entrepreneurial policies. 
Furthermore, some scholars have noted a resurgence of traditional economic 
development policies during the 1990s (Brace 2002, p. 168; Eisinger 1995, p. 147; Tietz 
1994, p. 104). States can choose from a variety of economic development policies within 
the two broad types. Consequently, economic development strategies vary across states 
and over time (Elkins, Bingham, and Bowen 1996, p. 161; Grady 1987, p. 91-92; Grant, 
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Wallace, and Pitney 1995, p. 142-143; Gray and Lowery 1990, p. 7; Hanson and 
Berkman 1991, p. 218-22; Leicht and Jenkins 1994, p 257, 264-66; Lowery and Gray 
1992, p. 485; Saiz 2001a, p. 204-5, 2001b, p. 50; Saiz and Clarke 2004, p. 423-24). 
During any given period many states will modify their economic development strategy by 
enacting new policies. My research examines the role of governors in these policy 
changes. 
Literature Review 
The review of scholarly literature that is relevant to this study is divided into three 
sections. The first section reviews literature concerning the governor’s role as chief 
legislator, the resources available to him for promoting his legislative program, and 
constraints on his legislative authority. The second section reviews the findings of 
empirical studies of gubernatorial-legislative relations. The final section assesses the  
literature regarding the governors’ role in economic development policymaking. 
The Governor as Chief Legislator 
Many scholars view the governor as one of the most important political actors in 
state policy making. A governor is important, in part, because he has a statewide 
constituency and is the most visible state official. This combination of high visibility with 
a statewide constituency creates an expectation that he will take a lead role in solving the 
state’s problems. A governor’s importance as a policy maker is also a result of the 
multiple roles he serves in state government and politics. He is not only the chief 
executive of state government, but also serves as the leader of his political party and as 
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the state’s “chief legislator” (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 73-75; Beyle 1983, p. 180; 
Beyle 2004, p. 194; Cox 1991, p. 55; Gross 1991, p. 1; Herzik 1991, p. 25 and 29; Jewell 
1969, p. 62; Morehouse 1976, p. 219 and 239; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 182, 192 
and 167-68; Ransone 1982, p. 120; Rosenthal 1990, p. 5; Sanford 1967, p. 184-85). 
A governor’s role as chief legislator is viewed as one of his most important roles 
in serving the state’s citizens. He is expected to solve the state’s problems by developing 
proposals to address them and then working to have them enacted and implemented. A 
governor’s legislative role also has great personal importance. The success or failure of 
his administration is often judged on the basis of his success or failure in having his 
proposals enacted. Consequently, his political future often depends, in large part, on his 
ability to use his legislative powers to obtain the cooperation of the legislature (Bernick 
and Wiggins 1991, p. 73-74; Beyle 1983, p. 206; Beyle 2004, p. 221; Rosenthal 1990, p. 
40-41).  
Formal Legislative Powers 
The chief legislative role is derived from the formal legislative powers that 
governors are granted by their states’ constitutions (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 75). 
First, governors of all fifty states are required to recommend a program of new policies to 
the legislature (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 76; Jewell 1969, p. 64; Ransone 1982, p. 
123-24; Rosenthal 1990, p. 6-7). Although a governor has many opportunities to 
publicize his policy priorities, the requirement that he deliver an annual address to the 
legislature provides him with a formal opening to enter the legislative process (Bernick 
and Wiggins 1991, p. 76). According to some scholars, the modern American conception 
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of executive-legislative relations is largely a result of the constitutional provisions 
requiring governors to make these proposals (Jewell 1969, p. 64; Ransone 1982, p. 124). 
If there were no requirement that the governor make policy proposals, then our view of 
his role might be much narrower (Ransone 1982, p. 124). We might view the governor 
more properly as a mere agent of the legislature, rather than as a major policy maker in 
his own right. 
Second, state constitutions require governors in all fifty states to prepare either an 
annual or biennial budget proposal and present it to the legislature (Bernick and Wiggins 
1991, p. 77; Beyle 1983, p. 198; Beyle 2004, p. 214-15; Jewell 1969, p. 65-66; 
Morehouse 1976, p. 225-26; Ransone 1982, p. 126-28). The preparation of the executive 
budget allows a governor to make a very specific and explicit statement of his priorities 
for state government (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 77; Beyle 2004, p. 214; Dometrius 
1991, p. 94). It also allows him to control the appropriation requests of executive branch 
agencies (Beyle 1983, p. 198; Beyle 2004, p. 214). 
Third, state constitutions allow governors to call special legislative sessions and in 
some states allow them to specify the legislative agenda for those sessions (Bernick and 
Wiggins 1991, p. 79-80; Jewell 1969, p. 66; Jewell and Morehouse 2000, p. 243; 
Ransone 1982, p. 156-57). Calling a special session allows a governor to focus the 
attention of the media, public, and legislature on a particular issue and have it considered 
separately from other issues (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 79-80; Jewell 1969, p. 66; 
Jewell and Morehouse 2000, p. 243; Ransone 1982, p. 157). Calling a special session also 
allows a governor to place some pressure on the legislature, especially if the subject is 
9 
one on which the legislature has failed to act. If the subject is truly important to the 
public, then the legislature must either act on the governor’s proposals or suffer the 
political consequences (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 79-80; Jewell 1969, p. 66; Jewell 
and Morehouse 2000, p. 243; Ransone 1982, p. 157). 
Finally, governors are empowered to veto bills passed by the legislature, 
preventing them from becoming law (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 78-79; Beyle 1983, 
p. 200; Beyle 2004, p. 215-17; Jewell 1969. p. 66-68; Morehouse 1976, p. 226; Ransone 
1982, p. 125-26). Although an executive veto is subject to be overridden by the 
legislature, overrides are infrequent because most states require a supermajority of each 
legislative chamber to override the governor’s veto (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 78; 
Beyle 2004, p. 216; Ransone 1982, p. 158; Rosenthal 1990, p. 9). Because a governor’s 
veto is seldom overridden, governors may use veto threats in negotiating with the 
legislature. For example, a governor can sometimes persuade legislators to amend a bill 
to conform more closely to his preferences by threatening to veto it if they refuse. He 
may also threaten to veto a bill that is important to a particular legislator as a way of 
persuading him to support a bill that is important to the governor (Beyle 2004, p. 217; 
Jewell 1969, p. 67; Ransone 1982, p. 158; Rosenthal 1990, p. 12-13). Governors may 
wish to use caution in exercising their veto power. A veto may be seen as a sign of 
weakness on the governor’s part, an admission that he failed to persuade the legislature to 
cooperate with him (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 79; Beyle 1983, p. 201; Beyle 2004, 
p. 216; Ransone 1982, p. 158; Rosenthal 1990, p. 12).  
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Many states’ constitutions provide their governors with veto options that are more 
flexible than a mere rejection of a particular bill. In most states, governors have a line 
item veto that allows them to eliminate or reduce particular appropriations without 
rejecting an entire appropriations bill (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 78; Beyle 1983, p. 
200; Beyle 2004, p. 215; Jewell 1969, p. 68; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 179-80; 
Rosenthal 1990, p. 10). The line item veto not only provides a governor with more 
authority over appropriations, but can also be used in bargaining for support on other bills 
of interest to him (Rosenthal 1990, p. 10). In a few states governors have amendatory 
veto power, which allows the governor to return the bill to the legislature with suggested 
amendments. The legislature may adopt the bill as amended by the governor, override the 
governor’s amendments and enact the original bill, or let the bill die without becoming 
law in either form (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 78; Beyle 1983, p. 200; Beyle 2004, p. 
216-17; Jewell 1969, p. 68; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 180; Rosenthal 1990, p. 9).  
The powers to recommend legislation, propose a budget, and call special sessions 
provide a governor with the opportunity to present his program to the legislature and the 
public. His veto authority provides him with a useful, but limited, tool for bargaining 
with the legislature. These formal legislative powers, however, are usually insufficient to 
ensure the enactment of a governor’s legislative program. A governor must exercise his 
other powers, both formal and informal, in order to use his legislative authority 
effectively (Ransone 1982, p. 159; Rosenthal 1990, p. 35-36 and 67-68). A governor 
must determine the policy preferences of legislators and assess the likelihood that they 
will support his proposals. Once he knows the likely sources of opposition and support, 
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the governor can then use other resources to bargain with legislative leaders and 
individual members to obtain their support for his proposals. As a part of the bargaining 
process, he can use incentives such as campaign support to obtain a legislator’s 
cooperation. In other cases, he may threaten to use sanctions, such as withholding his 
support for specific projects of importance to a legislator. In some situations, a governor 
may adopt an outside strategy in which he tries to build support for his policies among 
the public, hoping that his public support will pressure the legislature to enact his policies 
(Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 73-74; Beyle 1983, p. 206; Beyle 2004, p. 221; 
Morehouse 1976, p. 221; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 188; Ransone 1982, p. 148-56).  
Other Formal Powers and Resources 
A governor’s formal executive powers provide additional resources that he can 
use to secure passage of his legislative proposals. One important resource is a governor’s 
power to appoint certain state government officials. This appointment power not only 
allows a governor to place like-minded policy officials in positions of importance, but 
also provides him with bargaining chips for use in negotiating with legislators (Bernick 
and Wiggins 1991, p. 80; Beyle 1983, p. 196; Beyle 2004, p. 211-14). Similarly, the 
authority of a governor to award jobs, contracts, and other patronage favors provides a 
governor with additional bargaining resources (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 80; Beyle 
1983, p. 196 and 207; Jewell 1969, p. 77; Jewel and Morehouse 2000, p. 242).  
A governor’s staff is another executive resource that may aid him in exercising 
his legislative authority. Staff members who are specialists in a given policy area may 
assist the governor in developing and analyzing specific legislative proposals. Many 
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governors also have legislative liaison staff members who are knowledgeable in 
legislative procedures and assist the governor in planning his legislative strategy and 
negotiating with legislators (Beyle 1983, p. 207-8; Beyle 2004, p. 220-21; Cox 1991, p. 
60; Ransone 1982, p. 132).  
Informal Powers 
Governors have powers beyond the formal powers granted to them by their states’ 
constitutions. These informal powers provide a governor with additional resources to use 
when negotiating with the legislature (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 80-81; Beyle 2004, 
p. 205; Herzik 1991, p. 27). A governor who has recently been elected with a large 
margin of victory may be perceived as having an electoral mandate to implement the 
policies he promoted during his campaign. If legislators perceive that the governor’s 
platform has wide support among the voters, then they are more likely to cooperate with 
him than if he had only minimal voter support (Beyle 2004, p. 205; Ransone 1982, p. 
150-51; Rosenthal 1990, p. 28). 
A governor who maintains a high level of public approval throughout his 
administration may also maintain support for his policies within the legislature (Bernick 
and Wiggins 1991, p. 88-89; Beyle 2004, p. 208). Maintaining a high level of public 
approval may increase his legislative support for two reasons. First, because the media 
devotes a great deal of attention to the chief executive, his policy views, and his standing 
in the public, his popularity provides an indicator of the public’s support for his 
legislative proposals. Legislators want the support of their constituents, but they may be 
uncertain about voters’ opinions on public policy. For this reason, they will often use the 
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chief executive’s standing in the public to help them decide whether to support his 
legislative proposals (Jewell 1969, p. 70; Rosenthal 1990, p. 27-28 and 34-35). Second, a 
chief executive’s public standing provides an indication of his ability to mobilize public 
opinion against his opponents (Edwards 1989, p. 105-6). For this reason, a popular 
governor popular can threaten to withhold support from incumbent legislators who have 
opposed his policies, or he can even threaten to support their challengers during an 
election year. Such threats would be empty and likely to be ignored if they were made by 
an unpopular governor.  
A governor’s past experience as an elected official is another resource that may 
enhance his chances of legislative success. His preceding time in the governor’s office 
and experience in prior elected positions, such as a lower statewide office or as a state 
legislator, allows him to gain substantive knowledge about important policy areas and 
about the legislative process. His earlier experience also provides him with an 
opportunity to cultivate relationships with important political allies that may be able to 
assist him in negotiating with the legislature. By contrast, a governor with little or no 
political experience prior to his election as governor may have to spend the early part of 
his administration learning about policy and the legislative process and building new 
political relationships (Beyle 2004, p. 206; Ferguson 2003, p. 161-62; Morehouse and 
Jewell 2003, p. 149-50; Rosenthal 1990, p. 20-21 and 71). 
The prospect of a governor’s continuing political career may also strengthen his 
bargaining position with the legislature. In most states, governors are elected to a four-
year term and are eligible to run for reelection at least one time (Beyle 2004, p. 212-13). 
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The potential to serve in office for four years or more allows a governor the time needed 
to develop and pursue a legislative program by building a base of support within the 
legislature (Beyle 2004, p. 211; Jewell 1969, p. 68; Sabato 1983, p. 98). A governor’s 
political career may extend beyond his gubernatorial administration. Many governors go 
on to be elected to a higher political office such as a U.S. senator, vice president, or 
president, or they are appointed to a high-ranking federal position such as a cabinet office 
(Beyle 2004, p. 227-28; Sabato 1983, p. 45-48 Schlesinger 1966, p. 33-34). A governor 
with favorable prospects for moving on to higher office may be able to continue wielding 
political influence even as the end of his gubernatorial term approaches (Morehouse 
1976, p. 201; Schlesinger 1965, p. 210). 
Finally, a number of gubernatorial scholars have suggested that a governor’s 
ability to effectively use the resources at his disposal is an important contributor to his 
legislative success (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 73-74; Beyle 1983, p. 206; Beyle 2004, 
p. 221; Morehouse 1976, p. 221; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 188). Some of these 
scholars claim that legislative skill-level is the primary difference between successful and 
unsuccessful governors (Morehouse 1976, p. 221; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 188). 
Constraints on Gubernatorial Powers 
Gubernatorial powers are also subject to constraints that may limit a governor’s 
legislative influence. Some of these constraints are formal restrictions on the exercise of a 
governor’s constitutional legislative authority. For example, constitutional provisions 
allowing legislatures to override executive vetoes constrain governors’ legislative 
authority (Beyle 1983, p. 200; Beyle 2004, p. 215). Other constraints involve limits on a 
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governor’s budget authority. In some states, the state constitution requires a governor to 
consult other officials during the initial preparation of the budget. In most states, the 
legislature is permitted to make extensive amendments to the governor’s budget proposal 
when formulating the final budget for submission to the governor. Either type of 
constraint limits the effectiveness of a governor’s budget authority as a tool of legislative 
influence (Beyle 1983, p. 198; Beyle 2004, p. 214-15; Jewell 1969, p. 65; Ransone 1982, 
p. 128-29).  
Other constraints involve restrictions on the exercise of a governor’s executive 
powers that make them less useful in pursuing his legislative agenda. In some states, the 
state constitution requires the popular election of important executive branch officials, 
such as the secretary of education. This requirement reduces a governor’s appointment 
power, which may weaken his bargaining position with the legislature. Furthermore, 
popular election of these officials limits the governor’s influence over major executive 
branch functions. For example, the governor of a state with an elected secretary of 
education has less influence over activities of the education department than one who 
appoints an education secretary. These separately elected officials may have a different 
electoral constituency than the governor, making them less responsive to his policy 
preferences than an appointed official. In the extreme case, these officials may belong to 
the opposing political party, placing their policy preferences in direct conflict with those 
of the governor (Beyle 1983, p. 191-92; Beyle 2004, p. 210-11; Gross 1991, p. 10; Herzik 
1991, p. 26; Morehouse 1976, p. 222; Schlesinger 1965, p. 208). The existence of 
separately elected executive officials may not, however, necessarily constrain a 
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governor’s policy influence. Gross (1991) suggests that support from a separately elected 
official may be of more value to a governor than support from one of his own appointees 
(p. 11).  
A governor’s appointment power may also be reduced by constitutional 
provisions requiring legislative approval of his appointments to certain offices or 
provisions allowing other political actors to make certain appointments (Beyle 2004, p. 
211-14). In most states, appointment powers have been curtailed even further by civil 
service and merit system reforms that insulate many executive branch employees from 
direct gubernatorial influence (Beyle 1983, p. 206; Beyle 2004, p. 222; Jewell 1969, p. 
77-79; Ransone 1982, p. 152 and 155-56). In most states the existence of independent 
agencies, boards, and commissions further limits the governor’s executive influence. 
These bodies have been given executive authority, but placed outside the governor’s 
direct control. Their existence may limit the governor’s appointment power and his 
ability to direct policy within the independent body’s policy domain (Beyle 1983, p. 199-
200; Cox 1991, p. 57; Morehouse 1976, p. 227-28; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 177).  
Many state constitutions limit the number of consecutive terms which a governor 
may serve and in a few states governors serve two-year rather than four-year terms. 
These restrictions limit the time that a governor has to build a legislative coalition in 
support of his programs. These restrictions may also cause a governor’s bargaining 
strength to decline over the course of his administration (Beyle 2004, p. 206; Morehouse 
1976, p.198; Ransone 1982, p. 30, 26, and 170-71; Rosenthal 1990, p. 21; Sabato 1983, 
p. 98). For example, a governor may threaten to veto a bill that is important to a legislator 
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in order to persuade him to support a particular gubernatorial proposal. This threat may 
not carry much weight if the governor is in the last year of his term and is ineligible for 
reelection. The legislator knows that he will be working with a different governor the 
next year and may be willing to wait until then to pass his own legislation. If, on the other 
hand, the governor has three years remaining in his current term and is eligible to run for 
another term, then the legislator may decide that he needs to strike a deal with the 
governor. If he does not, then it may take him several years to overcome the governor’s 
veto threat. Gubernatorial term limits may also lessen a governor’s political influence 
relative to other statewide elected officials. If other statewide officials, such as the 
attorney general, are not subject to term limits, then they may be able to build a political 
constituency that allows them to contest the governor for influence over public policy 
(Schlesinger 1965, p. 219).  
Because a governor requires the cooperation of the legislature to enact legislation, 
conflict between the legislature and the governor may constrain the governor’s legislative 
authority (Rosenthal 1990, p. 40). One source of conflict is the difference in the two 
institutions’ perspectives regarding public policy (Beyle 1983, p. 207; Beyle 2004, p. 
221; Rosenthal 1990, p. 52-54). A governor’s constituency encompasses the entire state, 
whereas a legislator’s main constituency is located within his district. For this reason, 
governors are viewed as more likely than legislators to propose comprehensive policy 
changes that will affect the state over the long-term rather than incremental reforms that 
achieve short-term political objectives. This difference in policy goals leads, in turn, to a 
difference in bargaining styles. A governor will negotiate in an attempt to overcome 
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opposition to his program, while trying to retain its coherence. Legislators, on the other 
hand, will be more likely to compromise on various aspects of a policy proposal in an 
attempt to piece together a bill that will be supported by a majority of legislators 
(Rosenthal 1990, p. 52-54).  
Finally, there is a difference in the responsibility that is placed on governors and 
legislators. A failure to achieve his policy goals is viewed as a personal failure by a 
governor, as he holds sole responsibility for the conduct of his administration. 
Legislators, on the other hand, share collective responsibility with the rest of the 
legislature. If the legislature fails to act, then an individual legislator can almost always 
pass the buck and blame the failure on other legislators (Rosenthal 1990, p. 54).  
A legislature’s own policy making resources may further constrain a governor’s 
legislative authority by strengthening the legislature’s bargaining position with the 
governor (Ferguson 2003, p. 164; Rosenthal 1990, p. 39 and 47). One important policy 
making resource is time. Legislatures that are in session for more days of the year have 
more time to spend developing and promoting new policies. Another important resource 
is legislative staff to draft legislation, analyze proposals, and evaluate existing legislation. 
A larger legislative staff provides a legislature with a greater capacity for making its own 
policy proposals. Finally, higher legislator salaries enhance a legislature’s policymaking 
ability. Higher salaries free legislators from maintaining outside employment and allow 
them to devote more of their time to legislative activities (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 
88; Rosenthal 1990, p. 44-46 and 62-63). 
19 
A governor’s potential for legislative success may also be affected by the degree 
to which power is fragmented and decentralized within the legislature. A legislature with 
many committees and subcommittees provides a greater number of legislators with the 
ability to block legislation than one in which power is more centralized. An increase in 
the number of opportunities to block legislation may reduce a governor’s likelihood of 
legislative success, especially when the committees are controlled by members of the 
opposition party (Rosenthal 1990, p. 39 and 62).  
Governors depend heavily on their political party members to form the base of 
their supporting coalition in the legislature. There are several reasons that the governor’s 
party members will be motivated to support his legislative program. First, their electoral 
coalitions include many of the same voters and, therefore, they share many goals and 
policy preferences (Rosenthal 1990, p. 18). Second, legislative members of the 
governor’s party run for reelection on his record as well as their own. His success and 
popularity increases their own probability of electoral success (Morehouse 1998, p. 205; 
Rosenthal 1990, p. 19). Third, the governor’s party members often have personal 
loyalties or emotional commitments to their party and naturally prefer to support the 
governor rather than the opposition party (Rosenthal 1990, p. 18). Consequently, the 
constraints imposed by the legislature on a governor’s legislative authority are likely to 
be the strongest when the legislature is controlled by members of the governor’s 
opposition party (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 87-88; Beyle 1983, p. 206 and 230; 
Beyle 2004, p. 217; Jewell 1969, p. 81-82; Jewell and Morehouse 2000, p. 239; 
Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 185; Rosenthal 1990, p. 55). 
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A large legislative majority, however, provides no guarantee that the governor 
will be successful in having his legislative program enacted into law. Large legislative 
majorities are more likely than small ones to be divided into either ideological or regional 
factions. Conflict between these factions within the governor’s own party may make it 
difficult for him to build a legislative coalition to support his policies (Beyle 1983, p. 
206; Jewell 1969, p. 81-82; Ransone 1982, p. 168-69).  
Finally, the political, social, and economic environments in which a governor 
operates may place constraints on a governor’s ability to exercise legislative authority 
(Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 84). For example, the prevailing policy preferences of a 
state’s citizens may limit the exercise of a governor’s legislative authority. Erikson, 
Wright, and McIver (1993) find that states in which citizens are more liberal tend to have 
public policies that are more liberal (p. 89). They suggest that this relationship between 
state policies and citizen ideology occurs for two reasons. First, the party elites who serve 
as policymakers are drawn from the population at large, so that states with citizens who 
are more liberal produce policymakers who are more liberal (Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver 1993, p. 119). Second, citizens are likely to support politicians that enact policies 
that match their preferences. As a result, even politicians whose liberalism deviates 
greatly from that of the public at large are motivated to enact policies that correspond 
closely to public preferences in order to avoid losing the next election (Erikson, Wright, 
and McIver 1993, p. 138). DiLeo (1997) suggests that a governor’s policy choices will be 
constrained by the policy preferences of his state’s voters (p. 98). 
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A governor’s legislative authority may also be constrained by the state’s 
economic conditions. For example, a governor of a state with relatively little wealth may 
have very limited success in promoting policies that require large expenditures. Similarly, 
if a state is experiencing a budget deficit, proposals to implement new policies may find 
little support in the legislature if they require large appropriations of state funds (Bernick 
and Wiggins 1991, p. 84).  
Empirical Studies of Gubernatorial-Legislative Relations 
Many empirical studies of gubernatorial-legislative relations examine the extent 
to which a governor’s formal and informal powers contribute to his legislative success. 
Others examine the constraints imposed on his legislative authority by the political, 
social, and economic environment in which he operates. The findings of these studies are 
summarized in this section.  
I also review the findings of selected empirical studies of presidential influence in 
Congress. These studies are relevant to my study of gubernatorial-legislative relations 
because of the similarities between governors and presidents. Presidents and governors 
are each chief executives who are frequently the focus of attention by the public and the 
media.  Governors and presidents also fulfill similar policy roles and possess similar 
powers, such as the ability to veto legislation, make executive appointments, and 
recommend legislation. Key studies of the relationship between the president and 
Congress examine aspects of executive-legislative relations that have received relatively 
little attention within the gubernatorial literature. The findings of these studies provide 
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additional insights into the nature of executive-legislative relations that can be applied to 
our understanding of gubernatorial-legislative relations.   
The Impact of Formal Powers on Legislative Success 
Many gubernatorial scholars have asserted that a governor’s formal powers and 
resources provide him with tools that he can use in negotiating with the legislature, 
implying that strong governors should experience greater legislative success than weak 
ones (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 80; Beyle 1983, p. 196 and 207; Beyle 2004, p. 211-
14 and 217; Dilger, Krause, and Moffett 1995, p. 556; Jewell 1969, p. 67 and 77; Jewel 
and Morehouse 2000, p. 242; Ransone 1982, p. 158-59; Rosenthal 1990, p. 10, 12-13, 35-
36 and 67-68). The empirical evidence supporting the idea that strong governors are more 
successful in the legislature is, however, mixed. 
Ferguson (2003) examines the influence of gubernatorial powers on legislative 
success (p. 162). She finds that a governor’s legislative success is not affected by his veto 
power, authority over executive appointments, or budget authority (Ferguson 2003, p. 
170). Ferguson (2003) finds, however, that having a larger executive staff contributes to 
greater success in the legislature (p. 171). Dilger, Krause, and Moffett (1995) find that the 
combination of greater formal powers with other resources, such as a larger executive 
staff, contributes to greater gubernatorial effectiveness, although neither formal powers 
nor the other resources have any independent effect (p. 562). 
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The Impact of Informal Powers on Legislative Success 
Several scholars contend that governors’ formal powers must be supplemented by 
their informal powers to achieve legislative success (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 80-
81; Beyle 2004, p. 205; Herzik 1991, p. 27; Ransone 1982, p. 159; Rosenthal 1990, p. 35-
36 and 67-68). Key informal powers include a governor’s electoral mandate, public 
approval, prior experience in elected office, and skills in legislative negotiation.  
A governor is viewed as having public support for his policies if he can credibly 
claim an electoral mandate or if he has a high public approval rating. In either case, 
gubernatorial scholars assert that governors with greater public support will have more 
influence over the legislature than governors with less support (Bernick and Wiggins 
1991, p. 88-89; Beyle 2004, p. 205 and 208; Ransone 1982, p. 124; Rosenthal 1990, p. 
28; Van Assendelft 1997, p. 13 and 211). There is little empirical evidence, however, that 
greater public support translates directly into greater success in the legislative arena. 
Ferguson (2003) finds that neither a large margin of victory, which is a major indicator of 
an electoral mandate, nor high levels of public approval contribute to a governor’s 
legislative success (p. 169-70). She finds, however, that governors who are embroiled in 
scandal experience less success than governors who are not (Ferguson 2003, p. 170). 
The presidential literature provides additional information about the influence of 
public approval on a chief executive’s legislative success. Even within this literature, 
however, there is only limited evidence that high levels of public approval increase a 
president’s legislative success. Edwards (1989) finds that public approval has only a 
small effect on presidential support within Congress (p. 118-19). Bond and Fleisher 
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(1990), however, find that popular presidents win no more votes than unpopular 
presidents, after controlling for the other factors that affect legislative success, such as the 
partisan and ideological balance of Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 194).  
Edwards (1989) concludes that a high level of public approval will allow a 
president to use his other resources, such as campaign support or veto threats, more 
effectively. It is unlikely, however, to be a decisive factor in determining legislative 
success (p. 125). Bond and Fleisher (1990) conclude that the most important effect of 
public approval on a president’s legislative success is indirect. They contend that popular 
presidents can provide more campaign support to members of their party during mid-term 
congressional elections than unpopular presidents, thus increasing the number of 
congressional seats held by the president’s party and creating the potential for higher 
levels of legislative success (p. 194-95).  
A governor’s prior experience in state elective offices is another source of 
informal power that is expected to increase his influence within the legislature (Beyle 
2004, p. 206; Ferguson 2003, p. 161-62; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 149-50; 
Rosenthal 1990, p. 20-21 and 71). Ferguson’s (2003) findings provide mixed support for 
this proposition. She finds that governors with prior gubernatorial experience are more 
successful in having their legislative proposals enacted into law, but finds no relationship 
between prior legislative experience and legislative success (Ferguson 2003, p. 170).  
Conventional wisdom holds that a president’s success in Congress or a governor’s 
success in the state legislature depends on his legislative skills (Bernick and Wiggins 
1991, p. 73-74; Beyle 1983, p. 206; Beyle 2004, p. 221; Edwards 1989, p. 168; 
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Morehouse 1976, p. 221; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 188). According to this view, a 
chief executive must have knowledge of the legislature, including information about its 
procedures and which members possess the most power to aid him by advancing his 
policies. He can use that knowledge to consult with members of the legislature, find out 
about their policy preferences, and assess the likelihood of support for his proposals. 
Once he knows the likely sources of opposition and support, a chief executive can 
bargain and negotiate with legislative leaders and individual members to obtain their 
support. As a part of the bargaining process, he can use incentives such as campaign 
support or assistance in constituent service to obtain a legislator’s support. In other cases, 
he may threaten to use sanctions, such as withholding his support for specific projects of 
importance to a legislator. Occasionally, he will appeal directly to individual legislators 
to ask for their support. Finally, a chief executive must have the ability to compromise 
because he may need to modify his proposals in order to see them enacted (Edwards 
1989, p. 70-71, 84-87, 189, 196, and 199; Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 30-31). 
There is little empirical evidence that a chief executive’s legislative success 
depends significantly on his legislative skills. There are no major studies of 
gubernatorial-legislative relations that directly examine the influence of a governor’s 
legislative skills on his legislative success. Two studies within the presidential literature, 
however, explore the importance of legislative skills within the context of presidential-
congressional relations. These studies can help shed light on the contribution that 
legislative skills make to governors’ legislative success. Edwards (1989) examines 
legislative support during each presidential administration from Eisenhower to Reagan 
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and finds no systematic variation in support that can be attributed to the president’s 
legislative skill-level (p. 185). Bond and Fleisher (1990) analyze the relationship between 
the presidents’ perceived skill-levels and success on roll call votes. After controlling for 
other factors that are likely to affect presidential success, such as the partisan and 
ideological balance of Congress, they find that legislative success rates are unrelated to 
presidential skill-levels (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 218).  
Constraints on Gubernatorial Influence over the Legislature 
    Gubernatorial powers are subject to constraints that may diminish a governor’s 
influence over the legislature. Some constraints are a result of constitutional limitations 
on executive power, such as restrictions on a governor’s eligibility to seek reelection or 
requirements for the popular election of important executive branch officials. Sharkansky 
(1968) finds that governors of states where there are few separately elected officials have 
greater influence over the budget than those of states that elect relatively many statewide 
officials (p. 1229). He also finds that lame duck governors have less budgetary influence 
than those who are eligible for reelection (Sharkansky 1968, p. 1229). Ferguson (2003), 
on the other hand, finds that eligibility for reelection has no effect on a governor’s 
legislative success (p. 170). 
The partisan and ideological composition of the legislature may impose additional 
constraints on a governor’s legislative influence. Gubernatorial scholars suggest that a 
governor’s influence over the legislature will tend to be less when the opposition party 
controls one or both legislative chambers (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 87-88; Beyle 
1983, p. 206 and 230; Beyle 2004, p. 217; Jewell 1969, p. 81-82; Jewell and Morehouse 
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2000, p. 239; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 185; Rosenthal 1990, p. 55). The empirical 
evidence in support of this proposition is consistent. In three separate studies, Morehouse 
(1973, 1996, and 1998) finds that governors receive more support from their own party 
members in the legislature than from the opposition (Morehouse 1973, p. 67; 1996, p. 
369; 1998, p. 219-20). Ferguson (2003) finds that governors experience greater 
legislative success when their party controls the legislature than under conditions of 
divided government (p. 171). Even studies of presidential-congressional relations find 
that presidents also receive greater legislative support from their own party members than 
from opposition members (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 90-91; Edwards 1989, p. 40-41).  
A large legislative majority, however, does not ensure legislative success for a 
governor. Conflict between ideological or regional factions within the governor’s 
political party can make it difficult for him to assemble a legislative coalition to support 
his program (Beyle 1983, p. 206; Jewell 1969, p. 81-82; Ransone 1982, p. 168-69). 
Ideological diversity within the president’s party members in Congress can create similar 
coalition-building problems for the president (Edwards 1989, p. 39-40 and 47; Bond and 
Fleisher 1990, p. 91). Empirical studies that examine the influence of this ideological 
diversity on presidential success in Congress can aid our understanding of its contribution 
to gubernatorial success in state legislatures.  
Presidents typically receive support from no more than two-thirds of their party 
members in Congress because members of Congress sometimes defect from their party 
coalitions (Edwards 1989, p. 39-40 and 47; Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 91). Bond and 
Fleisher (1990) have analyzed in detail the effect of ideological diversity within 
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congressional parties on the president’s ability to obtain support for his policies. Within 
each party there is a base faction that includes members whose ideology is relatively 
close to the party’s mainstream views and a cross-pressured faction with an ideology that 
is closer to that of the opposition party (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 83-84). For example, 
most Republican members of Congress are ideologically conservative and they constitute 
the base faction within their party. There is also, however, a relatively small number of 
more liberal Republican members who constitute the cross-pressured faction. Presidents 
usually receive the most support from their party’s base faction and the least from the 
opposition’s base. A president’s partisan base alone, however, usually does not provide 
him with enough votes to ensure success on a roll call vote (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 
93). The additional support required for legislative success may come from either of the 
two cross-pressured factions (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 90-91). Depending on the issue 
under consideration, the president may build a partisan coalition comprised of the base 
and cross-pressured factions within his own party, or an ideological coalition made up of 
his base faction and the cross-pressured faction within the opposition party. The 
formation of a three-faction coalition by the president is unlikely because increased 
support from one cross-pressured faction is likely to result in decreased support from the 
other (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 118). 
The legislative factions that are most important to the president depend on which 
party controls Congress. During periods of unified government, when the president’s 
party is in control of Congress, the president’s probability of legislative success hinges 
largely on his ability to unify his base. If the president’s base is unified in support of an 
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issue, that is if he receives support from at least 75 percent of its members, he is highly 
likely to win a floor vote on an issue, even if the opposition base is unified. If the 
president lacks unified support from his base, however, then he is much less likely to 
experience legislative success (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 113-15).   
During periods of divided government, however, the president cannot rely solely 
on his own party members for support. He must seek votes from the opposition party in 
order to build a majority in support of his proposals. Obtaining support from the 
opposition, however, often requires the president to make concessions that alienate 
members of his own party. In this circumstance, the president’s likelihood of legislative 
success depends mainly on whether he can obtain support from the opposition party. If 
the opposition base is unified against him, then the president is unlikely to be successful 
in a floor vote, even if he has the unified support of his own base faction and one of the 
cross-pressured factions (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 113-15). Morehouse (1996 and 
1998) finds evidence that a governor must sometimes make a similar tradeoff between 
seeking legislative support from the opposition and seeking support from his own party. 
During periods of divided government, governors receive more support from the 
opposition and less from their own party than they receive during periods of unified 
government (Morehouse 1996, p. 379; 1998, p. 219-20). This shift in support indicates 
that concessions made by a governor to obtain support from the opposition can cost him 
support within his own party.  
A governor’s influence over public policy may also be constrained by the 
legislature’s ability to formulate its own policy proposals (Ferguson 2003, p. 164; 
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Rosenthal 1990, p. 39). This legislative policy making ability depends on the resources 
that a legislature has at its disposal, which are commonly measured in terms of time in 
session, legislative salary, and legislative staff (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 88; 
Ferguson 2003, p. 164; Rosenthal 1990, p. 44-46 and 62-63).   
Rosenthal (1990) suggests that highly professionalized legislatures will be more 
influential in legislative-executive bargaining than those that less highly professionalized 
(p. 47). This line of reasoning implies that a governor will receive less support for their 
proposals when working with a legislature that is highly professionalized than when the 
legislature has fewer policy making resources. Empirical analyses find, however, that 
governors of states with more highly professionalized legislatures enjoy greater success 
than those of states with less professionalized legislatures (Dilger, Krause, and Moffett 
1995; p. 562-63; Ferguson 2003, p. 171). 
Finally, the ability of a governor to recommend the legislative program he prefers 
may be constrained by such factors as the resources he has available to promote his 
policies, the budgetary and other governmental resources available to fund and 
implement them, and by state political, economic, and social conditions. Chief executives 
make a number of decisions as they formulate their legislative agendas that may 
influence their probability of legislative success. They must decide on the size of their 
agenda, when to introduce proposals, whether to propose the creation of a new program 
or modification of an existing one, whether the program should have a relatively large or 
small budgetary cost, and whether the program should make large or small changes to 
existing policies (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 31-33; Edwards 1989, p. 201-6; Light 1999, 
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p. 35; Peterson 1990, p. 148-49). Van Assendelft (1997) contends that governors attempt 
to maximize their probability of legislative success when making these decisions (p. 216).  
Because a chief executive’s resources are finite, many scholars argue that he must 
limit his legislative agenda to just a few, high priority issues. Presidential scholars 
contend that by limiting his agenda to a few issues, the president is able to better 
concentrate his efforts and those of his staff toward promotion of those issues within 
Congress. They also suggest that a limited agenda helps the president to ensure that 
Congress is attending to the issues of the most importance to him (Bond and Fleisher 
1990, p. 32; Edwards 1989, p. 201-2; Light 1999, p. 52-53). Empirical evidence to 
support these claims also exists at the state level. Ferguson (2003) finds that a governor’s 
probability of legislative success decreases as the number of items on his agenda 
increases (p. 170).  
Scholars also suggest that the timing of legislative proposals is important. Light 
(1999) describes a “cycle of decreasing influence” that affects the president’s legislative 
success. Light (1999) contends that during his administration, the president experiences a 
decline in important resources, such as political capital, time, and energy. This decline in 
resources leads to diminished legislative influence and success (p. 36-37). Light (1999) 
also describes a “cycle of increasing effectiveness” that counters the “cycle of decreasing 
influence.” Over time the president and his staff gain more knowledge about the 
legislative process and specific policy issues which contributes to an increase in 
legislative success (Light 1999, p. 37-38). Empirical evidence supports the existence of a 
“cycle of decreasing influence” at both the national and state levels. Light (1999) finds 
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that presidential proposals sent to Congress during the president’s first year in office have 
a better chance of passage than those sent later in the term (p. 44-45). In a study of 
executive-legislative relations at the state level, Ferguson (2003) finds governors have 
less legislative success at the end of their terms than at the beginning (p. 170).  
In addition to choosing when to introduce a proposal, a chief executive must 
choose between proposing the creation of a new program or the modification of an 
existing program (Light 1999, p. 109; Peterson 1990, p. 152-53). Each choice has both 
advantages and disadvantages. Formulating a proposal for a new program affords a chief 
executive a greater opportunity to change the direction of public policy, but consumes 
more of his staff member’s time (Light 1999, p. 109 and 123). Modifying an existing 
program may consume fewer staff resources than designing a new program, but an 
existing program frequently has a coalition that benefits from it. If the clientele groups 
view the changes as detrimental to their own interests, then they will most likely resist 
them, leading to a decreased probability of success (Light 1999, p. 109; Peterson 1990, p. 
155).  
A chief executive must also decide whether his proposed alternative will have a 
relatively large or small budgetary cost or make large or small changes to existing 
policies. Proposals that have large budgetary costs or that make large policy changes are 
expected to have a lower probability of legislative success because they are likely to 
receive more resistance than those with small costs or that make small changes (Light 
1999, p. 108-9; Peterson 1990, p. 152-53). 
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Peterson (1990) finds that the legislative outcome of a presidential proposal is 
influenced by these budgetary and programmatic characteristics. Proposals that involve 
both the creation of a new program and either a large budgetary cost or a large policy 
change are most likely to have a legislative outcome that is unfavorable from the 
president’s point of view. The president is more likely to succeed in creating a new 
program if its cost and effect on existing policy are both small. Passage of a proposal to 
modify an existing program frequently requires compromises between the president and 
Congress (Peterson 1990, p. 154). 
According to Peterson (1990), chief executives have limited flexibility when 
developing their legislative proposals. Their choice of policies may be constrained by 
such factors as the prevailing economic conditions or their own partisan affiliation 
(Peterson 1990, p. 149). Chief executives’ policy choices may also be constrained when 
issues, such as natural disasters or other crises, arise suddenly and demand immediate 
attention. The attention required by these transitory policy problems may prevent a chief 
executive from devoting attention to other issues that are important to him (Herzik 1991, 
p. 34-36). 
Studies of gubernatorial agenda setting provide empirical evidence that 
governors’ policy proposals are influenced by state political and economic conditions. A 
governor’s party affiliation is one key determinant of his policy preferences. In separate 
analyses of gubernatorial addresses, both DiLeo (2001) and Coffey (2006) find that 
Democratic governors place more emphasis than Republican governors on redistributive 
policies, which are intended to transfer resources from the wealthy to the poor (Coffey 
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2006, p. 17; DiLeo 2001, p. 57). The findings of these two authors differ with respect to 
developmental policies, which are designed to foster economic growth by improving the 
quality of public infrastructure and services, provide assistance to businesses, reduce 
crime, or provide recreational and cultural amenities. Coffey (2006) finds that Republican 
governors place greater emphasis on developmental policies than Democratic governors, 
whereas DiLeo (2001) finds no significant difference between governors of the two 
parties (Coffey 2006, p. 17; DiLeo 2001, p. 57). 
The policy preferences of a state’s citizens also influence gubernatorial legislative 
proposals. DiLeo (1997) finds that governors of states with strong public support for 
liberal policies place a greater emphasis on redistributive policies than those of states 
where there is little support (p. 105). Coffey (2006) finds that the influence of citizen 
policy preferences varies according to the type of policy and the governor’s party 
affiliation. He finds that Republican governors emphasize redistributive policies more 
heavily in states with a relatively large percentage of liberal citizens than in states with 
relatively few liberal citizens. He finds no effect, however, of citizen liberalism on 
Democratic proposals regarding redistributive policy (Coffey 2006, p. 19-20). In the case 
of developmental policies, he finds that Democratic governors emphasize them less when 
citizen liberalism is high than when it is low. He finds that Republican advocacy of 
developmental policies is unaffected by citizen liberalism (Coffey 2006, p. 19-20).  
A state’s economic conditions also influence the governor’s policy proposals. 
DiLeo (2001) finds that governors in states with high per capita incomes emphasize 
redistributive policies more heavily than those in states with low per capita incomes (p. 
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57). Coffey (2006) finds that Republican governors have a different response to poor 
economic conditions than Democratic governors. Specifically, Republican governors 
place less emphasis on redistributive policies during periods of high unemployment in a 
state than during periods of low unemployment. He finds that Democratic advocacy of 
redistributive policies, however, is unaffected by economic conditions (Coffey 2006, p. 
19-20). 
Partisan balance in the legislature is another important determinant of 
gubernatorial policy recommendations. Coffey (2006) finds that Democratic governors 
place a greater emphasis on redistributive policies when their party holds a large 
percentage of the legislative seats than when they hold relatively few. Republican 
governors increase their emphasis on developmental policy as their party strength 
increases in the legislature (p. 19-20). Van Assendelft (1997) concludes that governors 
are more likely to pursue policies that are strongly opposed by a significant portion of the 
population when their party controls the legislature, but will tend to avoid such 
controversy when their party is in the minority (p. 214). 
Governors and Economic Development Policymaking  
The role of governors in formulating state economic development policies dates 
back to the Depression era (Grady 1989, p. 881). Scholars have analyzed gubernatorial 
influence on state economic development policies using both quantitative methods and 
qualitative case studies. This section summarizes the findings of these studies. 
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Quantitative Analyses of Governors and Economic Development Policy 
There are relatively few quantitative studies concerning governors and economic 
development policymaking. Boeckelman (1996) content analyzes governors’ statements 
with regard to economic development policy and finds that their policy preferences are 
related to their party affiliation. He finds that Republican governors have a greater 
preference than Democratic governors for traditional economic development policies that 
attempt to attract businesses to a state by providing a low-cost business climate. He also 
finds that Democratic governors have a greater preference than Republican governors for 
entrepreneurial policies that are intended to stimulate the creation of new businesses 
within a state (p. 347). Other scholars examine the influence of governors’ institutional 
strength on the number and types of economic development policies that their states 
enact. They find that states with strong governors use a greater number and wider variety 
of economic development policies than states with weak governors (Ambrosius 1989, p. 
63; Elkins, Bingham and Bowen 1996, p. 166).  
Governors and the Initiation of Traditional Economic Development Programs 
Cobb’s (1993) case study of the industrial expansion efforts of Southern states 
from 1936 to 1990 highlights the role of governors at creating a formal role for state 
governments in making economic development policy. In 1936, Mississippi Governor 
Hugh White initiated the first formal state economic development program, which he 
called “Balance Agriculture with Industry” (Grady 1989, p. 881). Governor White argued 
that Mississippi must distinguish itself from other Southern states if it was to be 
successful at industrial recruiting. Not only did the other states have the same abundant, 
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low-cost labor, and access to raw materials as Mississippi, but most were already ahead 
of Mississippi in terms of per-capita manufacturing production (Cobb 1993, p. 11-12). 
White contended that a statewide program to offset mobile firms’ relocation costs by 
providing them with low-cost facilities would help make Mississippi more attractive than 
its neighboring states (Cobb 1993, p. 12).  
Under White’s program, a state commission assisted local governments with 
industrial recruiting and supervised the use of municipal bonds to finance plant facilities 
for the industrial firms that chose to locate in Mississippi communities (Cobb, 1993, p. 
5). Although Southern communities had been providing subsidies to industrial firms as a 
location inducement long before the Depression era, in most cases, local governments 
offering these subsidies were doing so without legal authorization. In some cases, the 
subsidies were provided despite being prohibited by state laws (Cobb 1993, p. 5). 
Governor White’s program was different from earlier industrial promotion efforts in that 
it was the first program to centralize the industrial recruitment effort at the state level 
(Cobb 1993, p. 32-34). 
The industrial promotion efforts initiated by Governor White were widely 
credited for Mississippi’s large growth in manufacturing output during the postwar period 
(Cobb 1993, p. 30-32). Consequently, other Southern states adopted similar industrial 
recruitment policies (Cobb 1993, p. 35-36). By 1962, nine Southern states had enacted 
programs similar to Mississippi’s and by 1968, every Southern state except North 
Carolina had a program for financing the construction of industrial facilities (Cobb 1993, 
p. 36). During this same period, Southern states expanded their use of traditional 
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economic development policies by providing manufacturing firms with tax exemptions, 
free and low-cost land, and other subsidies, further intensifying the interstate competition 
for new industrial development (Cobb 1993, p. 46-56).  
By the early 1960s, several northern states had adopted economic development 
policies similar to those of the Southern states (Cobb 1993, p. 36). Hugh White and other 
Southern governors had ushered in a competitive era in which state governments became 
deeply involved in using tax and financial incentives to promote economic growth (Cobb 
1993, p. 34). Traditional economic development programs continued to proliferate and by 
the early-1980s were used in nearly every state (Saiz 2001b, p. 50). 
Governors and the Emergence of Entrepreneurial Economic Development Policies 
Other case studies analyze the role of governors at initiating entrepreneurial 
economic development policies that attempt to create businesses locally rather than 
recruit them from other locations (Eisinger 1988; Ferguson and Ladd 1988; Fosler 1988; 
Jackson 1988; Landry 1988; Osborne 1988). These case studies find that governors began 
to reconsider the appropriate role of state governments in economic development policy 
in response to major changes in the national and regional economies that occurred in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.   
There were three facets to this economic transformation. First, the productive 
capacity of traditional industries, such as durable goods manufacturing, was growing 
faster than the market for their products. This change led to heightened competition 
within these sectors, which in turn contributed to fiscal stress in states where these 
industries comprised an important part of the economy. Second, American industries 
39 
were subjected to increased global competition. In some sectors, such as the automotive 
industry, foreign firms competed directly with domestic firms for a larger share of the 
American market. In other sectors, such as shoes and textiles, firms that had moved from 
the northeast to Southern states in search of low-wage labor moved overseas in search of 
even lower-wage workers. States with many workers employed in these industries 
experienced economic decline as a result of this competition. Finally, the development of 
new technologies such as those in information processing, robotics, and biotechnology 
stimulated the creation of new industries, which led to economic growth in states where 
these new businesses were located (Fosler 1988, p. 15-17).   
This economic transformation occurred at about the same time that a long series 
of state government reforms culminated in the expansion of gubernatorial policy making 
resources and the removal of many institutional obstacles that had prevented governors 
from effectively exercising their executive authority (Sabato 1983, p. 62 and 88-90). This 
period was also one in which there were major changes in the federal relationship 
between the national and state governments. These changes led to a shift of many policy 
responsibilities from the federal government to the states (O’Toole 1999, p. 23-24; 
Sabato 1983, p. 167-68).  This expansion of state policy making responsibility provided 
governors with opportunities to employ their enhanced executive authority (Sabato 1983, 
p. 180).  
In some states, policymakers argued that the proper response to the ongoing 
transformation of the economy was to intensify efforts to create a lower-cost business 
climate with traditional cost reduction policies (Jackson 1988, p. 113). Other 
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policymakers proposed the creation of new economic development policies that were 
intended to stimulate the creation of new businesses rather than merely attracting 
business firms from other states. Eisinger (1988) and Fosler (1988) argue that governors 
were among the important state policymakers who played a key role in the emergence of 
these entrepreneurial economic development policies (Eisinger 1988, p. 258, 292, and 
304-5; Fosler 1988, p. 319). Case studies specifically identify Governors William 
Milliken of Michigan, Richard Thornburgh of Pennsylvania, Michael Dukakis of 
Massachusetts, and Bruce Babbitt of Arizona as influential advocates for the adoption of 
entrepreneurial economic development policies in their states during the early 1980s 
(Ferguson and Ladd 1988; Jackson 1988; Landry 1988; Osborne 1988). 
Although each governor’s economic development plan was tailored to meet the 
particular needs of his state, the plans shared several common elements that define 
entrepreneurial economic development policies. First, all of the plans were intended to 
foster collaboration between the states’ higher education institutions and the private 
sector. The Centers of Excellence programs initiated by Governors Dukakis and Babbitt 
and the Ben Franklin Partnership developed by Governor Thornburgh all directly 
provided research funding to universities in the three states (Ferguson and Ladd 1988, p. 
76-77; Landry 1988, p. 262-63; Osborne 1988, p. 48-49). Governor Milliken’s program 
established advanced technology research centers in close proximity to Michigan’s major 
research universities, but the level of cooperation between the universities and the 
research centers was often low (Jackson 1988, p. 116). The research grants awarded 
under these programs funded projects to transform university research into new 
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commercial products or to assist firms in developing new production methods (Ferguson 
and Ladd 1988, p. 77; Jackson 1988, p. 115-16; Landry 1988, p. 262-63; Osborne 1988, 
p. 43). The Pennsylvania and Massachusetts programs required the universities receiving 
the grants to also secure financial support from a private sector partner. These 
requirements ensured that the research projects were targeted at private sector needs 
(Ferguson and Ladd 1988, p. 78; Osborne 1988, p. 48-49). 
Second, the economic development programs implemented by these governors 
focused on developing new technologies and industrial sectors, rather than maintaining 
the states’ established industries (Osborne 1988, p. 47-48). Governor Dukakis’ Centers of 
Excellence program specifically targeted the plastics, biotechnology, photovoltaic, and 
marine sciences sectors for development (Ferguson and Ladd 1988, p. 77). Governor 
Babbitt’s program targeted medical research, astronomy, agriculture, and electronics 
(Landry 1988, p. 263). In Michigan, the Milliken program was targeted at robotics and 
biotechnology (Jackson 1988, p. 116).  
Finally, most of these governors’ economic development programs provided 
resources to assist entrepreneurs in starting new businesses. In some cases, the programs 
provided significant financial resources. For example, the Michigan legislature enacted a 
law proposed by Governor Milliken that allowed the state to use up to five percent of the 
money in its pension system to establish several venture capital funds. These funds 
invested in new high-technology firms and were credited with attracting additional 
venture capital funding from private sources (Jackson 1988, p. 116-117). In other cases, 
the programs provided entrepreneurs with other valuable resources, such as low-cost 
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business facilities or entrepreneurial training programs (Ferguson and Ladd 1988, p. 78; 
Osborne 1988, p. 49). 
The entrepreneurial economic development programs initiated by these governors 
redefined the role of state governments in the process of economic development. States 
began to take an active role in stimulating the creation of new businesses rather than 
merely recruiting businesses from other states. Over time, more states enacted 
entrepreneurial economic development policies and by 1993, all fifty states had adopted 
economic development policies with entrepreneurial elements (Saiz 2001b, p. 50). 
Concluding Remarks 
For a modern American governor, the ability to have his proposals enacted by the 
legislature is an important factor in the success of his entire administration. The exact 
configuration of formal and informal powers available to a governor and the constraints 
imposed on his legislative authority vary from one state to another. These powers and 
constraints also vary over time. Governors today have many more resources available to 
them for wielding influence within the legislature than their predecessors had in the years 
immediately following American independence (Beyle 1983, p. 181; Ransone 1982, p. 
122-23; Sabato 1983, p. 3; Schlesinger 1965, p. 213). Even as late as the 1960s and early 
1970s, many governors lacked the authority to match their responsibility (Sanford 1967, 
p. 1-3; Sabato 1983, p. 57). A governor’s resources and constraints may even fluctuate 
during the course of his administration in response to changes in the political, economic, 
and social environments in which he operates. 
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Many of the empirical studies reviewed in this section find that the success of a 
governor in the legislative arena is influenced by several factors. Some of these factors, 
such as the powers granted to governors by their state’s constitution or the partisan 
composition of the legislature, are outside of their direct control. Other factors, such as 
the design of their policy proposals or the times they choose to introduce them, provide 
chief executives with the ability to make choices that influence their chances of 
legislative success. Quantitative analyses and qualitative case studies find that governors 
influence legislation concerning state economic development policy. In the next chapter, 
I outline a theory of how governors make choices when developing legislative proposals 
concerning economic development policy. 
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CHAPTER II 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING GUBERNATORIAL 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROPOSALS 
My theory of gubernatorial policy development is based on rational choice theory 
in which individuals are assumed to be self-interested. In other words, they have personal 
and political goals and choose actions that enable them to achieve those goals. Achieving 
their goals, however, requires individuals to use scarce resources such as time, effort, or 
money. Consequently, a rational actor will seek to be efficient in his goal attainment. He 
will attempt to either minimize the quantity of resources he expends in pursuit of a given 
goal or maximize the benefits he obtains in return for a given expenditure of resources. 
This assumption about efficiency also implies that if the quantity of resources required to 
attain a specific goal increases, then a rational actor will tend to seek less of it (Buchanan 
and Tullock 1962, p. 34; Downs 1957, p. 4-6, 1967, p. 2).  
Formulating the Governor’s Legislative Agenda 
A governor makes many choices when formulating his legislative agenda. First, 
he must choose which policy issues to include on his agenda. After he has placed an issue 
on his legislative agenda he must make several more choices in the course of developing 
one or more policy proposals to address it. Each choice has benefits and costs associated 
with it. In my theory, a governor acts rationally when making these choices by attempting 
to maximize his benefits while minimizing the use of his resources. A governor’s ability 
to make these choices may, however, be constrained by factors outside of his control. For 
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example, when the opposition party controls the legislature, a governor may need to 
accommodate the preferences of that party when preparing his legislative agenda.  
Gubernatorial Goals 
Light (1999) contends that presidents have one of three primary goals in mind 
when making agenda decisions: reelection, historical achievement, or good policy (p. 63). 
Governors have goals similar to those of presidents. For example, they value reelection 
when they are eligible for another term. If they are ineligible for reelection because of 
term limits, then they may seek election to a higher office such as the presidency or an 
appointment to a high-ranking position at the national level such as a cabinet office 
(Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 82; Beyle 2004, p. 227-28; Sabato 1983, p. 45-48 
Schlesinger 1966, p. 33-34). Governors are also motivated by a desire for an historical 
legacy. The enactment of a major gubernatorial policy proposal is an achievement that 
may enable a governor to be remembered favorably by the people of his state far beyond 
the end of his time in office (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 82).  
Governors also seek the enactment of particular policies (Beyle 2004, p. 219). A 
governor may favor certain policies over others because he believes they are needed to 
solve problems facing the state, because they are compatible with his political ideology, 
or because they are favored by members of his political party or the electorate. Once he is 
in office, a governor will be motivated to work for these policies in order to take credit 
for solving problems, because they are compatible with his ideology, or because doing so 
will allow him to fulfill campaign promises and satisfy his electoral supporters.  
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Governors have other goals in addition to those of reelection, historical 
achievement, and developing good public policy. For example, governors are often 
concerned with maintaining public support. Maintaining a high level of public support 
may help a governor to achieve multiple goals. It may contribute to his electoral success 
and may also aid him in achieving a specific policy goal by encouraging his party 
members in the legislature to provide greater support, increasing his chances of success in 
the legislature (Beyle 2004, p. 208-9; Edwards 1989, p. 125). A governor also wishes to 
increase the number of legislative seats that are held by members of his party because 
having a larger partisan faction in the legislature is another way to increase the level of 
support he can expect to receive for his legislative proposals (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 
90-91; Edwards 1989, p. 41; Morehouse 1973, p. 67, 1996, p. 369, 1998, p. 219-20). 
Governors also desire legislative success not only because it is a prerequisite for attaining 
policy goals, but also because it provides a means to build an historical legacy. Governors 
are judged by the media, other politicians, and the public according to their 
accomplishments in the legislature. A governor who has consistently failed in the 
legislative arena may be judged as a failure (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 73-74; 
Rosenthal 1990, p. 40-41). As a result, governors may sometimes be willing to 
compromise on the specific content of a proposal in order to avoid complete legislative 
failure.  
The existence of multiple gubernatorial goals creates the opportunity for goal 
conflict as electoral, historical, and policy goals may sometimes be incompatible with 
each other. For example, Light (1999) suggests that a focus on reelection may interfere 
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with a president’s goal of historical achievement if it causes him to dodge important, but 
controversial, issues. Similarly, pursuing policy goals through proposals calling for 
extensive policy changes may create controversy that hinders his reelection (p. 78). When 
faced with goal conflicts such as these, governors are forced to decide which goals are 
most important.  These decisions require them to make tradeoffs based on the expected 
costs and benefits associated with the pursuit of each goal. 
Selecting Agenda Issues 
A chief executive must limit the number of issues that he places on his legislative 
agenda because the resources he has to promote them within the legislature are finite 
(Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 32; Edwards 1989, p. 201-2; Light 1999, p. 52-53). A 
governor cannot include every possible issue on his legislative agenda. As a result, he 
must have criteria for selecting which issues to include on an agenda. A governor will 
include a particular issue on his legislative agenda only if it meets two conditions. First, 
the governor must expect that including an issue on his legislative agenda will provide 
greater net benefits than would be provided by excluding the issue from the agenda. 
Second, the governor must expect that including the issue on his legislative agenda will 
provide greater net benefits than would be provided by including any other issue that is 
not already on the agenda. Light (1999) contends that policies provide benefits to a chief 
executive to the extent that they aid him in attaining his goals (p. 64). Consequently, for 
an issue to make it onto a governor’s legislative agenda, it must at a minimum provide 
him with an opportunity to achieve one or more of his goals.  
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Placing economic development on his legislative agenda may aid a governor in 
pursuing his electoral goals under certain conditions. Because governors are held 
accountable for the economic performance of their states, unfavorable economic 
conditions in a state can lead to a decrease in a governor’s public approval rating and 
harm his chances of reelection (Atkeson and Partin 1995, p. 104; Hansen 1999, p. 177-
78; Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995, p. 948-49; Partin 1995, p. 88). As a result, a 
governor will be motivated to place economic development on his legislative agenda 
during times when the state is experiencing unsatisfactory economic conditions such as 
high unemployment, declining or stagnant income levels, or low rates of business 
formation. By including economic development as an issue on his legislative agenda, the 
governor can demonstrate his concern about the condition of the state’s economy and 
claim credit for taking action to remedy the adverse conditions.   
Making economic development policy a legislative priority can set the stage for 
later credit claiming that may assist a governor in his pursuit of historical achievement. If 
a governor’s economic development proposals are enacted by the legislature, a 
subsequent decision by a firm to locate in his state will provide him with an opportunity 
to take credit for the benefits of the firm’s decision (Dewar 1998, p. 74). Even in the 
absence of a specific favorable event such as the recruitment of a new firm, enactment of 
the governor’s economic development proposal will provide him with a credit claiming 
opportunity if the enactment is followed by a general improvement in the state’s 
economic conditions.  
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Finally, placing economic development issues on his legislative agenda provides a 
governor with opportunities to pursue specific policy goals. In some cases, a governor’s 
policy goals may be focused on solving important problems in the state (Beyle 2004, p. 
219). For example, some economic development scholars suggest that capital markets in 
some regions of the country provide insufficient venture capital, leading to a low rate of 
business creation and expansion (Barkley, Markley, and Rubin 2001, p. 350; Eisinger 
1988, p. 242). If a governor has identified inadequate venture capital as a problem, then 
he might attempt to rectify the situation by selecting economic development as an issue 
for his legislative agenda and proposing the creation of a state-funded venture capital 
fund.  
In other cases, however, a governor may choose policy goals that serve his 
personal political goals more than the public interest. For example, a governor may desire 
a reduction in business taxes for reasons other than the anticipated effect of a tax 
reduction on the state’s economy. He may propose the tax cut either because it fits his 
political ideology or because it is desired by important members of his electoral coalition. 
By making economic development an agenda issue, a governor can create an opportunity 
to propose his preferred policies. 
Formulating Policy Proposals 
After a governor has placed an issue on his legislative agenda, he must formulate 
one or more policy proposals to address it. A governor’s ideology, experience, or 
knowledge about a policy domain may predispose him to favor certain types of policies 
over others. When formulating policy proposals, however, the governor is often 
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constrained by his political and economic environment. The partisan and ideological 
balance within the legislature and the governor’s support among the public determine the 
general level of legislative support the governor can expect to receive for his proposals. 
The level of support he receives, however, will also depend on the specific policies that 
he proposes and whether legislators and the public view those policies favorably. 
Consequently, a governor may consider the policy preferences of the legislature and the 
public in addition to his own preferences when formulating policy proposals. 
Light (1999) has examined the policy formulation process within the context of 
the presidency. He contends that presidents and their staff members initially evaluate 
presidential proposals according to their potential for congressional passage, which Light 
terms “legislative expense” (Light 1999, p. 110). For example, proposals with large 
budgetary costs, those that call for extensive changes to existing policies, and those that 
create new programs are likely to be controversial. Such proposals are, therefore, likely to 
be more costly in terms of the resources a chief executive must expend to get them 
enacted than proposals for small or inexpensive modifications to existing programs. The 
great legislative expense attached to some policies does not mean, however, that a chief 
executive will necessarily avoid them in favor of those that can be obtained at a lower 
cost. A chief executive must weigh the political costs associated with a proposal against 
the political benefits it provides. If the potential benefits are great, then a chief executive 
will be willing to expend a large quantity of resources to have it enacted (Light 1999, p. 
110-11). The legislative expense associated with a proposal depends, in part, on choices 
made by a chief executive when he is formulating it. 
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When formulating his economic development policy proposals, a governor first 
has to decide whether to propose traditional or entrepreneurial economic development 
policies. Traditional economic development policies attempt to stimulate economic 
growth by lowering the cost of doing business in a state in order to attract mobile 
business establishments that employ many workers (Eisinger 1988, p. 129; Fosler 1992, 
p. 3; Gray and Lowery 1990, p. 4; Isserman 1994, p. 66-72; Leicht and Jenkins 1994, p. 
256; Peretz 1986, p. 624; Tietz 1994, p. 101). These policies reduce the cost of business 
investment or operation by providing specific tax or financial incentives and by 
maintaining generally low business tax rates, relatively lax environmental regulations, 
and business-friendly labor regulations (Brace 2002, p. 164; Eisinger 1988, p. 130; Fosler 
1992, p. 4; Isserman 1994, p. 69; Leicht and Jenkins 1994, p. 257; Saiz 2001a, p. 204; 
Spindler and Forrester 1993, p. 30).  
Entrepreneurial policies are intended to stimulate the creation and expansion of 
local firms, rather than merely attracting businesses from other locations. These policies 
include providing venture capital to aid new businesses, promoting products of local 
firms in foreign markets, and supporting the research and development of technology that 
can be commercialized by local businesses (Brace 2002, p. 164-65; Bradshaw and 
Blakely 1999, p. 229-30; Eisinger 1988, p. 240, 1990, p. 513; Gray and Lowery 1990, p. 
4; Isserman 1994, p. 73-78; Lowery and Gray 1992, p. 484-85; Tietz 1994, p. 102-3).  
A governor is not limited to choosing only traditional or entrepreneurial policies 
when formulating his economic development proposals. In many cases it may be 
advantageous for him to propose a combination of both types of policies since they are 
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supported by different segments of the legislature and the electorate. For this reason, a 
governor may be able to broaden his base of support by including proposals of both types 
on his legislative agenda. In addition, there may be instances when both policy types are 
needed to improve a state’s economic conditions. A governor who believes that solving 
his state’s economic problems requires both recruiting additional firms from other states 
and stimulating the creation of new firms within his state will want to recommend 
policies of both types. 
After a governor has decided whether to propose traditional or entrepreneurial 
economic development policies or policies of both types, he must decide how many 
specific policy changes he will propose. Proposing a large number of policy changes may 
offer a governor more potential benefits than proposing a more limited program. For 
example, if the economic problems facing a state are severe, then a governor may be 
expected to propose an extensive economic development program including many 
different policy changes. If he proposes only a small number of policy changes, he may 
risk being viewed by the public as not taking the state’s problems seriously.  
On the other hand, proposing a long list of policy changes may also increase the 
potential costs to a governor. The space on a legislature’s formal agenda is limited and it 
can only address a limited number of issues (Cobb and Elder 1983, p. 85-89). A 
governor’s resources are also finite and it may be difficult for him to effectively promote 
many different policy proposals simultaneously (Ferguson 2003, p. 161). A governor who 
proposes a large number of policy changes may risk being viewed as a failure if he is 
unsuccessful in having many of them enacted by the legislature. 
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Constraints on Gubernatorial Policy Formulation 
Although governors want to formulate policy proposals that will help them 
achieve their goals, they may face constraints that limit their ability to propose the 
policies they prefer the most. In my theoretical framework, the governor may be 
constrained in formulating policy proposals by the partisan composition of the legislature, 
the policy preferences of the state’s citizens, the state’s available budgetary resources, 
and the pressure to compete with other states for business investment. 
Because a governor can expect to receive less support from the opposition than 
from the legislators in his own party, his choice of policies may be constrained by an 
unfavorable partisan balance within the legislature. The greater the legislative strength of 
the opposition, the more a governor may be required to compromise on his policy 
choices. His need to compromise should be greatest under conditions of divided 
government when the opposition party controls both chambers of the legislature. One 
way in which a governor may compromise with the opposition party is to reduce his own 
policy demands by proposing fewer policies that the opposition is likely to oppose. He 
may also compromise by including among his proposals some policies that are preferred 
by the opposition party. In either case a governor’s choices are constrained because he 
must take the opposition party’s preferences into account.  
A governor’s policy choices may also be constrained by the policy preferences of 
the state’s citizens. Conservative and liberal citizens often prefer different policies. 
Politicians that support policies in accord with prevailing citizen preferences can expect 
more public support than those who propose policies that are contrary to most citizens’ 
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preferences. Consequently, governors whose policy preferences are in conflict with 
citizen preferences are likely to modify their policy proposals to bring them into closer 
accord with public sentiment. A governor who refuses to modify his proposals in this 
way risks legislative failure because most legislators will be reluctant to enact policies 
that have little public support. He also risks a decline in public support that may harm his 
future electoral prospects. 
A state’s budgetary situation may also impose constraints on the governor’s 
policy choices. Many policies require the expenditure of state funds during their 
implementation. During times of fiscal stress, when a state’s revenues are stagnant or 
declining, there may be insufficient funds available to fund all of the policies that a 
governor might prefer. Consequently, a governor may recommend fewer policy changes 
when state revenues are growing slowly than when the state is enjoying rapid revenue 
growth.   
A governor may also be constrained by the need to compete with other states for 
business investments. This competition may compel him to propose policies that are 
similar to those enacted in other states. A governor is likely to emulate other states’ 
policies when formulating his own policy proposals for three reasons. First, governors 
may use emulation as a decision making shortcut to simplify complex decisions. When 
searching for new policies, a governor may choose to propose policies that have been 
adopted in other states, rather than starting from scratch (Walker 1969, p. 889). This 
procedure reduces the cost of designing a new program.  
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Second, a governor may propose policies similar to those of other states as a 
means of avoiding blame for poor economic performance in his own state (Spindler and 
Forrester 1994, p. 41-42). Citizens use information that they have about other states’ 
policies as a benchmark to measure the performance of their elected officials (Breton 
1991, p. 40; Kenyon 1997, p. 14; Walker 1969, p. 890). If the economic performance of 
another state exceeds that of a governor’s own state and the other state has enacted 
policies that the governor’s state lacks, then these policies may be perceived by voters as 
the reason for the other state’s superior economic performance. If the governor has 
ignored these policies when formulating his economic development proposals, then he 
may be blamed for his state’s poor economic performance. As a result, governors are 
likely to adopt policies similar to those of states that voters are likely to use as a 
benchmark in evaluating the governor’s performance. 
Finally, public officials want to avoid blame for losing a competition with other 
states when a business firm is choosing a location for a major new facility. States that are 
not selected are viewed as losers even though they are no worse off economically than 
before the competition. When a state loses a plant location competition, its elected 
officials may be blamed for failure if the winning state had an economic policy that the 
losing state lacked. Consequently, a governor may copy the policies of states that he 
views as competitors to avoid being blamed for having the wrong policies in place (Noto 
1991, p. 254). 
56 
Hypotheses 
My theoretical framework allows me to generate a number of testable hypotheses 
regarding the formulation of gubernatorial legislative proposals with respect to economic 
development policy. In my theory, governors’ policy goals provide a starting point for 
developing their legislative proposals. Their own policy preferences determine the type 
and extent of policy changes that they desire, but they recognize that the state’s economic 
conditions, legislature, and voters often impose constraints on their ability to achieve the 
full extent of their policy goals. As a result of these constraints, they will often be willing 
to reduce their own policy demands or accommodate the preferences of other political 
actors in order to achieve at least a portion of their own policy goals. Governors, 
however, will not always be willing to compromise on policy goals. In some cases, they 
may decide that they can exploit their personal or institutional powers to overcome the 
constraints imposed on them.  
Placing Economic Development on the Governor’s Legislative Agenda 
A governor’s first decision with regard to economic development policy is 
whether to include it on his legislative agenda. He may sometimes choose not to propose 
any economic development policies because other policy issues have a higher priority. A 
governor has limited time and staff resources to devote to promoting issues within the 
legislature. The legislature must limit the number of issues that are addressed within a 
given legislative session because legislative resources are also limited. These limitations 
on agenda size mean that every issue placed on a governor’s legislative agenda has an 
opportunity cost in terms of the legislative and gubernatorial resources that are diverted 
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away from issues that are left off the agenda. A governor can make efficient use of his 
resources by focusing on issues that are salient among the voters. Paying attention to 
these issues not only increases his probability of electoral success, but may also aid him 
in achieving his policy goals because legislators also place a high priority on issues which 
are important to a large number of voters (Beyle 2004, p. 219; Cobb and Elder 1983, p. 
85-89; Light 1999, p. 53-55; Walker 1977, p. 424-26). 
A state’s economic performance is a salient issue in the public’s evaluation of the 
governor. Howell and Vanderleeuw (1990) find that voters who hold a favorable opinion 
of the state’s economy are more likely to approve of the governor’s job performance (p. 
163-64). Similarly, Hansen (1999) finds that governors of states experiencing high 
unemployment have higher disapproval ratings than governors of states with low 
unemployment (p. 177-78). A state’s economic performance also affects the governor’s 
electoral prospects because voters are less likely to vote for an incumbent governor if the 
state is experiencing poor economic conditions (Atkeson and Partin 1995, p. 104; Niemi, 
Stanley, and Vogel 1995, p. 949; Partin 1995, p. 88).  
Because voters hold a governor accountable for the state’s economic 
performance, the benefits of addressing economic development issues are likely to 
outweigh their costs during times of economic distress. If the governor fails to make 
proposals to improve the state’s economy when it is performing poorly, then voters might 
blame him for the poor economic conditions. Low approval ratings resulting from poor 
economic conditions may not only hurt the governor’s electoral prospects, but may also 
reduce the support he receives in the legislature for his legislative proposals. When the 
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state is in a good economic condition, on the other hand, a governor may gain more 
benefits by spending his time and other resources on other policy areas such as education, 
crime, or health care. In this situation, a governor will be likely to devote his attention 
and other resources to policy areas other than economic development policy. This 
discussion of the relationship between economic conditions and gubernatorial 
policymaking leads to my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A governor will be more likely to include economic development 
proposals on his legislative agenda when the economic conditions in a state are 
poor, than when conditions are good. 
After a governor has decided to include economic development as an issue on his 
legislative agenda, he must decide whether to propose many economic development 
policy changes or only a few. A governor who proposes three economic development 
policies is devoting more space on his legislative agenda to economic development than 
one who makes only a single proposal. Enacting each legislative proposal will require the 
expenditure of a portion of the governor’s limited legislative resources. By 
recommending multiple policy proposals addressing a single issue, a governor is 
committing a relatively large portion of his legislative resources to that issue. This 
commitment of resources to a single issue emphasizes the importance a governor places 
on this issue relative to others he could be addressing.  
It may not always be advantageous for a governor to make multiple proposals that 
address a single issue because promoting each proposal requires an expenditure of 
gubernatorial resources. Because gubernatorial resources are finite, each proposal that 
addresses a particular issue has an opportunity cost in resources that are no longer 
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available to promote proposals addressing other problems. The opportunity costs of 
including an additional economic development proposal on a governor’s agenda will be 
less when a state is experiencing economic distress than when conditions are more 
favorable. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: A governor will include a greater number of economic 
development proposals on his legislative agenda when economic conditions in a 
state are poor, than when conditions are good. 
Once a governor has made his initial decision about whether to include economic 
development as an issue on his legislative agenda and decided how much agenda space to 
devote to it, he must decide what types of economic development programs to propose. 
Although his initial agenda decisions are guided by the economic conditions in his state, 
his choices regarding policy types are guided by other factors.  
A Governor’s Economic Development Policy Preferences 
After a governor has decided to include economic development as an issue on his 
legislative agenda, he must decide on his policy orientation. Will he propose traditional 
economic development policies, entrepreneurial policies, or policies of both types? A 
governor’s preferences are likely to be related to his party affiliation. Boeckelman (1996) 
finds that Republican governors are more likely to advocate traditional economic 
development policies than Democratic governors because these policies provide aid to 
existing businesses, which are often important Republican supporters. He also finds that 
Democratic governors have a greater preference for entrepreneurial policies than 
Republican governors because Democrats are more comfortable with the direct 
government intervention in the economy required by these policies (p. 347). Beamer 
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(1999) finds that economic development policy preferences of state legislators follow the 
same party-related pattern (p. 82-83). Even if a governor’s personal preferences deviate 
from the prevailing policy preferences within his party, he is still likely to recommend 
policies that conform to the preferences of other members of his political party. 
Disregarding the preferences of his fellow party members is likely to cost a governor the 
support of legislators and electoral supporters within his party. This discussion of party-
related policy preferences leads to my next two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Republican governors will be more likely to include traditional 
economic development proposals on their legislative agendas than Democratic 
governors. 
Hypothesis 4: Democratic governors will be more likely to include 
entrepreneurial economic development proposals on their legislative agendas than 
Republican governors. 
After a governor has decided to recommend a particular type of economic 
development policy, he must decide how many proposals of that type to recommend. 
Because Republican governors are likely to have a greater preference for traditional 
economic development policies than Democratic governors, I expect that they will 
propose a greater number of traditional policies than Democratic governors. I expect 
Democratic governors, on the other hand, to recommend a greater number of 
entrepreneurial economic development policies than Republican governors. 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 5: Republican governors will include a greater number of traditional 
economic development proposals on their legislative agendas than Democratic 
governors. 
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Hypothesis 6: Democratic governors will include a greater number of 
entrepreneurial economic development proposals on their legislative agendas than 
Republican governors.  
Although a governor’s party affiliation may determine his economic development 
policy preferences, his choices about the specific proposals to include in his legislative 
program may be constrained by the economic, political, and social environments in which 
he operates. These constraints on gubernatorial policy choices are discussed next.   
Constraints on Gubernatorial Policy Choices 
Many economic development policies, such as the creation of a state-funded 
venture capital fund, require the appropriation of funds to implement a program. Other 
economic development policies, such as the creation of a new business tax incentive, are 
paid for by means of tax expenditures, which are reductions in future tax revenues. 
Consequently, a state’s financial condition may impose constraints on a governor’s 
economic development policy choices. When a state’s revenues are flat or decreasing, the 
governor may propose relatively few new economic development policies. The need to 
minimize cuts to existing programs may make it difficult to justify appropriating funds 
for a new program or reducing future revenues by creating new tax credits or deductions. 
When a state’s revenues are growing, on the other hand, a governor may have sufficient 
revenues available to fund both existing and new programs. In this situation, a governor 
will likely find it much easier to justify proposals that create or expand economic 
development programs. This discussion of the effect of budget constraints leads to my 
next hypothesis: 
62 
Hypothesis 7: Governors will include a greater number of economic development 
proposals on their legislative agendas when state revenues are increasing, than 
when revenues are flat or decreasing. 
When formulating his economic development proposals, a governor may be 
constrained by the policy preferences of the state’s citizens. One measure of citizen 
preferences is state citizen ideology. Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) find that states 
in which more citizens are liberal tend to have policies that are more liberal (p. 89). This 
relationship between citizen ideology and state policies occurs for two reasons. First, 
important policymakers, such as the governor, are drawn from the population at large, so 
that states with many liberal citizens are likely to produce liberal policymakers (Erikson, 
Wright, and McIver 1993, p. 119). Second, citizens are unlikely to support politicians that 
favor policies that are contrary their preferences. As a result, even conservative 
politicians will be motivated to support liberal policies if a large portion of the electorate 
is liberal because they want to avoid losing the next election (Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver 1993, p. 138).  
Conservatives and liberals are likely to prefer different types of economic 
development policies. Traditional economic development policies are more acceptable to 
conservatives than entrepreneurial policies because they involve a different type of 
government intervention in the economy. Traditional policies focus on reducing business 
costs by easing tax and regulatory burdens and leave responsibility for most business 
investment and location decisions to the private sector (Eisinger 1988, p. 78).  
Entrepreneurial policies, on the other hand, require state governments to assume a larger 
role in identifying investment opportunities and making business investment decisions 
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(Eisinger 1988, p. 9). Consequently, these policies are likely to be more attractive to 
liberals than conservatives. Variation in citizen ideology across states will lead to 
differences in public support for particular economic development policies. I expect that 
governors will respond to these public preferences when formulating their legislative 
agendas. Specifically:  
Hypothesis 8: Governors of states with low levels of citizen liberalism will 
include a greater number of traditional economic development proposals on their 
legislative agendas than governors of states with high levels of citizen liberalism. 
Hypothesis 9: Governors of states with high levels of citizen liberalism will 
include a greater number of entrepreneurial economic development proposals on 
their legislative agendas than governors of states with low levels of citizen 
liberalism. 
Longstanding traditions within a state about what constitutes proper governmental 
action may constrain a governor’s choices when formulating policy proposals. Elazar 
(1984) refers to these traditions as a state’s political culture (p. 114-15). The general 
political culture of the United States is based on two contrasting conceptions of the 
American political order. The first conception is of the political order as a marketplace in 
which public policies are a product of bargaining among individuals and groups acting in 
self-interest. The second conception is one in which public policies are viewed as the 
result of cooperation by citizens trying to create and maintain a government to implement 
widely shared principles (Elazar 1984, p. 112-15). One of the primary distinctions 
between the political cultures of individual states is the extent to which they emphasize 
these two conceptions of politics. 
Elazar (1984) identifies three state political cultures within the United States: 
individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic (p. 115). Individualistic political cultures 
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emphasize the conception of politics as a marketplace over the conception of politics as a 
commonwealth. Because individual economic opportunity, rather than the common good, 
is of central importance in individualistic cultures, government intervention in the 
economy is limited to the minimum level of intervention required to maintain its proper 
working order (Elazar 1984, p. 115). 
Moralistic political cultures, on the other hand, emphasize the conception of 
politics as a means to promote the public good over the conception of politics as a 
marketplace. Because politics is viewed as a way to advance widely shared public 
interests, rather than more narrow private interests, there is a greater acceptance within 
moralistic cultures of government intervention in the economy (Elazar 1984, p. 117). 
In traditionalistic political cultures, there is not a clear preference for either 
conception of politics. For example, there is less focus on promoting widespread 
individual economic opportunity in traditionalistic than in individualistic states. These 
states also focus less on promoting the wider public good than the moralistic states. In 
traditionalistic states, what is in the public good is determined from the viewpoint of 
established political elites and politics is viewed as a means of preserving the existing 
social order.  Consequently, government intervention will tend to be limited to policies 
that preserve the power of those at the top of the social order (Elazar 1984, p. 118-19). 
These differences across political cultures lead two scholars to suggest that a 
state’s political culture will influence the type of economic development policies favored 
by its political leaders (Hanson 1991, p. 64; Boeckelman 1991, p. 50). They suggest that 
traditional policies will receive more support within individualistic and traditionalistic 
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political cultures than within moralistic cultures (Hanson 1991, p. 65-66; Boeckelman 
1991, p. 51-52). Entrepreneurial policies, on the other hand, will be more widely 
supported within moralistic political cultures than within individualistic or traditionalistic 
cultures (Hanson 1991, p. 64-65; Boeckelman 1991, p. 51). This discussion of differences 
in political cultures leads to my next two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 10: Governors of states with individualistic or traditionalistic political 
cultures will include a greater number of traditional economic development 
proposals on their legislative agendas than governors of states with moralistic 
political cultures. 
Hypothesis 11: Governors of states with moralistic political cultures will include a 
greater number of entrepreneurial economic development proposals on their 
legislative agendas than governors of states with individualistic or traditionalistic 
political cultures. 
Because governors need action by the legislature to enact their proposals into law, 
their policy choices may be constrained by the partisan balance within the legislature. 
Legislators have electoral and policy goals of their own and a governor’s legislative 
success often depends on the number of legislative seats held by members of his party. A 
governor can expect greater support for his proposals as the size of his partisan faction in 
the legislature increases, because his party members are likely to share his policy 
preferences and are also motivated to see him succeed (Beyle 2004, p. 221; Bond and 
Fleisher 1990, p. 90-91 and 113-15; Edwards 1989, p. 40-41; Morehouse 1973, p. 67, 
1998, p. 219-20; Rosenthal 1990, p. 55).  
A governor’s prospects for legislative success are likely to be the greatest when 
his party members control the legislature. During unified government, not only does the 
governor’s party hold a majority of the seats in each legislative chamber, but his party 
66 
members also hold the most important leadership positions, such as the presiding office 
of each chamber and the chairs of key committees. As a result, policies preferred by the 
governor and his party are likely to be well received within the legislature and will 
require relatively little lobbying effort by the governor and his staff to get them enacted. 
For these reasons, I expect that a governor will recommend a greater number of economic 
development policies of the type preferred by his party members when his party controls 
the legislature. This discussion of unified government suggests two additional 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 12: A Republican governor will include a greater number of 
traditional economic development proposals on his legislative agenda during 
periods of unified government than during periods of divided government. 
Hypothesis 13: A Democratic governor will include a greater number of 
entrepreneurial economic development proposals on his legislative agenda during 
periods of unified government than during periods of divided government. 
During divided government, however, a governor can expect a lower level of 
legislative success. Legislators of the opposition party are unlikely to share a governor’s 
policy preferences and they probably will not be particularly motivated to see him 
succeed. When the opposition party controls the legislature, then proposals to implement 
policies preferred by the governor and his party will receive relatively little support and 
will require a greater lobbying effort by the governor. As a result, a governor may need to 
accommodate opposition party members by including in his recommendations one or 
more policy proposals that are compatible with the policy preferences of the legislative 
majority (Morehouse 1996, p. 362, 1998, p. 220). For example, a Democratic governor 
who proposes creating a state-funded venture capital fund may also propose expanding an 
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existing traditional economic development program as a way to obtain support from 
Republican legislators. By including policies of both types, a governor broadens the 
appeal of his entire economic development program. This discussion of divided 
government leads to two more hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 14: A Republican governor will include a greater number of 
entrepreneurial economic development proposals on his legislative agenda during 
periods of divided government than during periods of unified government. 
Hypothesis 15: A Democratic governor will include a greater number of 
traditional economic development proposals on his legislative agenda during 
periods of divided government than during periods of unified government. 
In my first fifteen hypotheses, the factors influencing gubernatorial economic 
development policy proposals have all been associated with the political, economic, and 
social environments of a governor’s own state. It is also possible, however, that 
gubernatorial policy proposals may be influenced by characteristics of the broader 
political, economic, and social environments that include other states. 
Effects of Policy Diffusion and Interstate Competition on Policy Choices 
State policy diffusion models assume that policy decisions of individual states are 
based, in part, on the policies enacted in other states (Berry and Berry 1999, p. 171). 
There are three reasons that policy diffusion may lead a governor to emulate other states’ 
policies when formulating his own policy proposals.  First, a governor may copy another 
state’s policies to avoid the need to design a program from scratch (Walker 1969, p. 889). 
Second, he may emulate another state’s policies to avoid being blamed if his state’s 
economic performance lags that of the other state (Breton 1991, p. 40; Kenyon 1997, p. 
14; Spindler and Forrester 1993, p. 41-42; and Walker 1969, p. 890). Third, a governor 
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may copy the policies of states that he views as his state’s competitors for attracting 
mobile business firms. Copying these states’ policies will help him to avoid blame in the 
event that a major business firm locates in one of the competing states (Noto 1991, p. 
254).  
Several researchers contend that interjurisdictional competition between states is a 
major cause of the diffusion of economic development policies from one state to another 
(Brace 2002, p. 173-74; Feiock 1989, p. 269; Grady 1987, p. 91-92; Peretz 1986, p. 625, 
630; Saiz 2001a, p. 209-10; Spindler and Forrester 1993, p. 32). Interjurisdictional 
competition is likely to occur in countries with a large number of separate jurisdictions 
possessing both fiscal responsibility and policy autonomy, which is precisely the situation 
that exists in the American federal system (Boyne 1996, p. 718-19).  At the local level, 
one prominent theory holds that communities compete with each other by adjusting their 
mix of public services and their tax levels in an attempt to attract new residents (Tiebout 
1956, p. 419-420). Kenyon (1997) observes that states engage in a similar type of 
competition as they adjust their economic development policies in an attempt to attract 
and retain business firms (p. 14).  
States enact traditional economic development policies to create lower-cost 
business climates. Traditional policies are intended to ease the tax or regulatory burdens 
on businesses, provide direct financial assistance in the form of loans or financial 
subsidies, or subsidize other business expenses, such as those for worker training 
(Eisinger 1988, p. 130). Proponents of traditional policies contend that by lowering the 
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cost of doing business in a state, these policies will make the state an attractive location 
for businesses seeking to expand or relocate their facilities (Lynch 2004, p. 4 and 11).  
States with low-cost business climates are already in a good position to compete 
for businesses seeking a low-cost operating environment. Enacting traditional policies to 
further lower the cost of doing business is likely to provide relatively few benefits for 
these states. In high-cost states, on the other hand, enacting traditional economic 
development policies may greatly improve their ability to compete for these businesses. 
This discussion suggests that a governor will consider his state’s current business climate 
when making decisions about traditional economic development proposals and it leads to 
the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 16: Governors of states with high-cost business climates will include a 
greater number of traditional economic development policies on their legislative 
agendas than governors of states with low-cost business climates. 
Interjursidictional competition may also contribute to the diffusion of 
entrepreneurial economic development policies. Entrepreneurial policies provide 
resources that foster the creation or expansion of local firms. These resources include 
venture capital to aid the formation of new businesses, export marketing assistance to 
help businesses sell their products in the international market, and research and 
development of new technology that can be commercialized by local firms or that will 
assist them in adopting more efficient production methods (Eisinger 1988, p. 240).  
Entrepreneurial resources are frequently provided by private firms, rather than 
state governments. For example, there are private investors who specialize in lending 
venture capital to entrepreneurs who wish to start a new business and many business 
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firms conduct their own export marketing or engage in their own research and 
development activities. Entrepreneurial resources, however, are not distributed equally 
among all states. For example, venture capital investment tends to be concentrated in the 
more densely populated metropolitan areas, rather than in more sparsely populated rural 
areas (Barkley, Markley, and Rubin 2001, p. 350).  
States that already have an abundance of entrepreneurial resources, whether they 
are provided by private markets or by the state, may have relatively little to gain by 
enacting policies that provide additional entrepreneurial resources. States in which these 
resources are scarce, however, may stand to gain more from enacting these policies. 
Consequently, governors of these states may be motivated to propose policies to provide 
more of these resources so that they can catch up with other states. Therefore, my 
seventeenth hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 17: Governors of states with few entrepreneurial resources will 
include a greater number of entrepreneurial economic development policies on 
their legislative agendas than governors of states with abundant entrepreneurial 
resources. 
When comparing his own state’s business climate and entrepreneurial resources to 
those of other states, a governor may pay particular attention to states that share a border 
with his state. There are three reasons that a governor might undertake this strategy. First, 
firm location decisions are not determined solely by a state’s economic development 
policies. Other important factors include the cost and availability of labor and raw 
materials and adequate access to transportation facilities. The first stage of a location 
decision is the identification of the region of the country that provides the best access to 
these other factors (Eisinger 1988, p. 202). Once a region is selected, a firm begins 
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narrowing the selection to a short list of the most promising locations within the region 
(Eisinger 1988, p. 203). As a result of this process, neighboring states are likely to be 
direct competitors for business firms seeking a new location. Second, there is empirical 
evidence that citizens use neighboring states as benchmarks in evaluating governors with 
respect to both tax policy and their state’s economic performance (Besley and Case 1995, 
p. 36 and Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995, p. 949). Finally, elected officials are likely to 
be more aware of policy decisions made in neighboring states than in other regions. 
Television and newspaper coverage areas often span state boundaries and a single station 
or newspaper will often report on politics and public policy in two adjoining states. This 
dual coverage will cause elected officials in one state to be aware of the policies in effect 
in adjoining states. This discussion leads to two hypotheses related to the influence of 
neighboring states’ business climates and entrepreneurial resources: 
Hypothesis 18: Governors of states with higher-cost business climates than their 
neighboring states will include a greater number of traditional economic 
development policies on their legislative agendas than governors of states with 
lower-cost business climates. 
Hypothesis 19: Governors of states with fewer entrepreneurial resources than their 
neighboring states will include a greater number of entrepreneurial economic 
development policies on their legislative agendas than governors of states with 
more entrepreneurial resources. 
In an earlier discussion in this chapter, I suggested that a governor may sometimes 
need to modify his proposals to make them more compatible with the policy preferences 
of other political actors, such as legislators or voters. In some situations, however, a 
governor may be able to overcome these political constraints without accommodating the 
preferences of others by exploiting his institutional or personal powers. 
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Overcoming Political Constraints by Using Gubernatorial Powers 
Earlier, I hypothesized that a governor would modify his policy proposals during 
periods of divided government. I suggested that he might make his legislative program 
more acceptable to the opposition party by including policies that are favored by 
members of the majority party. When the opposition holds a majority of only a few seats, 
however, the governor may have another strategy available that will enable him to enact 
his preferred policies without accommodating the preferences of the opposition party.  
A governor’s institutional powers such as his ability to make appointments, veto 
legislation, and influence the budget provide him with resources that can be used to 
reward legislators who support him and punish those who oppose him. Although these 
powers may not provide him with enough political capital to change a large number of 
votes, they may allow him to persuade a few legislators to change their votes. If the 
number of seats held by the opposition is only slightly greater than the number held by 
the governor’s party, then a governor may need to change only a few opposition votes in 
order to build a majority coalition in support of his proposals. In this situation, rather than 
accommodating the policy preferences of the opposition party, the governor can propose 
policies that are favored by his own party members and then use his institutional powers 
to convince a few opposition members to vote in favor of his proposals. Because the 
institutional powers of governors vary across states, some governors will have more 
resources available to use this strategy than others. Therefore:   
Hypothesis 20: During periods of divided government when there is a small 
difference in the number of seats held by the majority and minority parties, 
Republican governors with strong institutional powers will include a greater 
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number of traditional economic development policies on their legislative agendas 
than Republican governors with weak institutional powers. 
Hypothesis 21: During periods of divided government when there is a small 
difference in the number of seats held by the majority and minority parties, 
Democratic governors with strong institutional powers will include a greater 
number of entrepreneurial economic development policies on their legislative 
agendas than Democratic governors with weak institutional powers. 
I do not expect that this strategy is likely to be successful when a governor must 
change a large number of opposition votes to build a majority coalition. First, a 
governor’s bargaining resources are finite, which limits the number of political deals he 
can make with individual legislators. Second, conflicting demands made by legislators 
may make it difficult for a governor to make a large number of these political bargains. 
For example, a governor may promise to support a piece of legislation favored by a 
particular legislator in return for the legislator’s support for the governor’s proposal. 
Another legislator, however, may ask the governor to oppose the same piece of 
legislation in return for his support of the governor’s proposal. Because the governor 
cannot honor both requests, the earlier agreement prevents the governor from 
successfully negotiating the later agreement. The more agreements a governor has 
already negotiated, the more likely he is to run into conflicts of this sort when trying to 
negotiate additional agreements. For these reasons, I do not expect governors to attempt 
this strategy when the opposition party holds a large majority: 
Hypothesis 22: During periods of divided government when there is a large 
difference in the number of seats held by the majority and minority parties, the 
strength of Republican governors’ institutional powers will have no effect on the 
number of traditional economic development policies they include on their 
legislative agendas. 
74 
Hypothesis 23: During periods of divided government when there is a large 
difference in the number of seats held by the majority and minority parties, the 
strength of Democratic governors’ institutional powers will have no effect on the 
number of entrepreneurial economic development policies they include on their 
legislative agendas. 
A governor’s personal powers, such as a claim to an electoral mandate, may 
provide him with additional resources for overcoming political constraints. Scholars have 
suggested that both presidents and governors enjoy a honeymoon period during their first 
year in office in which they can expect greater legislative and popular support for their 
proposals (Ferguson 2003, p. 160-61; Light 1999, p. 45). A chief executive can expect to 
receive even greater support for his proposals during this period if the conditions of his 
election allow him to claim a mandate (Edwards 1989, p. 147).  
Winning an election by a large margin lends credibility to a chief executive’s 
claim of an electoral mandate. A large electoral victory by itself, however, may be 
insufficient to allow an executive to claim a mandate. A chief executive’s ability to 
credibly claim a mandate is enhanced if his victory is accompanied by additional 
conditions such as the defeat of an incumbent, a large increase in the number of 
legislative seats held by his party or a shift in control of one or both legislative chambers 
from the opposition to his own party (Edwards 1989, p. 150-61). Consequently, a 
recently elected governor who meets several of these conditions has a greater ability to 
claim an electoral mandate than one who meets few or none of these conditions.  
During the legislative session immediately following a gubernatorial election, 
governors who have a significant ability to claim a mandate possess more political capital 
and personal power than those who have little ability. This additional political capital 
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provides governors with additional resources for overcoming legislative resistance to 
their proposals. I expect that being able to claim a mandate will allow a governor to 
propose a larger number of his preferred policies than he could without a mandate. This 
discussion of the factors contributing to a governor’s ability to claim an electoral mandate 
leads to two more hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 24: Recently elected Republican governors will include a greater 
number of traditional economic development policies on their legislative agendas 
if they have a significant ability to claim an electoral mandate than if they possess 
little ability to claim a mandate. 
Hypothesis 25: Recently elected Democratic governors will include a greater 
number of entrepreneurial economic development policies on their legislative 
agendas if they have a significant ability to claim an electoral mandate than if they 
possess little ability to claim a mandate. 
The beneficial effects of an electoral mandate are unlikely to extend beyond a 
governor’s first year in office. A high public approval rating is another potential source of 
political capital and one that may be available to a governor throughout his 
administration. A chief executive’s public approval rating provides legislators with a way 
to estimate the public’s acceptance of the chief executive’s policy proposals (Edwards 
1989, p. 106-7). When a governor enjoys a high public approval rating, even legislators 
of the opposition party may be reluctant to oppose his policy proposals if they fear that 
voters will punish them during the next election. Furthermore, offers by a popular 
governor to campaign on behalf of those who help him are more valuable than offers of 
campaign support by an unpopular governor. Similarly, a threat to withhold campaign 
support from an uncooperative legislator, or even to campaign against him, carries little 
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weight when made by an unpopular governor. As a result, I expect that popular governors 
will propose more of their own preferred policies than unpopular governors. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 26: Republican governors with high public approval ratings will 
include a greater number of traditional economic development policies on their 
legislative agendas than Republican governors with low public approval. 
Hypothesis 27: Democratic governors with high public approval ratings will 
include a greater number of entrepreneurial economic development policies on 
their legislative agendas than Democratic governors with low public approval. 
The hypotheses discussed in this chapter will be analyzed beginning in Chapter 
IV. The next chapter explains the procedures that I used to collect my data concerning 
gubernatorial economic development proposals to test these hypotheses. Chapter III also 
discusses the differences between traditional and entrepreneurial economic development 
policies.  
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CHAPTER III 
CONTENT ANALYZING GUBERNATORIAL ADDRESSES 
To test my hypotheses, I require data about governors’ legislative agendas with 
regard to economic development policy. Herzik (1991) identifies three types of data 
sources that scholars have used to analyze governors’ legislative agendas: surveys of 
governors regarding their policy concerns at particular points in their administrations, 
gubernatorial campaign literature and speeches, and governors’ state of the state and 
other major legislative addresses (p. 29-30).  
Herzik (1991) suggests that campaign literature is an inadequate data source 
because it may focus on policy issues that appeal the most to voters rather than on the 
issues that a governor believes are the most important once he takes office (p. 30). Herzik 
contends that state of the state addresses are the best source of data concerning 
governors’ legislative agendas because they come at the start of a legislative session and 
contain specific policy proposals (p. 30). Bernick and Wiggins (1991) agree that state of 
the state addresses are a better source of data than campaign literature. They observe that 
gubernatorial candidates may address a long list of policy issues during their campaign, 
but then narrow their focus to a handful of the most important issues facing their state 
once they take office (p. 75).  
Even if a governor’s campaign literature and speeches provide accurate 
information about his agenda at the beginning of his term, changing conditions in the 
state could cause his policy priorities to change in subsequent years. State of the state 
addresses, on the other hand, are delivered annually in most states. Governors use these 
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addresses to announce to the media, the public, and the legislature the policies that they 
intend to pursue during the upcoming legislative session. Because governors have only a 
limited amount of time in which to deliver their addresses, they will usually focus on the 
issues and proposals that are the most important to them (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 
75; Ferguson 2003, p. 166-67; Herzik 1991, p. 30; Rosenthal 1990, p. 7 and 26). I obtain 
data for my study from governors’ annual addresses so that I can observe changes in their 
priorities over time.    
Data Collection 
The data for my dissertation was collected by content analyzing state of the state 
and other major legislative addresses delivered by governors of all fifty states during the 
period from 1997 to 2006. I read and analyzed 462 gubernatorial addresses for this study. 
I was not able to analyze addresses for the governors of all fifty states in every year of my 
study because governors of some states did not deliver a major legislative address in 
some of the years. For example, the state legislatures of Arkansas, Montana, Nevada, 
North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas meet biennially in odd numbered years. Consequently, 
the governors of these states do not deliver legislative addresses in even numbered years. 
The North Carolina legislature meets annually, but in even numbered years the session is 
held mid-year from May to July (Council of State Governments 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). I did not find any addresses delivered by North Carolina 
governors at the beginning of these mid-year sessions. In 2001, the Kentucky legislature 
switched from holding biennial sessions in even numbered years to annual sessions. 
Therefore, there were no addresses by the governor of Kentucky in 1997 or 1999. 
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Another instance in which there was no gubernatorial address to the legislature occurred 
in Minnesota in 2000. In this case, Reform Party Governor Jesse Ventura simply chose 
not to deliver a state of the state address (Ragsdale 2000, p. 2B).  
Whenever possible, I gathered data concerning governors’ economic development 
policies by analyzing their state of the state addresses. In some situations, governors did 
not deliver state of the state addresses in particular years, but delivered other major 
legislative addresses in which they outlined their legislative agendas. In many of these 
cases, the governor’s major legislative address was a budget address rather than a state of 
the state address. For example, in Pennsylvania the governor’s address at the beginning 
of the legislative session is commonly referred to as the budget address, even though 
Pennsylvania governors discuss issues other than budget appropriations in these 
addresses. In Connecticut, which practices biennial budgeting, the governor’s address to 
open the legislative session is referred to as the budget address during budget years and 
the state of the state address during other years. 
Some newly elected governors did not deliver a state of the state or budget 
address during their inaugural year. In these cases, I analyzed their inaugural addresses. 
There were two other cases in which I analyzed an address other than the governor’s state 
of the state address. In Louisiana it is common for the governor to call a special session 
of the legislature prior to the regular session.1 In 2002 and 2004, Louisiana governors 
called special sessions to deal with economic development policy. I considered their 
                                                 
1
 During the period from 1997 to 2006, there are only three years (1997, 1999, and 2003) in which the 
governor of Louisiana did not call a special session of the legislature prior to the regular session (See 
Louisiana Legislature Session Information at http://www.legis.state.la.us/ session.htm).  
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addresses to open these special sessions to be more comprehensive statements of each 
governor’s economic development agenda than their state of the state addresses.  
I obtained the text of gubernatorial addresses from many sources. Three types of 
official state websites provided a relatively large number of addresses. First, governors 
maintain official web sites that often contain the text of their major legislative addresses.  
I used these websites to obtain those addresses delivered by governors who were still 
serving in office at the time of my study. Second, a few states maintain online archives of 
speeches and other documents from former governors’ administrations, which provided 
additional sources for acquiring gubernatorial addresses. Third, most state legislatures 
print the text of gubernatorial addresses to the legislature in their legislative proceedings, 
which allowed me to obtain the text of some addresses from online legislative archives.  
I also obtained the text of gubernatorial addresses from online archives 
maintained by non-governmental organizations. A large number of the addresses 
delivered in the years from 2000 forward were obtained from an archive maintained by 
Stateline.org, a web site operated by the Pew Charitable Trust that provides news and 
information about state politics and policy.2 Because major daily newspapers frequently 
print the text of governors’ state of the state addresses, I was able to obtain the text of 
other gubernatorial addresses by searching newspaper archives in the LexisNexis 
database. The Internet Archive, a nonprofit organization that was founded to build an 
Internet library, maintains a searchable archive of website content dating back to the mid-
                                                 
2
 The web address of the gubernatorial speech archive is http://www.stateline.org/live/resources/ 
State+Speeches. 
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1990s.3 I was able to locate the text of addresses delivered by several governors who are 
no longer in office by searching this archive. Finally, I contacted state archives, libraries, 
and historical societies to obtain those addresses that were unavailable from online 
sources.  
Identifying and Classifying Gubernatorial Economic Development Proposals 
Governors propose many different types of policies in their legislative addresses. 
My first step at analyzing gubernatorial addresses was to identify those policy proposals 
that were related to economic development. It is common for governors to justify their 
policy proposals by suggesting that they will have a beneficial effect on their state’s 
economy. In fact, a governor can argue that almost any public policy will have at least an 
indirect effect on the economic activity within a state (Fisher and Peters 1998, p. 31-32).  
Instead of adopting a broad definition of economic development policy based on 
gubernatorial rhetoric, I adopt a narrower definition that combines the definitions 
provided by Fisher and Peters (1998) and Eisinger (1988). Fisher and Peters (1998) 
define economic development policies as those that are primarily intended to promote job 
creation and economic growth. If a policy could plausibly have some other primary 
purpose, then it is not an economic development policy (Fisher and Peters 1988, p. 32). 
Eisinger (1988) defines economic development policy as an effort by government to 
encourage new business investment in a particular location (p. 3-4). A new business 
investment is expected to increase the number of jobs in the area, leading to reductions in 
unemployment and increases in personal income (Eisinger 1988, p. 34-35). Eisinger 
                                                 
3
 The archive search page is located at http://www.archive.org/web/web.php. 
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(1988) further observes that this localized business investment and job growth can occur 
in three different ways: when new business firms are established, when existing firms 
expand, or when firms move into a state from another location (p. 34-35). I combine 
Fisher and Peter’s (1998) and Eisinger’s (1988) definitions to develop my criteria for 
identifying gubernatorial economic development policies. I define a governor’s policy 
proposal as an economic development policy if it is primarily intended to influence the 
investment and location decisions made by business firms or entrepreneurs. 
My definition excludes some types of policy proposals even though they may 
reasonably be expected to improve the state’s economy. I exclude them because their 
primary purpose is something other than influencing business investment and location 
decisions. For example, governors often claim that their education or transportation 
policy recommendations will improve the state’s economic conditions. Although 
improving the quality of a state’s educational services or transportation infrastructure 
may indeed be beneficial to a state’s economy, there are other valid objectives for these 
proposals that are unrelated to economic development. Improvements in education can be 
justified on equity grounds and transportation improvements can be justified on safety 
grounds. Because these policies have primary purposes other than influencing business 
investment and location decisions, they do not have an explicit economic development 
objective according to my definition and are, therefore, excluded from my analysis.   
I also excluded gubernatorial proposals that could be implemented without any 
action by the legislature. For example, governors sometimes enact policies by using their 
authority to issue executive orders or by instructing a cabinet member to take a particular 
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action. Because my study focuses on the formal legislative process, I exclude these types 
of unilateral gubernatorial proposals from my analysis.  
In some cases, governors recommended several different economic development 
policies as a single proposal. In these situations, I had to decide whether to count their 
recommendations as one proposal or several. I made this decision according to whether 
the individual policies were inseparable. In some cases, the individual elements of a 
governor’s proposal must all be enacted in order to achieve his objective and allow him 
to claim legislative success. For example, in 2005, Republican Governor Robert Taft of 
Ohio proposed reforming his state’s business taxes by broadening the base of taxable 
activity while reducing both marginal rates and the overall level of taxation on the state’s 
businesses (Taft 2005). The individual elements of this proposal are inseparable because 
it is unlikely that he would claim success if the legislature broadened the base without 
reducing rates, because that action would increase, rather than decrease the level of 
taxation on businesses. A proposal such as this one would, therefore, be classified as a 
single proposal.  
In other cases, the individual elements of a governor’s proposal are separable and 
enacting only a portion of them would provide the governor with partial legislative 
success, rather than failure. For example, in 2004, Republican Governor Haley Barbour 
of Mississippi presented a package of tort reform proposals that included caps on punitive 
damage awards, restrictions on venue selection, and changes to joint and several liability 
rules (Barbour 2004). Because the enactment of even one of these policies would advance 
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his tort reform agenda, I determined the policies to be inseparable and classified them as 
separate economic development proposals. 
After I identified a governor’s economic development proposals, I classified each 
one into one of two categories: traditional policies that are intended to attract mobile 
businesses from other locations by reducing business costs, or entrepreneurial policies 
that provide resources intended to stimulate the creation and expansion of local business 
firms. The next sections describe the criteria that I used to classify gubernatorial 
economic development policies. 
Traditional Economic Development Policies 
Traditional economic development policies attempt to influence business location 
and investment decisions and thereby stimulate economic growth by lowering the cost of 
doing business in a state. Proponents of traditional policies contend that lowering 
business costs will attract mobile business establishments that employ many workers to a 
state and discourage existing firms from leaving the state (Eisinger 1988, p. 129; Fosler 
1992, p. 3; Gray and Lowery 1990, p. 4; Isserman 1994, p. 66-72; Leicht and Jenkins 
1994, p. 256; Lynch 2004, p. 3-4; Peretz 1986, p. 624; Tietz 1994, p. 101). Traditional 
economic development policies rely on four methods to reduce the cost of business 
investment or operation: maintaining low levels of taxation on businesses and business 
owners, maintaining business-friendly environmental and labor regulations, providing 
businesses with financial subsidies, and providing businesses with non-financial subsidies 
(Brace 2002, p. 164; Eisinger 1988, p. 130; Fosler 1992, p. 4; Isserman 1994, p. 69; 
Leicht and Jenkins 1994, p. 257; Saiz 2001a, p. 204; Spindler and Forrester 1993, p. 30). 
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I classified a gubernatorial economic development proposal in the traditional category if 
it used one of these four methods to reduce business costs. I also classified proposals in 
the traditional category if they contained inseparable elements using two or more of these 
methods into one policy proposal. Thus, my classification scheme includes five 
subcategories of traditional economic development policies: tax policies, regulatory 
reform policies, financial subsidies, non-financial subsidies, and mixed or unspecified 
incentives. I describe the policies within each subcategory more fully in the subsections 
below to illustrate the types of policy proposals that are included in the traditional 
category. 
Tax Policies 
Traditional economic development tax policies include proposals to create or 
expand specific tax incentives, to create or expand competitive tax code provisions, and 
to cut tax rates. Specific tax incentives include such policies as local property tax 
abatements, investment tax credits, employment tax credits, and research and 
development tax credits. These incentives reduce the tax liability of firms that comply 
with certain requirements regarding hiring or investment decisions (Fisher 2007, p. 58).  
Competitive tax code provisions are features of the tax code that apply to all 
businesses but do not impose any investment or hiring requirements on them. These 
provisions typically reduce firms’ tax liability by reducing the taxable base of economic 
activity rather than by reducing tax rates and they include favorable income 
apportionment rules, exemptions of certain business property from property taxation, and 
exemption of utilities or other business inputs from sales taxation (Fisher 2007, p. 58). 
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Cuts in corporate income tax, franchise tax, and gross receipts tax rates have a 
clear economic development rationale, as these taxes are levied directly on businesses. 
Similarly, cuts in workers’ compensation fees and unemployment insurance taxes are also 
intended to stimulate economic growth (Eisinger 1988, p. 168). Governors sometimes 
argue that these rates must be lowered to remain competitive with other states (Keating 
1998; Underwood 1999).  
In some cases, politicians extend the economic development rationale to cuts in 
taxes that are not necessarily levied on business firms, such as personal income taxes, 
estate taxes, or taxes on capital gains (Fisher 2007, p. 58). They argue that high marginal 
rates on these taxes discourage entrepreneurs and high-income individuals from locating 
within a state. This rationale is also used by governors when recommending cuts in taxes 
that are levied on both business firms and individuals, such as property taxes or sales 
taxes.  
Not all proposals for cuts in personal income, property, or sales taxes, however, 
are based on an economic development rationale. For example, income tax cuts targeted 
at low-income individuals, property tax cuts for homeowners or the elderly, and 
exemptions of groceries from sales taxation are justified by concerns other than economic 
development. 
Finally, governors sometimes frame their proposals for economic development 
tax cuts in ways that fail to make clear exactly what taxes they propose to cut or how they 
propose to cut them. For example, governors sometimes propose unspecified tax relief for 
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broad sectors, such as manufacturing, or they will call on the legislature to enact some 
package of business tax cuts without providing details within the text of their addresses.  
Regulatory Reform Policies 
Traditional regulatory economic development policies are intended to reduce the 
cost of operating a business in a state by reducing the regulatory burden on business firms 
(Eisinger 1988, p. 165-172). These policies include both broad-based proposals to lessen 
the regulatory burden on all businesses and more narrowly defined proposals that are 
targeted at particular industry sectors.  
Broad-based regulatory reform proposals include policies that ease environmental 
and labor regulations and tort reform proposals that limit business firms’ exposure to 
liability lawsuits. Governors also make general proposals to reduce the regulatory burden 
imposed on businesses without indicating which specific types of regulations they wish to 
change.  
Regulatory proposals targeted at particular industry sectors include proposals to 
deregulate the electric utility or telecommunications industries, proposals to lower the 
regulatory burden imposed on insurance companies, and the elimination of restrictions on 
certain types of medical research.  
Financial Subsidies 
Financial subsidies include grants, loans, loan guarantees, and loan subsidies that 
states extend to an existing business firm that locates or expands within the state. These 
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policies are intended to lower the cost of acquiring land, facilities, or equipment for these 
business firms (Fisher and Peters 1998, p. 40).  
Non-financial Subsidies 
Non-financial subsidies lower firms’ operating costs by providing them with 
goods or services. Customized training programs, which are often operated by a state’s 
community colleges, are a commonly provided non-financial subsidy. These programs 
are intended to lower the workforce preparation costs of a firm that is opening a new 
facility or expanding an existing one (Fisher and Peters 1998, p. 40). Industrial parks and 
“spec” building programs are used to provide relocating or expanding business firms with 
free or reduced-cost land and buildings. These programs not only reduce the cost of 
facilities for a relocating business firm, but also allow a firm to begin production sooner 
by providing buildings or building locations with access to necessary utilities and 
transportation infrastructure (Eisinger 1988, p. 177-79).  
Unspecified and Mixed Traditional Incentives 
Finally, governors sometimes develop vague proposals to lower business 
operation costs, enhance their incentive offerings, or increase their states’ recruitment 
efforts without describing the specific policies that would be used to accomplish these 
objectives. Governors also sometimes propose the creation or expansion of enterprise 
zone programs, which include a combination of tax incentives, financial subsidies, and 
other economic development policies. When a governor made one of these types of 
89 
unspecific or mixed proposals, I classified it as a traditional economic development 
proposal.  
Entrepreneurial Economic Development Policies 
Entrepreneurial economic development policies are intended to stimulate 
economic growth by encouraging the creation and expansion of local firms, rather than 
merely inducing mobile firms to locate in a state. Consequently, entrepreneurial policies 
require state governments to take a more active role in business investment decisions than 
is required by traditional economic development policies. Traditional policies attempt to 
induce private investors who have already identified a business opportunity to locate 
within a particular state to pursue that opportunity. Entrepreneurial policies, on the other 
hand, require state governments to identify business opportunities and to provide 
resources to develop those opportunities, rather than relying strictly on private investors 
(Eisinger 1988, p. 228-29). Entrepreneurial economic development policies provide three 
types of resources for developing business opportunities: resources to stimulate the 
creation of new businesses, resources to assist existing businesses to expand the market 
for their products, and resources to enhance business productivity and innovation. I 
classified a gubernatorial economic development proposal as an entrepreneurial policy if 
it provided one of these three types of resources to stimulate business creation or 
expansion. Thus, my classification scheme includes three subcategories of 
entrepreneurial economic development policies: business creation policies, market 
expansion policies, and productivity and innovation policies. I describe the policies 
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within each of these subcategories more fully in the subsections below to illustrate the 
types of policy proposals that are included in the entrepreneurial category. 
Business Creation Policies 
Business creation policies are intended to enhance the ability of entrepreneurs to 
start a business. State-run venture capital programs assist new businesses by providing 
financial resources to entrepreneurs during the early stages of a new business (Eisinger 
1988, p. 245-6). Business incubators assist new business firms by providing them with 
low-cost office space and secretarial services instead of capital financing.  
Market Expansion Policies 
Market expansion policies provide resources to assist business firms in selling 
their products or services to customers in other states or overseas (Eisinger 1988, p. 293-
5). Some state export promotion programs conduct seminars, provide consulting services, 
and produce handbooks to advise business firms about how to export their products 
(Eisinger 1988, p. 302-303). Other programs provide financing to businesses to help 
cover the costs associated with initiating export activities (Eisinger 1988, p. 302-304). 
These programs can be particularly beneficial for small businesses that may lack the 
knowledge or financial capability to enter the export market on their own (Eisinger 1988, 
p. 297). Tourism promotion and agricultural marketing programs are other examples of 
market expansion policies.  
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Productivity and Innovation Enhancement Policies 
Productivity enhancement policies provide resources to help a state’s business 
firms adopt new production technology and processes in order to increase their 
productivity and be able to better compete in the global economy. Innovation 
enhancement policies are intended to foster the development and commercialization of 
new products that can be produced and marketed by firms within a state.  
A state’s research universities frequently play important roles in productivity and 
innovation enhancement programs. First, university research develops technology that 
can lead to the creation of new products and companies. Second, universities attract and 
produce the high-skilled workers that are required by technologically advanced 
companies (State Science and Technology Institute [SSIT] 2006, p. 12).  
A variety of policies may be categorized as productivity and innovation programs. 
Some policies simply provide a university with funds needed to enhance its capacity for 
conducting research within a particular field, such as biotechnology, information 
technology, or advanced manufacturing processes. These funds may be used to hire 
faculty, purchase research equipment, or construct new research facilities. Other policies 
encourage universities to seek additional research funding from other sources such as the 
federal government by providing matching grants. All of these programs attempt to 
identify and promote university research with the potential to be developed into 
commercial products and to create partnerships with private-sector organizations to 
develop and market the products (SSIT 2006, p. 14-15, 18-19, 21-22, and 24-25). 
Manufacturing extension programs attempt to increase productivity by providing 
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manufacturing firms with technical services to assist them in converting to new 
production methods (Jarmin 1999, p. 101). 
Other programs attempt to stimulate productivity and innovation by expanding 
broadband Internet access throughout a state. These programs are intended to make a 
state more attractive to knowledge workers, enable telecommuting, and make a state a 
more attractive location for IT-using firms (Gillett, Lehr, Osorio, and Sirbu 2006, p. 7).  
Data Summary 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of all the economic development policies proposed 
by governors from 1997 through 2006. Over this period, governors included 1,219 
economic development proposals in their state of the state or other major legislative 
addresses. Of these proposals, 826 concerned traditional economic development policies. 
The remaining 393 proposals concerned entrepreneurial policies.  
Policies in the tax and regulatory reform subcategories accounted for almost four-
fifths of all traditional economic development proposals. Over 59 percent of all 
traditional proposals were tax policies, with regulatory reforms at a distant second at 20 
percent. Policies in each of the other three subcategories, unspecified and mixed policies, 
non-financial subsidies, and financial subsidies, accounted for less than 10 percent of 
traditional proposals.  
Productivity and innovation policies were the most common entrepreneurial 
policies recommended, comprising almost two-thirds of all entrepreneurial proposals. 
Business creation and market expansion policies each accounted for less than 20 percent 
of all entrepreneurial proposals. 
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Table 3.1: Number and Percentage of Gubernatorial Economic Development 
Proposals by Category and Subcategory, 1997-2006 
Traditional Policies Entrepreneurial Policies 
Subcategory f Percent Subcategory f Percent 
Tax  488  (59%) Productivity and 
Innovation 
253  (64%) 
Regulatory Reform 162  (20%) Business Creation 76  (19%) 
Unspecified and 
Mixed 
73  (9%) Market Expansion 64  (16%) 
Non-financial 
Subsidies 
70  (8%)   
Financial Subsidies 33 (4%)   
Total 826  (100%) Total 393  (100%) 
Note: Individual percentages may not total to 100 due to rounding. 
Figure 3.1 presents the distribution of gubernatorial economic development 
proposals across governors’ legislative addresses. The data illustrated in the histogram 
indicates that interest in economic development policy was widespread among American 
governors during the study period. More than three-quarters of legislative addresses 
analyzed for this study included at least one economic development proposal.  
Although a few governors made a dozen or more proposals in a single speech, 
most governors made relatively few economic development proposals. Approximately 58 
percent of the legislative addresses included two or fewer economic development 
proposals. About 80 percent contained fewer than five proposals. 
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Figure 3.1: Frequency Distribution of Economic Development Proposals, 1997-2006 
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Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 present the frequency distributions of traditional and 
entrepreneurial economic development proposals, respectively. Traditional policies 
appear to have the more widespread support among governors than entrepreneurial 
policies. Almost two-thirds of all legislative addresses I analyzed included at least one 
traditional policy proposal, whereas less than 42 percent of addresses included any 
entrepreneurial proposals. The two figures also demonstrate that when economic 
development policy is on their legislative agendas, it is common for governors to make 
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multiple proposals of one type. An examination of Figure 3.2 reveals that governors 
proposed two or more traditional policies in 192 addresses, which is more than 53 percent 
of the addresses that contained at least one traditional proposal. Figure 3.3 illustrates that 
they proposed two or more entrepreneurial policies in 100 addresses, which is 52 percent 
of the addresses containing any entrepreneurial policies. 
Figure 3.2: Frequency Distribution of Traditional Economic Development 
Proposals, 1997-2006 
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Figure 3.3: Frequency Distribution of Entrepreneurial Economic Development 
Proposals, 1997-2006 
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Figure 3.4 displays the mean number of economic development proposals per 
legislative address for each year in my study. The figure presents a separate line graph for 
traditional, entrepreneurial, and both types of proposals combined. The results for both 
types of economic development policies combined reveals that the emphasis that 
governors place on economic development in their legislative addresses varies over time. 
Specifically, the mean number of economic development policies recommended by 
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governors to their legislatures from 1997 to 2006 was fairly constant at approximately 2.5 
proposals per address. There was a noticeable dip in the mean number of proposals in 
2002, which was the first year after the end of the recession which lasted from March to 
November 2001.4 In 2003, the mean number of economic development proposals 
returned to its pre-recession level of approximately 2.5 proposals per address. From 2004 
to 2006, the average was steady at approximately 3.2 proposals per address. 
Figure 3.4: Mean Number of Economic Development Proposals per Legislative 
Address by Category and Year, 1997-2006. 
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4
 The National Bureau of Economic Research lists the beginning and ending dates of business cycle 
expansions and contractions at http:// www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
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Figure 3.4 also reveals that traditional and entrepreneurial economic development 
proposals have followed different trends. During the period under study, there has been a 
general increase in the average number of entrepreneurial policy proposals over time. 
From 1997 to 2001, the average number of entrepreneurial proposals per legislative 
address increased from 0.5 to 0.9 proposals per address. After entrepreneurial policies 
declined to 0.7 proposals per address in 2002, the upward trend resumed. In 2006, the 
average number of entrepreneurial policies had risen to approximately 1.0 proposal per 
address, or about twice the 1997 average.  
Traditional policies, on the other hand, have exhibited two separate trends. Over 
the period from 1997 to 2000, the average number of traditional proposals per address 
declined from about 2.0 to about 1.0 proposal per address. However, from 2002 to 2006, 
the number of traditional proposals increased to approximately 2.2 proposals per 
legislative address. 
Overall, the results in Figure 3.4 demonstrate that during the last few years of the 
economic expansion that ended in 2001, there was little change in the collective emphasis 
that governors placed on economic development policy in their legislative agendas. 
During this period, however, their specific policy preferences seemed to be shifting from 
traditional to entrepreneurial economic development policies. During the 2002 legislative 
sessions which followed the 2001 recession, governors decreased their emphasis on 
economic development policy. This decrease was reflected in a decline in both traditional 
and entrepreneurial policy proposals. I could argue, however, that the decline in 
traditional policies was the continuation of a pre-existing trend. I am surprised by the 
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reduced emphasis by governors on economic development policy at that time, because I 
would have expected them to view the effect of the recent recession as a problem 
requiring an increased attention toward economic policy. As the economic recovery 
continued however, they resumed their earlier level of emphasis on economic 
development policy. By 2004, governors had reached a new steady-state in which they 
placed even more emphasis on economic development policy than they had in the late 
1990s. 
Summary 
In this chapter, I described my procedures for collecting data regarding the 
economic development policies that governors recommend to their legislatures. I also 
summarized the data that I collected and I briefly analyzed changes over time in the 
numbers and types of economic development policies that governors propose while in 
office. 
In Chapter IV, I will begin analyzing my data to test the hypotheses that I 
presented in Chapter II. Specifically, I will examine the influence of state economic 
conditions, budget resources, gubernatorial party affiliation, partisan legislative control, 
citizen ideology, state political culture, business climates, and state entrepreneurial 
resources on the number and types of economic development policies that governors 
propose to state legislatures.  
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CHAPTER IV 
A MODEL OF GUBERNATORIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
POLICYMAKING 
In Chapter II, I outlined my theory of gubernatorial economic development 
policymaking and stated a number of testable hypotheses derived from that theory. In this 
chapter, I estimate four models of gubernatorial economic development policymaking in 
order to test the first nineteen hypotheses. These hypotheses relate to the influence of 
state economic conditions, budget resources, gubernatorial party affiliation, partisan 
legislative control, citizen ideology, state political culture, business climates, and state 
entrepreneurial resources on governors’ economic development policy decisions.  
Dependent Variables 
My four models each have a different dependent variable. These dependent 
variables are derived from the data about governors’ economic development proposals 
that I collected using the procedures described in Chapter III. The first model predicts 
whether a governor includes one or more traditional economic development policies in 
each legislative address. The dependent variable in this model is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if a governor proposed at least one traditional economic development 
policy in his legislative address and a value of zero if he proposed none. The second 
model predicts whether a governor includes one or more entrepreneurial economic 
development policies in each legislative address. This model’s dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if a governor proposed at least one 
entrepreneurial economic development policy in his legislative address and a value of 
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zero if he proposed none. I estimate these models using logistic regression because it is 
the standard way to estimate models with binary dependent variables (Gelman and Hill 
2007, p. 79). 
The third model predicts the number of traditional proposals that governors 
include in each legislative address. The dependent variable in this model is the number of 
traditional economic development policies that a governor proposed in each legislative 
address. The fourth model predicts the number of entrepreneurial proposals included in 
each gubernatorial address. This model’s dependent variable is the number of 
entrepreneurial economic development policies that a governor proposed in each 
legislative address. Because the dependent variables of these two models are count 
variables, I estimate these models using a method appropriate for count data. Ordinary 
least squares regression, although commonly used for analyzing count data, is an 
inappropriate method because it may produce biased coefficients and may predict 
negative event counts, which are nonsensical (King 1988, p. 845-46). Quantitative 
methods that are appropriate for analyzing count data include Poisson and negative 
binomial regression. The primary practical difference between Poisson and negative 
binomial regression is that Poisson regression assumes that the variance of the dependent 
variable is equal to its mean. Negative binomial regression, on the other hand, assumes 
that the variance of the dependent variable is greater than the mean (King 1998, p. 51). In 
other words, the dependent variable is overdispersed. If Poisson regression is used to 
analyze overdispersed data, then the coefficients will be unbiased. The standard errors, 
however, will tend to be too small, overstating the statistical significance of the 
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coefficients (King 1988, p. 840). Because the dependent variables for my third and fourth 
models are overdispersed, I use negative binomial regression to estimate these models. 
Summary statistics for all dependent and independent variables used in my analyses are 
presented in the appendix (see Table A.1). 
Independent Variables 
Each model contains independent variables measuring each state’s economic 
conditions, budget resources, gubernatorial party affiliation, partisan legislative control, 
citizen ideology, state political culture, business climate, and entrepreneurial resources. 
These variables and the sources of the data used to create them are discussed below. 
State Economic Conditions 
There are numerous indicators that measure a state’s economic conditions. The 
need for parsimony prohibits including all of them in my statistical models. Because my 
study is concerned with the effect of state economic conditions on gubernatorial 
economic development proposals, I selected indicators based on the types of economic 
measures that governors mentioned in their legislative addresses when they were 
discussing their states’ economies. While analyzing gubernatorial addresses, I classified 
the economic indicators that governors mentioned in each address into several different 
categories. I then determined how many gubernatorial addresses mentioned economic 
indicators in each category. This information is presented in Table 4.1.   
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Table 4.1: Number and Percentage of Gubernatorial Addresses Mentioning State 
Economic Indicators by Category, 1997-2006 
Category f Percentage a 
Jobs or Employment 309 67% 
Business Creation or Investment 135 29% 
Income or Wages 130 28% 
Business Climate 102 22% 
State Credit Rating 59 13% 
Poverty 19 4% 
a
 Percentages are based on a total of 462 gubernatorial addresses. 
The state economic indicators mentioned in the largest number of addresses were 
those measuring jobs or employment, such as aggregate employment levels and 
unemployment rates. Of the 462 gubernatorial addresses analyzed for this study, 
governors mentioned a job or employment-related indicator in 309, or just over two-
thirds of them. Economic indicators measuring business creation or investment and 
income or wages were the next two most frequently mentioned types of indicators. 
Business creation and investment measures mentioned by governors included the dollar 
value of new business investment and the number of new employers in a state. Income 
and wage indicators included measures such as per capita income and average 
manufacturing wage.  
Economic indicators must often be compared to benchmarks to determine whether 
they represent favorable or unfavorable economic performance. When governors discuss 
economic indicators, they use two types of benchmarks for comparison. In some cases, 
governors compare their states’ performance to that of other states. For example, a 
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governor would compare his state’s unemployment rate to the national unemployment 
rate or to the unemployment rates of other states within the same region. In other cases, 
governors use their own states’ prior economic conditions as benchmarks, such as 
pointing out that real per capita income in a state has increased since the beginning of the 
governor’s administration. 
I create independent variables based on economic indicators within each of the 
three categories mentioned most often by governors in their legislative addresses: jobs or 
employment, business creation or investment, and income or wages.  I develop two 
variables within each of the three categories: one that compares a given state’s 
performance to a benchmark based on the concurrent performance of the nation as a 
whole and one that compares the state’s performance to a benchmark based on the state’s 
own performance one year earlier. Although many states have agencies that gather 
economic data, I create my economic performance variables using data gathered by 
federal agencies to minimize differences in collection and measurement methods across 
states.  
Unemployment Rates 
I use state unemployment rates to develop variables measuring state economic 
conditions related to employment. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports monthly and 
annual unemployment rates for each state and for the entire nation. I use monthly 
unemployment rates, rather than annual rates, to create my variables because the monthly 
rates provide a better indication of a state’s economic condition at the time its governor 
delivers his legislative address.  
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Most gubernatorial addresses are delivered shortly after the beginning of a 
calendar year. For this reason, I use the seasonally adjusted, monthly unemployment rates 
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for each state and the nation in December of 
the previous year5 as measures of the economic condition of each state and the nation at 
the time of each governor’s legislative address. I derive two measures of economic 
conditions from these unemployment rates: the relative unemployment rate, which 
compares a state’s economic performance to a national benchmark, and the annual 
change in unemployment rate, which compares a state’s economic performance to a 
benchmark based on the state’s prior economic performance.  
A state’s relative unemployment rate is the value obtained by subtracting the 
national unemployment rate from the state’s unemployment rate reported during the same 
month. The annual change in a state’s unemployment rate is the value obtained by 
subtracting the unemployment rate of the twelfth prior month from the state’s monthly 
unemployment rate. Positive values indicate unfavorable economic conditions for both of 
these variables. 
Business Creation Rates  
I use state firm creation rates to develop variables measuring state economic 
conditions related to business creation and investment. I obtained data regarding annual 
firm creation rates from reports published by the Small Business Administration (1997, 
1999, 2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005, 2006). A state’s firm creation rate is the number 
of new firms created during a year divided by the number of existing firms at the 
                                                 
5
 In most cases, the December report announced the November unemployment rate. 
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beginning of the year. I convert the rate to a percentage and use this value as a measure of 
the rate of business creation in a state at the time of the governor’s legislative address. I 
derive two measures of economic conditions from this firm creation rate: the relative firm 
creation rate, which compares a state’s economic performance to a national benchmark, 
and the annual change in firm creation rate, which compares a state’s economic 
performance to a benchmark based on the state’s prior economic performance.  
A state’s relative firm creation rate is the value obtained by subtracting the 
arithmetic average of all fifty states’ firm creation rates from the state’s firm creation 
rate. The annual change in a state’s firm creation rate is the value obtained by subtracting 
the state’s firm creation rate from the state’s firm creation rate for the prior year. Positive 
values indicate favorable economic conditions for both of these variables. 
Average Wages 
I use the average wage per job, as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis6 
(BEA) for each state, to develop variables measuring state economic conditions related to 
income and wages. The BEA computes a state’s average wage per job by dividing its 
annual wage and salary disbursements by its total wage and salary employment in the 
same year. I use the average wage per job because this measure includes only wages and 
salaries earned through employment and excludes non-employment income, such as 
transfer payments and investment income, which are included in broader income 
measures, such as per capita personal income.  
                                                 
6
 These data may be downloaded from the BEA’s Local Personal Income website at 
http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/default.cfm?catable=CA34&section=2.  
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I use the average annual wage reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) for the previous year as a measure of the average wage in a state at the time of the 
governor’s legislative address. Because the BEA reports average wages in nominal 
dollars, I adjusted these average wages to real average wages reported in 2006 dollars. I 
derive two measures of economic conditions from this average wage data: the relative 
average wage, which compares a state’s economic performance to a national benchmark, 
and the annual change in real average wage, which compares a state’s economic 
performance to a benchmark based on the state’s prior economic performance.  
A state’s relative average wage is the percentage by which a state’s average wage 
exceeds or falls short of the arithmetic average of all fifty states’ real average wages. In 
other words, if the real average wage in a state is 110 percent of the national average, 
then that state’s relative average wage is 10 percent. If the real average wage in a state is 
95 percent of the national average, then that state’s relative average wage is -5 percent. 
The annual change in a state’s real average wage is the percentage change in real average 
wage since the prior year. Positive values indicate favorable economic conditions for 
both of these variables. 
State Budget Resources 
I measure each state’s budget resources using information obtained from the 
Fiscal Survey of the States, which is prepared by the National Association of State 
Budget Officers (NASBO) in association with the National Governors Association 
(NGA). This report is issued annually and contains data concerning each state’s general 
fund revenues for the previous, current, and upcoming fiscal years. The report also 
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contains information about tax cuts, tax increases, and other revenue changes proposed 
by the governor of each state. 
I use data obtained from these surveys (NASBO/NGA 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) to calculate the projected percentage change in 
available general fund revenues for each state in each year. The surveys report the 
projected general fund revenue for the current fiscal year, including any revenue 
transferred into the general fund from other funds. I estimated the projected general fund 
revenues available for the coming fiscal year by subtracting the governor’s proposed tax 
and revenue changes from the total projected general fund revenues. Because these 
figures are reported in nominal dollars, I adjust these revenue amounts to figures reported 
in 2006 dollars. I then compute the projected percentage change in available general fund 
revenues.  
Gubernatorial Party Affiliation and State Legislative Control 
I obtain information concerning the party affiliation of each governor in my 
dataset from the gubernatorial data contained within the Book of the States (Council of 
State Governments [CSG] 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). I included 
this information in my dataset by coding two variables indicating each governor’s party 
affiliation at the time of each legislative address. The first variable has a value of one if 
the governor was a Republican and zero if he was not. The second variable has a value of 
one if the governor was a Democrat and zero if he was not. In the case of governors who 
were not affiliated with either major party, both variables have a value of zero. 
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I also code two variables indicating which political party controlled the state 
legislature at the time of each governor’s legislative address. The first variable has a 
value of one if the legislature was under Republican control and a value of zero if it was 
not. The second variable has a value of one if the legislature was under Democratic 
control and a value of zero if it was not. If neither political party controlled the 
legislature, both variables have a value of zero. I considered a state legislature to be under 
a particular party’s control when both chambers were controlled by that party. I 
considered a state legislature to be under neither party’s control if each chamber was 
controlled by a different party or if one or both chambers were under shared control.7 
I use a dataset and set of definitions developed by Klarner (2003) to determine 
which party controlled each chamber of a state legislature. Klarner (2003) defines a 
legislative chamber as controlled by a single party when one of three conditions exists: 
(1) when a party has more than 50 percent of the seats in the chamber for the entire 
session; (2) when a party begins a session with more than 50 percent of the seats and then 
loses the majority during the session but retains control of the legislative leadership 
positions and committee chairs; or (3) when neither party has a majority of seats but one 
party holds more than 75 percent of the committee chairs (p. 314). These three situations 
account for the vast majority of cases. However, control of a legislative chamber may be 
shared by the two parties. Klarner (2003) counts each party as having 50 percent control 
of a chamber during periods when neither party has a majority of seats and neither party 
holds more than 75 percent of the committee chairs (p. 314).  
                                                 
7
 I cannot create variables that indicate which party is in control of the Nebraska legislature because it is 
nonpartisan. For this reason, I have excluded addresses by Nebraska governors from my analysis. 
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The Klarner dataset8 provides data concerning partisan control of state legislatures 
from 1997 through 2000. I construct a dataset for the years 2001 through 2006 using 
Klarner’s (2003) definitions and data from the Book of the States (CSG 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006) and data from the web site of the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). I obtained information about instances of 
shared control of legislative chambers from the NCSL website (NCSL 2007a, 2007b), 
various issues of State Legislatures, a periodical published by the NCSL (Ammons 
2001a; Dennison 2005; Diamond 2002; Fischer 2001; Gardner 2003; Quinn 2001; and 
Wong 2003), and from articles in the news media (Ammons 2001b; Davenport 2003; 
“Democrats Shuffle…” 2001; Glover 2006; Kinney 2003; Rice 2004; Robertson 2005; 
and Shanahan 2002). Table 4.2 presents the number and percentage of addresses 
delivered under each combination of gubernatorial party affiliation and legislative 
partisan control.  
Table 4.2: Number and Percentage of Addresses by Gubernatorial Party Affiliation 
and Legislative Partisan Control, 1997-2006 
Legislative Partisan Control  Gubernatorial 
Party 
Affiliation Republican Split Democratic Total 
Republican 112 (25%) 53 (12%) 95 (21%) 260   (58%) 
Democratic 60 (13%) 50 (11%) 73 (16%) 183   (40%) 
Other 0   (0%) 3 (<1%) 6 (1%) 9     (2%) 
 172 (38%) 106 (23%) 174 (38%) 452 (100%) 
Note: Addresses by Nebraska governors are excluded because of Nebraska’s nonpartisan legislature. 
                                                 
8
 The Klarner dataset is available for download at the State Politics and Policy Quarterly data resource web 
site. The web site address is http://www.unl.edu/SPPQ/journal_datasets.html. 
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The data presented in Table 4.2 indicate that there are more addresses by 
Republican governors than Democratic governors. Both Republican and Democratic 
governors were more slightly likely to experience unified government than to face a 
legislature controlled by the opposition party. Democratic governors, however, were 
more likely than Republican governors to face a legislature under split control. 
Democratic governors faced a split legislature 50 out of 183 times or approximately 27 
percent of the time. Republican governors faced a split legislature only 50 out of 260 
times, or approximately 20 percent of the time. As a result of this difference, Democratic 
governors were slightly more likely to experience divided government than Republicans. 
Citizen Liberalism 
I measure citizen liberalism using the method developed by Erikson, Wright, and 
McIver (1993). Wright provides a dataset used to compute citizen liberalism values on 
his website.9 This dataset contains aggregated CBS and New York Times poll results over 
the period from 1976 to 2003 with variables measuring the percentages of each state’s 
population that identify as liberal, conservative, or moderate. A state’s mean citizen 
liberalism is defined as the difference between the percentage of the population that 
identifies as liberal and the percentage that identifies as conservative (Erikson, Wright, 
and McIver 1993, p. 15-17). Like Erikson, Wright, McIver (1993), I compute each state’s 
liberalism score by pooling data from multiple years in order to reduce the volatility 
caused by sampling error arising from small sample sizes in some states (p. 37).  
                                                 
9
 http://php.indiana.edu/~wright1/ 
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State Political Culture 
I hypothesize that the economic development proposals that a governor 
recommends to the legislature will depend, in part, on whether his state has a moralistic, 
traditionalistic, or individualistic political culture. I identify each state’s political culture 
using Gray’s (2004) adaptation of Elazar’s (1984) political culture classifications. 
Because most states exhibit more than one political culture, Gray (2004) categorizes each 
state according to which political culture dominates its politics (p. 24).  
I incorporate state political culture into my models using two dummy variables. 
The first variable takes a value of one if a state has a traditionalistic culture and a value of 
zero if it does not. The second variable takes a value of one if a state has an 
individualistic political culture and a value of zero if it does not. If a state has a moralistic 
political culture, then both variables take a value of zero.10  
Newcomers to a state may either adopt the political attitudes associated with the 
political culture of their new home or they may maintain the political attitudes they 
brought with them from their previous residence. Consequently, migration of people from 
one state to another may either reinforce or modify the existing political culture within a 
state. These changes, however, occur slowly and scholars have found that some political 
and policy differences between states are explained by Elazar’s original political culture 
                                                 
10
 The traditionalistic states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and 
West Virginia. The individualistic states are Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and Wyoming. The moralistic states are California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin (Gray 2004, p. 24). 
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classifications (Gray 2004, p. 24-25). For these reasons, I assume that each state’s 
political culture is unchanged over the period under study.  
State Business Climate 
Eisinger (1988) defines a state’s business climate as a “composite measure of the 
attitudes of a state’s population and government officials toward business” (p. 130). 
Factors that are thought to affect business costs within the states, such as tax levels, 
environmental regulations, and labor laws, are used as indicators of these attitudes 
(Eisinger 1988, p. 130, 138-139, 165-168, and 169-170).  
I create business climate variables that are based on state tax revenues and 
workers’ compensation expenditures. As with my variables measuring states’ economic 
performance, I develop business climate variables using data that were collected by a 
single government agency or private organization in order to minimize differences in 
collection and measurement methods across states and over time.  
State Tax Revenues 
I use tax and population data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau to develop a 
variable measuring the relative per-capita tax revenues of each state. The U.S. Census 
Bureau collects annual data concerning state tax revenues.11 A state’s per capita tax 
revenue in a given year is computed by dividing its real state tax revenue (in 2005 
                                                 
11
 The Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center has created the State & Local Government 
Finance Data Query System to aid researchers in downloading and using this data. The Tax Policy Center’s 
system can be accessed at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/slf-dqs/pages.cfm. 
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dollars) by its population.12 I then subtract the average per capita tax revenue for all states 
in that year to obtain the state’s relative per capita state tax revenue.  
Workers’ Compensation Benefits  
I use data collected by the National Academy of Social Insurance (2007) to create 
a variable measuring business costs related to workers’ compensation insurance.  I 
computed each state’s workers’ compensation benefits per job by dividing its real 
workers’ compensation benefits (in 2005 dollars) paid in a given year by its total wage 
and salary employment for the same year.13 I then subtract the average workers’ 
compensation benefits per job for all states in that year to obtain each state’s relative 
workers’ compensation benefits per job. In computing each of these variables, I use 
values for the year prior to the year in which a governor delivered his legislative address. 
State Entrepreneurial Resources 
Hall (2007) observes that implementing newer economic development policies 
focused on business creation and innovation requires different resources than for 
implementing traditional industrial recruitment policies (p. 107-08). He classifies these 
resources into three categories: (1) human resources for innovation, (2) financial 
resources for innovation, and (3) financial resources for commercialization (Hall 2007, p. 
109-11). I account for the influence of a state’s entrepreneurial resources in my model by 
                                                 
12
 The combined state and local tax burden would be a better measure of a state’s tax burden than just the 
state tax burden alone because it provides a more comprehensive measure. Unfortunately, the Census 
Bureau did not collect local tax data for individual states in 2001 and 2003.  
13
 Wage and salary employment data is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis website: 
http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/default.cfm?catable=CA34&section=2. 
115 
including one variable measuring each of these three types of resources. These variables 
are based on each state’s high tech employment, private venture capital funding, and 
academic research and development expenditures. 
High Tech Employment  
I use a state’s high tech employment as a measure of its human resources for 
innovation. I define a state’s high tech employment in a given year as the percentage of 
its workers that are employed in high tech industries as defined by Hecker (1999 and 
2005).14 These industries include sectors such as aerospace, pharmaceutical, or computer 
manufacturing. Relative high tech employment is obtained by subtracting the national 
percentage of high tech employment for that year from the state percentage. 
Private Venture Capital Funding  
I measure each state’s financial resources for innovation with a variable based on 
its private venture capital funding. I computed a state’s private venture capital funding 
per job by dividing its real venture capital funding15 (in 2005 dollars) by its total wage 
and salary employment for the same year. I then subtracted the average venture capital 
funding per job for all states to obtain a state’s relative venture capital funding. 
                                                 
14
 I obtained state employment figures by industry from the U.S. Census Bureau’s annual County Business 
Patterns publications, which are available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/cbp/view/ cbpview.html. 
15
 I obtained the total private venture capital funding for each state in each year from a database maintained 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture Capital Association. It can be accessed at 
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/nav.jsp?page=historical. 
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Academic Research and Development Spending  
I use a state’s academic science and engineering research and development 
expenditures as a measure of its financial resources for innovation. I calculate a state’s 
academic research and development expenditures per job in a given year by dividing a 
state’s annual academic science and engineering research and development 
expenditures16 by its total wage and salary employment for the same year. I obtain 
relative research and development expenditures by subtracting the average research and 
development expenditures per job for all states for that year. 
Analyzing Economic Development Policymaking 
I test my hypotheses by estimating four models. Two of the models use logistic 
regression to predict whether governors include at least one traditional or entrepreneurial 
economic development proposal in their legislative addresses. The other two models use 
negative binomial regression to predict the number of traditional or entrepreneurial 
economic development policies that governors propose in their legislative addresses. I 
provide the logistic and negative binomial regression results regarding my models in the 
appendix (see Table A.2 and Table A.3) as a point of reference for the reader. However, 
the direct interpretation of these regression coefficients in relation to my hypotheses is 
rather complex. The complexity arises because the coefficients cannot be directly 
interpreted as changes in the quantities of interest in my analysis, which are probabilities 
and proposal counts. Therefore, I use computer simulations, as suggested by King, Tomz, 
                                                 
16
 I obtained academic science and engineering research and development expenditures for each state in 
each year from a database maintained by the National Science Foundation. This database can be accessed at 
http://webcaspar.nsf.gov/. 
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and Wittenberg (2000), to analyze my hypotheses. The simulation procedures are 
described later in this chapter. 
Economic Development Policy as a Response to State Economic Conditions  
Poor economic conditions in a state can reduce a governor’s approval among the 
public and diminish his prospects of being reelected (Atkeson and Partin 1995, p. 104; 
Hansen 1999, p. 177-78; Howell and Vanderleeuw 1990, p. 163-64; Niemi, Stanley, and 
Vogel 1995, p. 949; Partin 1995, p. 88). Because governors are rational political actors, I 
expect them to place issues on their legislative agendas that will allow them to increase or 
maintain their public approval to increase their chances of being reelected. Consequently, 
I expect governors to be more likely to place economic development on their legislative 
agendas during times of economic distress than during times of good economic 
performance. I stated this expectation in my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A governor will be more likely to include economic development 
proposals on his legislative agenda when the economic conditions in a state are 
poor, than when conditions are good. 
In my models, I measure states’ economic conditions in two ways: (1) with 
relative measures that indicate whether a state is leading or lagging the national average 
in economic performance, and (2) with measures of annual changes in economic 
performance that indicate whether the condition of a state’s economy has improved or 
declined during the preceding year. My first hypothesis implies that governors of states 
that are lagging the nation or that have experienced economic decline over the past year 
will be more likely to include traditional and entrepreneurial economic development 
proposals in their legislative addresses.  
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Some of the coefficients of the traditional policy model presented in Table A.2 
provide support for my first hypothesis. They indicate that governors are significantly 
more likely to propose traditional economic development policies when their states lag 
the nation with respect to unemployment or firm creation rates. The coefficients of the 
entrepreneurial model, however, do not support this hypothesis. They indicate that 
governors of states with unemployment rates above the national rate are significantly less 
likely to propose entrepreneurial policies than governors of states with more favorable 
unemployment rates. 
The regression results provide no evidence, however, that governors of states 
experiencing economic decline are more likely to propose either type of economic 
development policies during their legislative addresses than governors of states that are 
experiencing economic improvement. On the contrary, the results of the traditional policy 
model indicate that governors of states experiencing increasing unemployment rates and 
declining firm creation rates are significantly less likely to propose traditional economic 
development policies than governors of states experiencing economic improvement. 
Similarly, the coefficients of the entrepreneurial policy model indicate that governors of 
states experiencing increasing unemployment and declining firm creation rates are 
significantly less likely to include entrepreneurial economic development proposals in 
their legislative addresses than governors of states experiencing economic improvement. 
Examining the individual coefficients reported in Table A.2 allows me to make a 
qualitative assessment of the effect of economic conditions on the probability that 
governors address economic development as a policy issue on their legislative agendas. 
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Examining the individual coefficients does not, however, allow me to report these effects 
in terms of the quantity of interest, which is the change in probability associated with a 
given change in economic conditions. Logistic regression coefficients are not interpreted 
as a change in probability, but instead are interpreted as a change in the logarithm of the 
odds ratio, which is known as the log-odds ratio. The odds ratio is the ratio of the 
probability that the dependent variable has a value of one to the probability that the 
dependent variable has a value of zero (Gujarati 1999, p. 449). The interpretation of a 
change in the log-odds ratio is not very intuitive. Furthermore, an individual coefficient 
estimates the effect of changing one variable while holding the others constant. 
Considering the coefficients in this way may provide an unrealistic interpretation because 
the economic condition variables are likely to covary.  In other words, a state that is 
performing poorly on one measure is likely to be performing poorly on others.  
To solve the problem of co-variation regarding the economic performance 
measures, I classify states into a two-dimensional typology of state economic 
performance. The first dimension indicates whether a state is leading or lagging the 
national average. The second indicates whether a state’s economy has improved or 
declined over the past year. These two dimensions produce a four-category typology of 
state economic performance: leading/improving, leading/declining, lagging/improving, 
and lagging/declining.  
I classify a state as leading the nation in a given year when it outperforms the 
national average on at least two of the three relative performance variables. I classify a 
state as improving in a given year if at least two of the three annual performance 
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variables indicate an improving economy. Figure 4.1 presents a graphical display of the 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for each of the six economic 
performance variables for states in each of the four economic performance categories and 
for all states. I use these mean values in computer simulations to estimate the effect of a 
state’s economic performance on the economic development policies that the state’s 
governor includes in his legislative address. 
Figure 4.1: Graphical Summary of Economic Performance Variables, 1996-2005 
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Note: Mean values are indicated by a small black dot; solid lines indicate standard deviations; diamond 
symbols indicate maximum and minimum values. 
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The patterns displayed in Figure 4.1 are largely what I would expect. Leading 
states tend to have lower unemployment rates, higher average wages, and greater firm 
creation rates than states that are lagging. States with improving economic conditions 
tend to have declining, rather than rising, unemployment rates and experience larger 
annual increases in wages and firm creation rates than declining states.  
To solve the problem of interpreting the regression coefficients, I can use 
computer simulation, as suggested by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000). For example, 
I can use the regression results to predict the probability that a governor will propose one 
or more traditional economic development policies during his legislative address given 
that his state is leading the nation in economic performance and has experienced 
economic improvement over the past year.  First, I randomly draw a set of model 
parameters from their asymptotic distribution, which is defined by the vector of model 
coefficients and their variance-covariance matrix. Second, I set the explanatory variables 
to values appropriate for the simulation. In this example, I set the economic performance 
variables to the mean values for states in the leading/improving performance category. 
All other explanatory variables are set to their overall mean values. Third, using the 
simulated coefficients from the first step and the explanatory variables from the second 
step, I compute the expected probability that a governor will include one or more 
traditional economic development proposals in his legislative address. I then repeat this 
algorithm 10,000 times.17 The mean value of these predictions is the expected probability 
that a governor will include one or more traditional policies in his legislative address 
                                                 
17
 I use the Zelig package (Imai, King, and Lau 2007) within the R statistical software program to estimate 
the models and perform the simulations. 
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under the economic conditions simulated. I repeat this algorithm for states in the other 
three economic performance categories. 
The results of these simulations are plotted in Figure 4.2. The prediction point 
estimates are indicated by vertical lines. I also plot probability distribution curves for 
each estimate to highlight the fact that these predictions are estimates with uncertainty 
attached to them and to provide a visual indication of the amount of uncertainty 
surrounding each estimate. The estimates plotted in the top panel of Figure 4.2 indicate 
that there is a 52 to 57 percent probability, depending on whether the state is declining or 
improving, that a governor of a state that is leading the nation in economic performance 
will include at least one traditional economic development policy in his legislative 
address. The estimates for governors of states that are lagging economically are plotted in 
the bottom panel of Figure 4.2. There is a 69 to 75 percent probability that governors of 
these states will propose traditional economic development policies as part of their 
legislative agendas.  
Comparing the simulation results in the top and bottom panels of Figure 4.2 
reveals that there is a 17 to 18 percent greater probability, depending on whether the state 
is improving or declining, that governors of lagging states will propose at least one 
traditional economic development policy compared to governors of leading states. These 
differences are statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 99 percent. The 
difference between improving and declining states in each panel is not statistically 
significant.  
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Probability that a Governor Will Include Traditional Policies 
in His Legislative Address, Conditional on Economic Conditions, 1997-2006 
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The results of the simulations predicting the inclusion of entrepreneurial policies 
are plotted in Figure 4.3. These results indicate that there is a probability of 39 to 40 
percent, depending on whether the state is declining or improving, that a governor of a 
leading state will propose one or more entrepreneurial policies in his legislative address. 
For governors of lagging states, the probability is 42 to 43 percent. Comparing the 
predictions in the top and bottom panels of Figure 4.3 reveals that governors of lagging 
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states are only slightly more likely than governors of leading states to propose 
entrepreneurial economic development policies. Neither these differences nor the small 
differences between improving and declining states in each panel are statistically 
significant.  
Figure 4.3: Predicted Probability that a Governor Will Include Entrepreneurial 
Policies in His Legislative Address, Conditional on Economic Conditions, 1997-2006 
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This analysis provides mixed support for my first hypothesis. As predicted in my 
first hypothesis, I find that governors of states that are lagging the nation in economic 
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performance are more likely to include traditional economic development proposals in 
their legislative addresses than governors of states that are leading the nation. Lagging 
economic performance does not, however, increase the probability that governors 
recommend entrepreneurial policies. I also find, contrary to my first hypothesis, that 
governors of states that are experiencing economic decline are no more likely to include 
either type of economic development policies in their legislative proposals than 
governors of states that are experiencing economic improvement. 
Because poor economic conditions in a state can reduce governors’ public 
approval ratings and diminish their prospects of being reelected, I expect that poor 
economic performance will lead governors to devote a greater portion of their agenda to 
economic development policy (Atkeson and Partin 1995, p. 104; Hansen 1999, p. 177-78; 
Howell and Vanderleeuw 1990, p. 163-64; Niemi, Stanley, and Vogel 1995, p. 949; 
Partin 1995, p. 88). Based on this expectation, I formulated my second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: A governor will include a greater number of economic 
development proposals on his legislative agenda when economic conditions in a 
state are poor, than when conditions are good. 
The results of the simulations conducted to test this hypothesis with respect to 
traditional policies are plotted in Figure 4.4. These simulations are based on the negative 
binomial regression results presented in Table A.3. The estimates plotted in the top panel 
indicate that governors of states that are leading the nation in economic performance are 
expected to propose approximately 1.1 to 1.3 traditional policies per legislative address, 
depending on whether their state’s economy has improved or declined over the past year. 
The estimates for governors of states that are lagging in economic performance are 
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plotted in the bottom panel. Governors of these states are expected to recommend 
approximately 1.6 to 1.9 traditional policies per legislative address, or approximately 0.5 
to 0.6 more proposals per address than governors of leading states. These differences in 
the predictions for governors of leading and lagging states are statistically significant at a 
confidence level exceeding 99 percent. 
Figure 4.4: Predicted Number of Traditional Policies Included in a Governor’s 
Legislative Address, Conditional on Economic Conditions, 1997-2006 
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Comparisons of the estimates plotted within each panel of Figure 4.4 indicate that 
governors of states that are experiencing economic improvement are expected to propose 
approximately 0.2 to 0.3 more traditional policies per address than governors of states 
that are experiencing declining economic conditions, depending on whether their state is 
leading or lagging. These predicted differences are statistically significant at a confidence 
level exceeding 99 percent. 
The results of the simulations conducted to test my second hypothesis with 
respect to entrepreneurial policies are plotted in Figure 4.5. The plotted estimates indicate 
that, contrary to my hypothesis, a state’s economic conditions have no significant 
influence on the number of entrepreneurial policies that a governor recommends to the 
legislature. Governors of leading and lagging states and improving and declining states 
all propose similar numbers of entrepreneurial policies (0.6 to 0.8 per legislative address). 
None of the differences are statistically significant. 
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Figure 4.5: Predicted Number of Entrepreneurial Policies Included in a Governor’s 
Legislative Address, Conditional on Economic Conditions, 1997-2006 
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The simulation results presented in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.4 indicate that 
governors respond to lagging economic performance in their states by recommending the 
adoption of traditional economic development policies. An inspection of the regression 
results presented in the appendix in Table A.2 and Table A.3 reveals that all three aspects 
of lagging economic performance – relatively high unemployment rates, relatively low 
wages, and relatively low rates of firm creation – increase both the probability that 
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governors will propose traditional economic development policies and the number of 
individual traditional policy recommendations they include in their legislative addresses. 
This finding provides evidence that governors recognize poor state economic 
performance as a condition that threatens both their public approval and their prospects 
for reelection. In an attempt to avoid these unfavorable consequences, they try to 
stimulate economic growth by recommending the enactment of traditional economic 
development policies.  
The simulation results plotted in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.5 indicate, however, that 
governors do not propose greater numbers of entrepreneurial policies in response to 
generally lagging economic performance. A close inspection of the negative binomial 
regression results presented in Table A.3 reveals that only one aspect of lagging 
economic performance, a relatively low firm creation rate, is associated with an increase 
in the number of entrepreneurial policies proposed by governors. The other two aspects 
of lagging performance, a relatively high unemployment rate and relatively low wages, 
are associated with fewer entrepreneurial policy proposals. The effects associated with 
these other two measures, however, are not statistically significant. An examination of 
the logistic regression results presented in Table A.2 shows that the unemployment rate is 
the only aspect of a state’s relative economic performance that has any statistically 
significant effect on the probability that a governor advocates the adoption of 
entrepreneurial economic development policies. A relatively high unemployment rate, 
however, is associated with a lower probability that a governor proposes entrepreneurial 
policies, which is the opposite of the effect that I predicted.  Similarly, the negative 
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binomial regression results presented in Table A.3 indicate that a relatively high 
unemployment rate is also associated with a reduction in the number of entrepreneurial 
policy proposals, although this effect is not statistically significant. 
I conclude from this analysis that governors view traditional policies as suitable 
for improving generally poor economic conditions, but specifically target entrepreneurial 
policies at improving poor rates of firm creation. It is plausible that entrepreneurial 
policies are targeted in this way because entrepreneurial policies are intended to stimulate 
the creation of new business firms. These findings also lend support to the claims by 
several scholars that politicians support traditional economic development incentives 
because they provide them with opportunities to take credit for highly visible evidence of 
economic improvement, such as the opening of new factories that will employ many 
workers (Buss 1999, p. 351; Dewar 1998, p. 73-74; Loveridge 1996, p. 154; Noto 1991, 
p. 254; Wolman and Spitzley 1996, p. 130-31). 
I am surprised to find that governors do not respond to economic decline within 
their states by including more economic development proposals on their legislative 
agendas. A decline in a state’s economic performance has no significant effect on either 
the probability that a governor will propose entrepreneurial policies or the number of 
entrepreneurial proposals included in a governor’s legislative address. Furthermore, 
governors appear to make fewer, rather than more, traditional policy proposals when state 
economic performance is declining.  
These findings raise a question: Why would governors fail to respond to 
economic decline or respond by deemphasizing economic development in their 
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legislative programs? I suggest two related reasons for this behavior. First, the economic 
conditions in many states decline during national recessions. Consequently, when a state 
is in economic decline, voters in the state may believe it is caused by the national 
business cycle. Other empirical studies find that national economic conditions have a 
much smaller effect on gubernatorial approval ratings and election results than state 
economic conditions (Howell and Vanderleeuw 1990, p. 164-65; Partin 1995, p. 88). In 
other words, voters do not hold governors responsible for national economic conditions. 
If voters believe that their state’s economic decline is caused by changes in national 
economic conditions, then they may believe it is a problem that is best addressed by 
changes in federal policies and may not expect their governor to take action. As a result, a 
governor may not try to fix a problem when voters do not blame him for it. 
Second, during periods when the national economy is expanding, many states are 
likely to be simultaneously experiencing economic improvement and many businesses 
may be opening new facilities or expanding existing ones. During periods when many 
firms are considering plant construction and expansion, governors may propose new 
economic development incentives in an attempt to gain a competitive advantage over 
other states in the competition for these new facilities (Brace 1993, p. 118; Cohen and 
King 2004, p. 1269). This behavior would be an example of what Noto (1991) calls the 
“early-bird model” of interjurisdictional competition. In this model, public officials try to 
be the first to offer new economic development incentives so that their communities can 
benefit from them before others begin offering the same incentives (Noto 1991, p. 253).   
During economic recessions, on the other hand, there are few expanding businesses for 
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states to compete over, leading to a reduction in economic development policy proposals 
by governors. 
The Influence of Gubernatorial Party Affiliation  
According to my theory of gubernatorial policymaking, a governor will be more 
likely to propose policies that conform to his own preferences and to the preferences of 
his fellow party members than to propose policies that deviate from those preferences. 
Based on Boeckelman’s (1996) findings, I assume that Republican governors will have a 
greater preference for traditional policies than Democratic governors because these 
policies provide aid to existing businesses, which are often important Republican 
supporters. I assume that Democratic governors will have a greater preference for 
entrepreneurial policies than Republicans because Democrats are more comfortable with 
the direct government intervention in the economy required by these policies 
(Boeckelman 1996, p. 347). These assumptions lead to the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Republican governors will be more likely to include traditional 
economic development proposals on their legislative agendas than Democratic 
governors. 
Hypothesis 4: Democratic governors will be more likely to include 
entrepreneurial economic development proposals on their legislative agendas than 
Republican governors. 
The results of the simulations conducted to test my third and fourth hypotheses 
are plotted in Figure 4.6. The estimates plotted in the top panel indicate that there is a 73 
percent probability that Republican governors will propose one or more traditional 
policies in their legislative addresses, while there is only a 58 percent probability that 
Democratic governors will propose at least one traditional policy under the same 
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conditions. The difference in probability of 15 percent between Republican and 
Democratic governors is statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 99%. 
This finding provides confirmation of my third hypothesis. 
Figure 4.6: Predicted Probability that a Governor Will Include Traditional or 
Entrepreneurial Policies in His Legislative Address, Conditional on Party 
Affiliation, 1997-2006 
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The estimates plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 4.6 indicate that the 
probabilities that Republican or Democratic governors will propose one or more 
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entrepreneurial policies in their legislative addresses are nearly the same at approximately 
41 percent. The slight difference in probability between Republican and Democratic 
governors is not statistically significant. Thus, I find no support for my fourth hypothesis. 
I assume that the party-related policy preferences found by Boeckelman (1996) 
will influence not only the probability that a governor will recommend a particular type 
of economic development policy, but also the number of individual policy proposals of 
each type that he includes in his legislative address.  My assumptions about the 
relationship between gubernatorial party affiliation and the number of economic 
development policy recommendations are formally stated in two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5: Republican governors will include a greater number of traditional 
economic development proposals on their legislative agendas than Democratic 
governors. 
Hypothesis 6: Democratic governors will include a greater number of 
entrepreneurial economic development proposals on their legislative agendas than 
Republican governors.  
Figure 4.7 presents the simulation results for testing these two hypotheses. The 
simulation results plotted in the top panel confirm that Republican governors are 
expected to propose more traditional policies than Democratic governors. Republican 
governors are expected to propose 1.9 traditional economic development policies per 
legislative address while Democratic governors are expected to propose only about 1.2 
traditional policies per address. These simulations provide support for my fifth hypothesis 
because the predicted difference of approximately 0.7 proposals per address is 
statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 99 percent. 
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Figure 4.7: Predicted Number of Economic Development Policies Included in a 
Governor’s Legislative Address, Conditional on Party Affiliation, 1997-2006 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
Traditional Policies
R
e
la
tiv
e
 
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy Republican Governors
Democratic Governors
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
Entrepreneurial Policies
Proposals per Address
R
e
la
tiv
e
 
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy
 
 
The simulation results plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 4.7 indicate that 
Republican and Democratic governors are expected to propose very similar numbers of 
entrepreneurial proposals (approximately 0.75 per legislative address). The slight 
predicted difference is not statistically significant, thus failing to confirm my sixth 
hypothesis. 
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Republican and Democratic governors have different preferences regarding 
economic development policies, although the differences are not as clear-cut as I had 
predicted. Like Boeckelman (1996, p. 347), I find that Republican governors have a 
greater preference for traditional economic development policies than Democratic 
governors because they are more likely to recommend adoption of traditional economic 
development policies. I also find that they tend to make a larger number of individual 
recommendations when they propose these policies. Unlike Boeckelman (1996, p. 347), 
who finds that Democratic governors tend to recommend more entrepreneurial policies 
than Republicans, I find that governors of the two parties have similar preferences for 
these policies. Governors of each party are equally likely to recommend entrepreneurial 
policies and they tend to include similar numbers of these proposals in their legislative 
agendas when they recommend them.  
Budgetary Conditions as a Constraint on Policy Choices 
Because most economic development policies require either appropriations for 
implementation or reductions in future tax revenues, an unfavorable budget situation may 
constrain a governor’s ability to recommend new economic development policies. 
According to my theory, a governor will find it much easier to justify proposals that 
create or expand economic development programs if state revenues are projected to grow 
rather than decline. Based on this prediction, I formulated the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7: Governors will include a greater number of economic development 
proposals on their legislative agendas when state revenues are increasing, than 
when revenues are flat or decreasing. 
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The simulation results provide little support for my seventh hypothesis. The 
predictions plotted in the top panel of Figure 4.8 indicate that governors of states 
experiencing budget growth are expected to propose more than 1.6 traditional policies per 
legislative address. Governors of states experiencing budget decline, however, are 
expected to propose only 1.5 traditional policies per address.18 Although governors with 
more budget resources at their disposal propose more traditional policies as predicted, the 
difference of less than 0.2 proposals per legislative address is not statistically significant. 
The predictions plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 4.8 indicate that the amount 
of available budget resources has no effect on the number of entrepreneurial economic 
development policies proposed by governors. They are expected to recommend 
approximately 0.75 entrepreneurial policies per address under either growing or declining 
budgetary conditions. The very small predicted difference is not statistically significant.  
Despite these results, an examination of the logistic model coefficients presented 
in Table A.2 reveals that a decline in budgetary resources results in a statistically 
significant reduction in the probability that a governor proposes any traditional policies at 
all.  Consequently, I believe it would be incorrect to assert that budgetary resources have 
no substantive effect on governors’ decisions about traditional economic development 
policies.  
                                                 
18
 I modeled budget decline as a projected decrease in general fund revenues of 2.73% and budget growth 
as a projected increase of 2.45%. These values represent the 25th and 75th percentiles of projected change 
in available general fund revenues within my data. 
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Figure 4.8: Predicted Number of Economic Development Policies Included in a 
Governor’s Legislative Address, Conditional on Projected Budget Growth, 1997-
2006 
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My analysis also indicates that a state’s budget condition affects the governor’s 
traditional and entrepreneurial proposals differently. The logistic model coefficients 
presented in Table A.2 indicate that change in a state’s budgetary resources has no 
statistically significant effect on the probability that its governor proposes one or more 
entrepreneurial policies. Thus, the results of my logistic regressions indicate that 
budgetary conditions affect only governors’ decisions about traditional economic 
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development policies and not their entrepreneurial policy decisions. This pattern is 
mirrored in Figure 4.8. State budgetary resources have a substantive, although not 
statistically significant effect on traditional policy proposals, but they have no effect on 
entrepreneurial proposals. 
This finding raises an interesting question: Why would state budgetary resources 
affect governors’ decisions about traditional policies, but not decisions regarding 
entrepreneurial policies? I argue that the difference may be a result of the different 
demands that the two types of policies place on a state’s finances. When a state funds an 
entrepreneurial economic development program, the financial obligation is usually close-
ended. For example, if a state undertakes a program to fund university research about a 
specific technology, it appropriates a fixed amount of money for the program within the 
state budget. Once those funds are expended, continuing the program requires another 
appropriation and the governor and other policymakers have an opportunity to evaluate 
whether the program’s results justify devoting additional resources to it. The financial 
obligation for traditional programs, on the other hand, is often open-ended. If, for 
example, a state reduces the corporate income tax rate, then the tax reduction becomes a 
feature of the state’s tax code that continues in effect until the governor and legislature 
act to change it. The results of my analysis indicate that the ongoing financial obligations 
associated with traditional policies make governors reluctant to propose them during 
periods of unfavorable budget conditions. 
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Citizen Liberalism as a Constraint on Policy Choices 
According to my theory, governors will be constrained by the policy preferences 
of their states’ citizens. Governors of states with a large proportion of conservative 
citizens will propose more policies that are favored by conservatives.  Governors of states 
with a large proportion of liberal citizens, on the other hand, will propose more policies 
favored by liberals. I assume that conservatives prefer traditional economic development 
programs because they favor the tax cuts and deregulatory policies that are associated 
with them. Liberal citizens, on the other hand, will have a greater preference for 
entrepreneurial policies because they are more comfortable with the more active 
governmental intervention associated with these policies. These assumptions lead to the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 8: Governors of states with low levels of citizen liberalism will 
include a greater number of traditional economic development proposals on their 
legislative agendas than governors of states with high levels of citizen liberalism. 
Hypothesis 9: Governors of states with high levels of citizen liberalism will 
include a greater number of entrepreneurial economic development proposals on 
their legislative agendas than governors of states with low levels of citizen 
liberalism. 
My simulation results indicate that the level of citizen liberalism in a state affects 
the number of entrepreneurial economic development policies recommended by its 
governor, but not the number of traditional policies. The predictions plotted in the top 
panel of Figure 4.9 indicate that governors of states with either high or low levels of 
citizen liberalism are expected to propose similar numbers of traditional policies 
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(approximately 1.6 per legislative address).19 The small predicted difference is not 
statistically significant. 
Figure 4.9: Predicted Number of Economic Development Policies Included in a 
Governor’s Legislative Address, Conditional on Mean Citizen Liberalism, 1997-
2006 
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The predictions plotted in the bottom panel of the figure indicate that governors of 
states with high levels of citizen liberalism are expected to propose almost 1.0 
entrepreneurial policy per legislative address. Governors of states with low levels of 
                                                 
19
 I modeled low and high citizen liberalism as the 25th and 75th percentiles of mean citizen liberalism 
within my data.  
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citizen liberalism, however, are expected to propose approximately 0.7 entrepreneurial 
policies per address. The predicted difference of almost 0.3 proposals per legislative 
address is statistically significant at a confidence level exceeding 99 percent, thus 
confirming my ninth hypothesis. 
These findings raise an important question: Why would citizen ideology affect 
governors’ entrepreneurial economic development policy proposals, but not their 
traditional proposals? This difference may be explained by the role of site location 
consultants in the business site selection process. Site location consultants first began 
assisting manufacturing firms that were expanding or relocating in the 1930s (Markusen 
and Nesse 2007, p. 11). These consultants assist mobile businesses in lobbying state and 
local governments for concessions, such as those provided by traditional economic 
development policies. Furthermore, a site location consultant can approach multiple state 
governments on behalf of a business firm, even if an optimal location has already been 
selected. They can then use the resulting competition between the states to ensure that the 
firm is able to extract the maximum possible concessions from the government at the 
preferred location. Scholars who study industrial location decisions contend that these 
activities of site location consultants create a perception among state government officials 
that offering financial and tax concessions is required to successfully compete for 
business investment (Markusen and Nesse 2007, p. 12; Thomas 2007, p. 43). The 
influence of these consultants on states’ economic development policies may be forceful 
and pervasive enough to outweigh the influence of citizen preferences. Site location 
consultants do not play the same role in decisions about entrepreneurial policies, 
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however, which may allow citizen preferences to exert greater influence on gubernatorial 
policies. 
State Political Culture and Policy Choices 
I assume that a governor’s choices about public policy may be constrained by 
longstanding traditions within a state about what constitutes appropriate governmental 
action. These traditions are referred to as a state’s political culture (Elazar 1984, p. 114-
15). Elazar (1984) identifies three state political cultures within the United States: 
individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic (p. 115). In Chapter 2, I formulated two 
hypotheses regarding the influence of a state’s political culture on the economic 
development policies proposed by its governor: 
Hypothesis 10: Governors of states with individualistic or traditionalistic political 
cultures will include a greater number of traditional economic development 
proposals on their legislative agendas than governors of states with moralistic 
political cultures. 
Hypothesis 11: Governors of states with moralistic political cultures will include a 
greater number of entrepreneurial economic development proposals on their 
legislative agendas than governors of states with individualistic or traditionalistic 
political cultures. 
The results of my analysis show that state political cultures influence the 
economic development policies recommended by governors, although this influence is 
not as extensive as I predicted. I find that governors of traditionalistic and moralistic 
states recommend different economic development policies, but that there are no 
statistically significant differences between proposals made by governors of 
individualistic and moralistic states.  
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The simulation results for testing these hypotheses are plotted in Figure 4.10. The 
predictions plotted in the top panel indicate that governors of states with traditionalistic 
political cultures are expected to propose approximately 1.9 traditional policies per 
legislative address. Governors of moralistic states are expected, however, to propose only 
1.4 policies per address. This predicted difference of 0.5 policies per address is 
statistically significant at a confidence level of 90 percent. Although this finding provides  
Figure 4.10: Predicted Number of Economic Development Policies Included in a 
Governor’s Legislative Address, Conditional on State Political Culture, 1997-2006 
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only partial support for my tenth hypothesis, it is in accordance with the findings of 
Boeckelman (1991) and Hanson (1991). They each found that states with traditionalistic 
political cultures tend to rely more heavily on traditional economic development policies 
than states with moralistic or individualistic political cultures (Boeckelman 1991, p. 57; 
Hanson 1991, p. 79). 
The predictions plotted in the bottom panel of the figure indicate that governors of 
states with moralistic political cultures are expected to propose approximately 0.8 
entrepreneurial policies per legislative address. As predicted by my eleventh hypothesis, 
governors of traditionalistic and individualistic states are expected to propose fewer 
entrepreneurial policies than governors of moralistic states. The predicted differences 
between, however, are not statistically significant. The lack of significant differences 
between states with different political cultures may be an indication that the migration of 
people from one state to another has lessened some of the differences among states since 
Elazar last classified state political cultures in 1984 (Hanson 1992, p. 376). 
Divided Government as a Constraint on Policy Choice 
I assume that Republican legislators share the economic development policy 
preferences of Republican governors and that Democratic legislators share the 
preferences of Democratic governors. As a result of these shared preferences, I 
hypothesize that during periods of unified government governors will propose a greater 
number of their preferred policies than during periods of divided government. Stated 
formally, these hypotheses are: 
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Hypothesis 12: A Republican governor will include a greater number of 
traditional economic development proposals on his legislative agenda during 
periods of unified government than during periods of divided government. 
Hypothesis 13: A Democratic governor will include a greater number of 
entrepreneurial economic development proposals on his legislative agenda during 
periods of unified government than during periods of divided government. 
I find evidence that Republican governors are constrained by divided government 
as I predict in my twelfth hypothesis. The predictions plotted in the top panel of Figure 
4.11 demonstrate that Republican governors are expected to propose more than 2.4 
traditional economic development policies per legislative address during periods of 
unified government, but only 1.4 per address during periods of divided government. This 
predicted difference of more than 1.0 traditional proposal per address is statistically 
significant at a confidence level exceeding 99 percent. 
I find no evidence, however, that Democratic governors are constrained by 
divided government as I predict in my thirteenth hypothesis. The simulation results 
plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 4.11 indicate that Democratic governors are 
expected to propose approximately 0.7 entrepreneurial proposals per legislative address 
during either unified or divided government. The slight predicted difference is not 
statistically significant, thus failing to confirm my hypothesis.  
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Figure 4.11: Predicted Number of Preferred Economic Development Policies 
Included in a Governor’s Legislative Address, Conditional on Partisan Control of 
the Legislature, 1997-2006 
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This lack of a constraint provides additional evidence that Democratic and 
Republican politicians do not have different preferences with regard to entrepreneurial 
economic development as I predicted. The simulation results plotted earlier in Figure 4.6 
indicate that Democratic and Republican governors have similar preferences for 
entrepreneurial policies because they are expected to recommend about the same number 
of them per legislative address, when all other influences are held constant. If Republican 
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legislators have preferences for entrepreneurial policies that are similar to those of 
Democratic legislators, then Democratic governors would have no reason to propose 
fewer entrepreneurial policies during periods of divided government than during periods 
of unified government.   
Governors’ expectations of legislative success are lower during periods of divided 
government than during periods of unified government. In order to increase their 
prospects of legislative success, I predict that during periods of divided government, 
governors will propose a greater number of economic development policies of the type 
preferred by the opposition party than they would propose if their own party members 
controlled the legislature. This prediction leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 14: A Republican governor will include a greater number of 
entrepreneurial economic development proposals on his legislative agenda during 
periods of divided government than during periods of unified government. 
Hypothesis 15: A Democratic governor will include a greater number of 
traditional economic development proposals on his legislative agenda during 
periods of divided government than during periods of unified government. 
The predictions plotted in the top panel of Figure 4.12 indicate that Republican 
governors are expected to propose approximately 0.9 entrepreneurial economic 
development policies per legislative address during periods of unified government, but 
only 0.6 per address during periods of divided government. This finding is contrary to my 
fourteenth hypothesis. This predicted difference, however, is not statistically significant. 
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Figure 4.12: Predicted Number of Non-Preferred Economic Development Policies 
Included in a Governor’s Legislative Address, Conditional on Partisan Control of 
the Legislature, 1997-2006 
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The simulation results plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 4.12 indicate that 
Democratic governors are expected to propose approximately 1.4 traditional economic 
development policies per legislative address during periods of unified government, but 
only about 1.1 per address during periods of divided government. In my fifteenth 
hypothesis, I had predicted that Democratic governors would propose more traditional 
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policies during periods of divided government than during periods of unified government. 
This predicted difference is not, however, statistically significant. 
These findings suggest that during periods of divided government governors do 
not adopt the strategy of accommodating the opposition party that I had predicted. Rather 
than proposing a greater number of the policies that are preferred by the opposition party, 
governors may attempt to set themselves apart from the opposition by proposing fewer of 
those policies. These findings may also indicate that governors recognize that unified 
government provides a favorable environment for passing their legislative proposals, 
which allows them to expand their economic development agendas by including greater 
numbers of both types of policies. 
State Business Climates and Interjurisdictional Competition 
In Chapter II, I predicted that interjurisdictional competition would lead 
governors of states with high-cost business climates to propose traditional economic 
development policies in order to lower the cost of doing business in their states. This 
cost-cutting strategy allows them to better compete for business investments with low-
cost states. I stated this expectation in my sixteenth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 16: Governors of states with high-cost business climates will include a 
greater number of traditional economic development policies on their legislative 
agendas than governors of states with low-cost business climates. 
I define a state as having a high-cost business climate in a given year if its state 
tax revenues and workers’ compensation benefits are both greater than the national 
average. A state is defined as having a low-cost business climate if it has below average 
values on both measures. 
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Figure 4.13 presents a graphical display of the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for both of the business climate variables for high-cost states, 
low-cost states, and all states. These mean values will be used in computer simulations to  
Figure 4.13:  Graphical Summary of Business Climate Variables, 1996-2005 
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Note: Mean values are indicated by a small black dot; solid lines indicate standard deviations; diamond 
symbols indicate maximum and minimum values. 
estimate the influence of a state’s business climate on the economic development policies 
that its governor proposes to the state legislature.  
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An inspection of the upper panel of Figure 4.13 reveals that the average high-cost 
state has per capita state tax revenue that exceeds the national average of $2,078 by about 
$434, or about 21 percent. The average low-cost state, on the other hand, has per capita 
state tax revenue that is $288, or about 14 percent, below the national average. The lower 
panel of Figure 4.13 illustrates that high-cost states have workers’ compensation 
expenses that exceed the national average of $319 per job by about $130, or about 41 
percent. The expense in low-cost states is approximately $79 per job, or about 25 percent, 
below the national average. I use these average values in my simulations to predict the 
influence of state business climates on governors’ economic development policy 
recommendations. 
The simulation results plotted in Figure 4.14 indicate that governors of high-cost 
states propose more traditional economic development policies than governors of low-
cost states. Governors of states with higher than average tax revenues and workers’ 
compensation costs are expected to propose almost 1.8 traditional economic development 
policies per legislative address, compared to less than 1.5 traditional policies proposed by 
governors of states with low-cost business climates. This predicted difference of 0.3 
traditional policies per address is not, however, statistically significant. 
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Figure 4.14: Predicted Number of Traditional Policies Included in a Governor’s 
Legislative Address, Conditional on Business Climate, 1997-2006 
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
0
1
2
3
4
Traditional Policies
Proposals per Address
R
e
la
tiv
e
 
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy High-Cost Climate
Low-Cost Climate
 
Although my simulation results do not demonstrate that a state’s overall business 
climate affects the number of traditional policies proposed by the governor, an 
examination of the negative binomial regression coefficients presented in Table A.3 
reveals that one component of a state’s business climate – workers’ compensation 
expenditures – has a significant influence on traditional policy proposals. This finding 
supports the idea that traditional economic development policies are intended to lower the 
cost of doing business in a state.  
Economic Development Policy to Expand Entrepreneurial Resources 
When describing my theory in Chapter II, I suggested that interjurisdictional 
competition would influence governors’ decisions about entrepreneurial economic 
development policies. Specifically, I stated the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 17: Governors of states with few entrepreneurial resources will 
include a greater number of entrepreneurial economic development policies on 
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their legislative agendas than governors of states with abundant entrepreneurial 
resources. 
I define a state as having a high level of entrepreneurial resources in a given year 
if it exceeds the average for all states in at least two of my three measures of 
entrepreneurial resources. I define a state as having a low level of entrepreneurial 
resources if it is below average in at least two of the three measures. 
Figure 4.15 presents a graphical display of the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for each of the entrepreneurial resource variables for high-
resource states, low-resource states, and all states. I use these mean values in computer 
simulations to estimate the influence of a state’s entrepreneurial resources on its 
governor’s economic development proposals. 
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Figure 4.15: Graphical Summary of Entrepreneurial Resource Variables, 1996-2005 
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Note: Mean values are indicated by a small black dot; solid lines indicate standard deviations; diamond 
symbols indicate maximum and minimum values. 
An inspection of the upper panel of Figure 4.15 reveals that there is a fairly large 
difference in high-tech employment between high- and low-resource states. High-tech 
employment in the average high-resource state exceeds the national average of 4.1 
percent by 1.7 percentage points, while low-resource states fall below the national 
average by about one percentage point. 
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An examination of the middle panel of Figure 4.15 reveals that the distribution of 
venture capital funding is skewed by the very high levels of private venture capital 
funding that exist in a handful of states, such as California, New York, and 
Massachusetts. In other words, the mean value for all states, $158 per job, is much closer 
to the minimum value than to the maximum. There is a large difference in venture capital 
funding between high- and low-resource states. High-resource states experience private 
venture capital funding that exceeds the national average by approximately 119 percent, 
or $188 per job. In low-resource states, on the other hand, venture capital funding falls 
short of the national average by 67 percent, or more than $107 per job.  
Examining the lower panel of Figure 4.15 reveals that the distribution of 
academic research and development expenditures in science and engineering is also 
skewed. Academic research and development spending in high-resource states exceeds 
the national average by more than $58 per job. In low-resource states it falls short of the 
national average by more than $33 per job. These differences represent 26 percent and 15 
percent of the national average of $223 per job. 
The simulation results plotted in Figure 4.16 confirm that governors of low-
resource states propose more entrepreneurial economic development policies than 
governors of states with abundant entrepreneurial resources. Governors of states with 
lower than average entrepreneurial resources are expected to propose more than 0.9 
entrepreneurial economic development policies per legislative address, compared to 
approximately 0.5 entrepreneurial policies by governors of states with higher than 
average entrepreneurial resources. This predicted difference of more than 0.4 
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entrepreneurial policies per address is statistically significant at a confidence level 
exceeding 95 percent. These findings provide support for my seventeenth hypothesis. 
These findings lend additional support to my earlier claim that governors use 
entrepreneurial policies to address particular deficiencies within their states, rather than 
as a response to generally poor economic conditions. An inspection of the coefficients in 
Table A.3 reveals that lower than average levels of all three entrepreneurial resources – 
high tech employment, venture capital funding, and academic research and development 
spending – are associated with an increase in entrepreneurial policy advocacy by a state’s 
governor. 
Figure 4.16: Predicted Number of Entrepreneurial Policies Included in a 
Governor’s Legislative Address, Conditional on Entrepreneurial Resources, 1997-
2006 
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The Influence of Neighboring States’ Business Climates 
In Chapter II, I suggested that interjurisdictional competition would lead 
governors to pay particular attention to the business climates of neighboring states when 
making decisions about traditional economic development policies. Specifically, I stated: 
Hypothesis 18: Governors of states with higher-cost business climates than their 
neighboring states will include a greater number of traditional economic 
development policies on their legislative agendas than governors of states with 
lower-cost business climates. 
I use my business climate variables to create additional variables measuring the 
average business climate of each state’s neighbors. I define the relative per capita state 
tax revenue of a state’s neighbors as the arithmetic mean of the relative per capita state 
tax revenues of all states sharing a border with the state.20 Similarly, I define the relative 
workers’ compensation expenditures of a state’s neighbors as the arithmetic mean of the 
relative workers’ compensation expenditures of all states sharing a border with it.  
I use these measures of neighboring states’ business climates to determine which 
states have neighbors with higher-cost business climates and which have neighbors with 
lower-cost business climates. I define a state as having higher-cost neighbors if it has 
both lower per capita tax revenue and lower workers’ compensation expenses than its 
neighbors. A state has lower-cost neighbors if it has both higher per capita tax revenue 
and higher workers’ compensation expenses than its neighbors. 
Figure 4.17 presents a graphical display of the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for both of the business climate variables for all states and their 
higher-cost and lower-cost neighbors. I use these means in computer simulations to 
                                                 
20
 Alaska and Hawaii are excluded because they share a border with no other states. 
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estimate the influence of neighboring states’ business climates on the economic 
development policies that governors propose for their own states.  
Figure 4.17:  Graphical Summary of Neighboring States’ Business Climate 
Variables, 1996-2005 
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Note: Mean values are indicated by a small black dot; solid lines indicate standard deviations; diamond 
symbols indicate maximum and minimum values. 
An inspection of the upper panel of Figure 4.17 reveals that on average there is 
relatively little difference between a state’s own per capita tax revenue and the average 
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per capita tax revenue of its neighboring states. The average difference between a state’s 
own tax revenue and that of its neighbors is approximately $269 per capita if the 
neighboring states have higher-cost business climates. If the neighboring states have 
lower-cost business climates, then the difference in tax revenues is also approximately 
$269 per capita. These differences are approximately 13 percent of the average state tax 
revenue during the study period of $2,078 per capita.  
The lower panel of Figure 4.17 reveals that the average difference between a 
state’s own workers’ compensation expenditures and that of its neighbors is 
approximately $32 per job if the neighboring states have higher-cost business climates 
and approximately $40 per job if the neighboring states have lower-cost business 
climates. These differences are less than 13 percent of the average workers’ comp 
expenditure of $319 per job. These averages are used in simulations to predict the 
influence of state business climates on governors’ economic development policy 
recommendations. 
Figure 4.18 presents the results of simulations conducted to test my eighteenth 
hypothesis. These results indicate that governors make traditional economic development 
proposals without considering whether neighboring states have lower- or higher-cost 
business climates. The small predicted difference is not statistically significant and 
provides no support for my hypothesis that governors’ economic development policy 
decisions are especially influenced by the business climates of neighboring states. 
This finding provides support for the claim that the geographic scale of 
interjurisdictional competition for business investment has broadened. Both Bartik (2007) 
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and Thomas (2007) have noted that declines in communication and transportation costs 
have made it easier to coordinate business activities between distant locations, which 
increases the number of feasible locations for any particular business firm (Bartik 2007, 
p. 103-105; Thomas 2007, p. 43-45). These changes imply that geography is not a very 
important consideration in the competition for business investment. In other words, the 
governor of South Carolina, for example, has no real reason to consider North Carolina 
and Georgia as greater competitors than Colorado or Massachusetts, merely because they 
are closer in geographic proximity.   
Figure 4.18: Predicted Number of Traditional Policies Included in a Governor’s 
Legislative Address, Conditional on Business Climate of Neighboring States, 1997-
2006 
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The Influence of Neighboring States’ Entrepreneurial Resources 
In Chapter II, I theorized that governors would be influenced by the level of 
entrepreneurial resources of neighboring states when making decisions about 
entrepreneurial economic development policies. Specifically: 
Hypothesis 19: Governors of states with fewer entrepreneurial resources than their 
neighboring states will include a greater number of entrepreneurial economic 
development policies on their legislative agendas than governors of states with 
more entrepreneurial resources. 
I use my entrepreneurial resource variables to create additional variables 
measuring the average level of entrepreneurial resources of each state’s neighbors. For 
each of the three resources, I define the resource level of a state’s neighbors as the 
arithmetic mean of the resource levels of all states sharing a border with the state.  
I use these measures to determine which states have neighbors with higher levels 
of entrepreneurial resources and which have neighbors with lower levels of 
entrepreneurial resources. I define a state as having higher-resource neighbors if it has 
lower levels of entrepreneurial resources than its neighbors in at least two of the three 
measures. A state has lower-resource neighbors if it has higher levels of entrepreneurial 
resources than its neighbors in at least two of the three measures. 
Figure 4.19 presents a graphical display of the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for each of the entrepreneurial resource variables for all states 
and their higher-resource and lower-resource neighbors. I use these mean values in 
computer simulations to estimate the influence of neighboring states’ entrepreneurial 
resources on the entrepreneurial economic development policies that governors 
recommend for their own states. 
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Figure 4.19: Graphical Summary of Neighboring States’ Entrepreneurial Resource 
Variables, 1996-2005 
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Note: Mean values are indicated by a small black dot; solid lines indicate standard deviations; diamond 
symbols indicate maximum and minimum values. 
Figure 4.19 reveals that on average there is relatively little difference between a 
state’s own high-tech employment percentage and that of its neighboring states. The 
average difference between a state’s own high-tech employment and that of its neighbors 
is less than three-tenths of a percentage point if the neighboring states have higher levels 
of entrepreneurial resources and less than four-tenths of a percentage point if the 
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neighboring states have lower levels of resources. These differences are small compared 
to the average high-tech employment percentage of 4.1 percent.  
The lower panel of Figure 4.19 reveals that there is relatively little difference on 
average between a state’s own level of academic R&D spending and that of its neighbors. 
The average difference is less than $13 per job when the adjoining states have higher 
levels of entrepreneurial resources. The average difference is similar when the adjoining 
states have lower levels of resources. These differences are small compared to the 
average R&D expenditure of $223 per job.  
The middle panel of Figure 4.19 reveals that the average difference between a 
state’s private venture capital funding and that of its neighbors is approximately $52 per 
job if the adjoining states have higher levels of entrepreneurial resources, and $55 per job 
if they have lower levels of resources. These differences are relatively large compared to 
the national average of $158 per job. These relatively large differences may be caused by 
the very high levels of private venture capital funding in a handful of states, such as 
California, New York, and Massachusetts. 
The results of the simulations conducted to test my nineteenth hypothesis are 
presented in Figure 4.20. These results indicate that the level of entrepreneurial resources 
of neighboring states has no significant influence on the number of entrepreneurial 
economic development policies that a governor proposes. This finding provides  
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Figure 4.20: Predicted Number of Entrepreneurial Policies Included in a 
Governor’s Legislative Address, Conditional on Entrepreneurial Resources of 
Neighboring States, 1997-2006 
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additional support for the idea that declines in communication and transportation costs 
have lessened the contribution of geographic proximity to interstate competition for 
business investment.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I tested several hypotheses derived from my theory of 
gubernatorial economic development policymaking. Although some hypotheses were 
confirmed, others were refuted, which suggests that governors sometimes act in ways that 
are contrary to the behavior that I outlined in my theory. Several hypotheses were neither 
supported nor refuted. I find that a governor’s choices about the numbers and types of 
policies to include on his legislative agenda are influenced by the state’s economic 
conditions, his own party affiliation, the party in control of the legislature, citizens’ 
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policy preferences, state political culture, and the state’s existing levels of entrepreneurial 
resources.  
Governors act rationally when formulating their legislative agendas with respect 
to economic development policy. Governors of states that are lagging the nation in 
economic performance are more likely to include economic development policies on their 
legislative agendas. They also devote a larger portion of their agendas to economic 
development policy by increasing the number of traditional economic development 
policies they recommend to the legislature. Similarly, governors respond to lagging rates 
of business creation and deficiencies in resources that stimulate business creation by 
recommending a larger number of entrepreneurial policies intended to expand those 
resources. 
When making economic development policy decisions, a governor may be 
constrained by features in the political environment, such as divided government, his 
state’s political culture, or the policy preferences of the state’s citizens. For example, 
Republican governors exhibit a much stronger preference for traditional economic 
development policies than Democratic governors. When state legislatures are controlled 
by Democrats, however, Republican governors tend to make substantially fewer 
traditional economic development policy recommendations than when their fellow 
Republicans are in control. I interpret this finding as further evidence that governors act 
strategically when making economic development policy decisions. Republican 
governors recognize that traditional policies will not be well received by Democratic 
legislators and that trying to promote a large number of these policies may consume 
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bargaining resources that can be used more effectively on other policy issues. In the next 
chapter, I will investigate whether governors are able to overcome constraints on their 
policy choices by using the formal and informal gubernatorial powers at their disposal.  
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CHAPTER V 
GUBERNATORIAL POWERS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
POLICYMAKING 
In the previous chapter, I tested hypotheses about the influence of state economic 
conditions, budget resources, gubernatorial party affiliation, partisan legislative control, 
citizen ideology, state political culture, business climates, and state entrepreneurial 
resources on governors’ economic development policy decisions. I found that in some 
cases, these factors constrain a governor’s set of choices with regard to economic 
development policies. Governors often have formal institutional powers, such as line-
item veto authority, and personal powers, such high public approval, that they can use to 
overcome constraints imposed on them by the political environment. In this chapter, I test 
my remaining hypotheses concerning the influence of governors’ institutional and 
personal powers on their economic development policy recommendations. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
I estimate three pairs of models regarding gubernatorial economic development 
policymaking. The first pair of models is used to examine the influence of governors’ 
institutional powers on their economic development proposals, the second pair examines 
the influence of electoral mandates on their proposals, and the third pair concerns the 
influence of public approval. The dependent variable of the first model in each pair is the 
number of traditional economic development policies that governors proposed in each of 
their legislative addresses. The dependent variable of the second model in each pair is the 
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number of entrepreneurial economic development policies. As in the previous chapter, I 
estimate these models using negative binomial regression. 
Each model in this chapter contains independent variables measuring the 
economic conditions, budget resources, gubernatorial party affiliation, partisan legislative 
control, citizen ideology, state political culture, business climate, and entrepreneurial 
resources in each of the fifty states from 1997 to 2006. These variables and the sources of 
the data used to create them were discussed in Chapter IV. In addition to those variables, 
each model in this chapter also contains variables that measure the strength of governors’ 
institutional or personal powers. These variables and the sources of the data used to 
create them are discussed below. Summary statistics for all dependent and independent 
variables used in my analyses are presented in the appendix (see Table A.1). 
Institutional Powers 
A governor’s institutional powers include his ability to make appointments, veto 
legislation, and serve multiple terms. These powers provide a governor with political 
capital that he can use to bargain with legislators for their support of his legislative 
proposals. I created two dummy variables to classify the strength of a governor’s 
institutional powers into one of three categories: strong, weak, or average. The first 
variable takes a value of one if a governor’s institutional powers are exceptionally 
stronger than average and a value of zero if he is average or below average in strength. 
The second variable takes a value of one if a governor is exceptionally weaker than 
average and a value of zero if his powers are average or above average in strength. If a 
governor’s institutional powers are neither exceptionally strong nor exceptionally weak, 
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then both variables take a value of zero. To identify exceptionally strong and weak 
governors, I created indexes measuring their institutional powers in three areas that 
strengthen governors’ ability to bargain with legislators: the existence of separately 
chosen statewide officials, tenure potential, and line-item veto power. Each of these 
individual indexes measures gubernatorial powers on a scale from one to four. Governors 
with the strongest powers have an index value of four and those with the weakest powers 
have an index value of one. I then combine these individual indexes to create an index 
measuring overall institutional power on a scale from three to twelve. Finally, I use this 
index of overall institutional strength to classify governors as strong, weak, or average. 
The data used to create each of the individual indexes are discussed below. 
Separately Chosen Statewide Officials  
The ability to appoint important statewide executive branch officials not only 
allows a governor to place like-minded policy officials in positions of importance, but 
also provides him with resources that he can use in negotiating with legislators (Bernick 
and Wiggins 1991, p. 80; Beyle 1983, p. 196; Beyle 2004, p. 211-14). In some states, 
however, many important statewide officials may either be popularly elected or appointed 
by political officials other than the governor, such as the legislature. These other methods 
of choosing statewide officials reduce a governor’s appointment powers, which can limit 
the resources that a governor has available for legislative bargaining. Popular election or 
appointment of these officials by someone other than the governor also limits a 
governor’s influence over important executive branch functions, because these separately 
chosen officials may have a different constituency than the governor or different policy 
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goals, making them less responsive to his policy preferences than an appointed official 
(Beyle 1983, p. 191-92; Beyle 2004, p. 210-11; Gross 1991, p. 10; Herzik 1991, p. 26; 
Morehouse 1976, p. 222; Schlesinger 1965, p. 208).    
I count the number of important statewide officials in each state that are either 
popularly elected or appointed by political officials other than the governor. This measure 
provides an indication of a governor’s institutional strength with regard to separately 
chosen officials. I define important statewide officials to include the lieutenant governor, 
secretary of state, attorney general, and treasurer. I also include the secretary of 
education, secretary of agriculture, secretary of labor, chief insurance commissioner, and 
chief utility regulation official in this category. I obtain information about the method of 
selecting these officials in each state from the Book of the States (Council of State 
Governments 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).21  
The number of separately chosen statewide officials varies from zero in Alaska 
and New Jersey to eight in Georgia, North Carolina, and North Dakota. Approximately 
60 percent of the states had three, four, or five separately chosen statewide officials, with 
a median of four. Only about 20 percent of the states had more than five separately 
chosen officials. A similar percentage had fewer than three. 
I use this data to create an index measuring gubernatorial institutional strength 
with respect to separately chosen statewide officials on a scale from one to four. Because 
governors are generally stronger when they compete for political influence with relatively 
                                                 
21
 The Book of the States was not published in 1998 or 2000. Because states do not frequently change their 
methods for selecting officials, I assume that officials were selected by the same methods in 1998 and 2000 
as in 1997 and 1999, respectively. 
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few other officials, I rank the 20 percent of governors in states with two or fewer 
separately chosen officials as the strongest on this dimension and assign them an index 
value of four. Governors who must compete with many other officials for influence are 
the weakest on this dimension. For this reason, I rank the 20 percent of governors in 
states with more than five separately chosen officials as the weakest and assign them an 
index value of one. Governors of states with exactly four separately chosen officials are 
at the median level of strength on this dimension. I assign them an index value of 2.5, 
which is the mid-point between one and four. Governors of states with three separately 
chosen officials are slightly above the median strength, but not among the strongest 
governors, so I assign them an index value of three which is slightly above the mid-point.  
Similarly, governors of states with five separately chosen officials are slightly below the 
median strength, but not among the weakest governors. I assign these governors an index 
value of two. 
Tenure Potential  
In most states, gubernatorial terms are four years long and governors may serve 
no more than two terms. The need to run for reelection and the imposition of term limits 
restrict the time that governors have to build legislative coalitions and may also lead to a 
decline in gubernatorial bargaining strength over the course of their administrations 
(Beyle 2004, p. 206; Morehouse 1976, p.198; Ransone 1982, p. 30, 26, and 170-71; 
Rosenthal 1990, p. 21; Sabato 1983, p. 98). A lame duck governor serving his final term 
is potentially at a disadvantage in bargaining with legislators compared to a governor 
who is eligible to run for reelection.  A legislator who opposes a lame duck governor’s 
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policies may choose to wait until a new governor is elected and takes office rather than 
bargain with the current governor. If a governor is eligible to run for reelection, on the 
other hand, a legislator may decide to negotiate with him because it may be several years 
before a new governor takes office. Similarly, governors with three or four years 
remaining in their current term have more potential power than governors with only one 
or two years remaining.  
I obtain information about gubernatorial term lengths, gubernatorial term limits, 
and when each governor in my dataset was first elected or succeeded to office from the 
Book of the States (Council of State Governments 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006). I used these data to create an index measuring gubernatorial tenure potential 
on a scale from one to four. A governor is weakest with regard to tenure potential when 
he is both ineligible for reelection and has only one or two years remaining in his current 
term. I assign governors in this situation the lowest possible index value of one. 
Governors who have three or four years remaining in their current term and are eligible to 
serve another term have the greatest strength on this dimension. These governors are 
assigned the highest index value of four. A governor who has three or four years 
remaining in his current term but is term-limited and ineligible to run for reelection, has 
intermediate strength with regard to tenure potential. A governor who has only one or 
two years left to serve in his current term, but is eligible to run for reelection also has 
intermediate strength in this regard. Because it is not clear to me which of these two 
governors are stronger, I assign each of them an index value of 2.5, which is the mid-
point value between the strongest and weakest governors.  
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Line Item Veto Power 
Although governors of all fifty states possessed the power to veto legislation 
during the period of my study, several states do not grant their governor the power to 
exercise a line item veto. Line item veto authority expands gubernatorial veto power by 
allowing a governor to eliminate or reduce particular appropriations without rejecting an 
entire appropriations bill (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 78; Beyle 1983, p. 200; Beyle 
2004, p. 215; Jewell 1969, p. 68; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 179-80; Rosenthal 1990, 
p. 10). This enhanced veto power not only provides a governor with greater appropriation 
authority, but can also be used in bargaining for support on other bills of interest to him 
(Rosenthal 1990, p. 10). For example, a governor with the line item veto can threaten to 
reduce or eliminate an appropriation that is important to a particular legislator unless the 
lawmaker votes in favor of a particular bill supported by the governor.  
I determined which governors had line item veto authority from information 
contained in the Book of the States (Council of State Governments 1997, 1999, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). I used this information to create an index measuring 
gubernatorial veto power on a scale from one to four. Governors lacking the line item 
veto are assigned an index value of one and those with the line item veto are assigned a 
value of four. 
Overall Institutional Power 
I sum the values of the three individual indexes for each observation in my dataset 
to create another index measuring overall institutional power on a scale from three to 
twelve. Only 25 percent of the governors have an overall institutional power index value 
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of 10.5 or greater. I considered these governors to be those with strong institutional 
powers. At the other end of the scale, only 25 percent of governors had an overall index 
value of 7.5 or less. I considered these governors to have weak institutional powers. If a 
governor had an overall index value greater than 7.5 but less than 10.5, I considered him 
to be neither strong nor weak. 
I use these overall index values to assign values to my two dummy variables that 
indicate weak and strong governors. The first variable, which indicates strong governors, 
takes a value of one if a governor’s overall institutional power index is 10.5 or more and 
a value of zero if it is less than 10.5. The second variable, which indicates weak 
governors, takes a value of one if a governor’s overall institutional power index is 7.5 or 
less and a value of zero if it is more than 7.5.  
Number of Opposition Votes Required 
In Chapter II, I suggested that during periods of divided government a governor 
could use his institutional powers to persuade members of the opposition party to support 
his legislation. I also suggested that this strategy would be viable only when the governor 
needed a relatively small number of opposition votes to form a majority. Consequently, 
governors would be unlikely to use it when they needed a large number of opposition 
votes. I include a variable measuring the number of opposition votes required by each 
governor in the first pair of models so that I can test my hypotheses concerning 
institutional powers. 
The dataset that I use to determine the political party in control of each state 
legislature contains information about the number of seats in each state legislative 
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chamber that are held by each political party in each year. I use this information to create 
a variable that measures the minimum number of opposition votes needed by each 
governor to build a working majority. For example, consider a hypothetical situation in 
which a Republican governor is working with a state legislature in which Democrats hold 
32 of 50 seats in the upper chamber and 52 of 100 seats in the lower chamber. If I assume 
that all Republican legislators will vote in favor of the governor’s legislation, then the 
governor needs a minimum of eight opposition votes to obtain a majority in the upper 
chamber and three to obtain a majority in the lower chamber for a total of eleven 
opposition votes.  When a governor’s political party controls a legislative chamber, then I 
assume that he can obtain a majority from among his own party members and will not 
need any opposition votes to pass legislation in that chamber. 
Electoral Mandate 
In the second pair of models, which examine the influence of an electoral 
mandate, I include a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the governor was elected 
under conditions that would provide him with an electoral mandate and a value of zero if 
he has no electoral mandate. Edwards (1989) identifies the conditions that contribute to a 
president’s claim of an electoral mandate. These conditions include winning the election 
by a large margin, defeating an incumbent, and having his victory be accompanied either 
by a large increase in the number of legislative seats held by his party or a shift in control 
of one or both legislative chambers from the opposition to his own party (Edwards 1989, 
p. 150-61).  
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For each full or partial gubernatorial term represented in my dataset, I gather data 
concerning the conditions under which the governor assumed office. I use these data to 
determine whether they attained office under conditions that strengthen their claim to an 
electoral mandate. I use this data to create an index measuring the strength of each 
governor’s claim to a mandate. Finally, I use this index of electoral mandate strength to 
assign values to the dummy variable that indicates that a governor has an electoral 
mandate. The data I use to create my electoral mandate index are discussed below. 
Winning Electoral Margin 
A large margin of victory is one indicator of an electoral mandate (Beyle 2004, p. 
205). By contrast, a governor who succeeds to office upon the resignation or death of his 
predecessor has the weakest claim to an electoral mandate. I assign governors who 
succeeded to office after the death or resignation of the previous governor an electoral 
mandate index value of zero. Governors who were elected to office receive one point 
toward their electoral mandate index. I add an additional point if a governor was elected 
by an exceptionally large percentage of the vote. Because I had no preconceived idea 
about how large a governor’s vote percentage must be to provide him with an electoral 
mandate, I examined my data concerning vote percentages received by the governors in 
my dataset. I found that only 25 percent of the governors received more than 58.3 percent 
of the vote. I assumed that a vote percentage in excess of this value is an indication of an 
electoral mandate, because it is so uncommon. I obtain data concerning the winning vote 
percentage of each elected governor from Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to U.S. 
Elections (Congressional Quarterly 2005; Moore, Preimesberger, and Tarr 2001).  
178 
Defeat of the Incumbent Party 
A chief executive’s claim to an electoral mandate is enhanced when there is 
evidence that voters elected him because of their desire for a change in policy direction 
(Edwards 1989, p. 160-61). One way that voters can indicate their desire for change is by 
electing a governor of a different party than the incumbent. This indication is particularly 
strong when a challenger defeats the incumbent governor. I assign governors who were 
elected by defeating a member of the incumbent governor’s party one point toward their 
electoral mandate index. If a governor defeated the incumbent governor, then I add an 
additional point to his index. 
Coattail Effects 
A chief executive’s claim to an electoral mandate is strengthened when his 
election is accompanied by a large increase in his party’s strength in the legislature 
(Edwards 1989, p. 151). When a governor is elected under these circumstances, voters 
appear to be providing a strong indication of support for him and his policies. I use 
information in my legislative dataset to determine the percentage of the seats in each 
state’s legislature that were held by the governor’s party members before and after his 
election. I add an additional point to the electoral mandate index of governors whose 
elections were accompanied by an exceptionally large increase in the percentage of 
legislative seats held by their fellow party members. I had no preconceived idea about 
how large the increase in a governor’s legislative party strength must be to indicate that 
his election had coattail effects. For this reason, I examined my data concerning changes 
in legislative party composition. I found that only 25 percent of gubernatorial elections 
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were accompanied by a change in legislative seats of more than 5.67 percent. I assumed 
that a change in the governor’s party strength larger than this percentage indicated that he 
had coattails because changes this large are so uncommon. If a governor’s election was 
also accompanied by a shift in control of one or both chambers of the state legislature to 
the governor’s party, then I add an additional point for each chamber that changed 
control. 
Overall Electoral Mandate Strength  
I add the points awarded for meeting each of the electoral mandate conditions 
described above to form an overall electoral mandate index. The index values for the 
governors in my dataset range from zero to four. During the ten years covered by my 
study, governors served 168 full or partial terms in office. Of these 168 terms, governors 
began 40 of them, or approximately 24 percent, with an electoral mandate index value of 
three or greater. Because this combination of conditions is so uncommon, I assume that 
an overall electoral mandate index of three or greater indicates the presence of an 
electoral mandate. I indicate that a governor has an electoral mandate using a dummy 
variable takes a value of one if the value of a governor’s electoral mandate index is three 
or more and a value of zero if it is less than three.   
Years Served During the Current Term 
In Chapter II, I suggest that the benefits of an electoral mandate decline as a 
governor continues his term in office. To account for the possibility that the effect of an 
electoral mandate might change over the course of a governor’s term, I include in the 
180 
second pair of models a variable that indicates the number of years a governor has served 
during his current term. This variable takes a value of zero during the first year of a 
governor’s term after being elected or succeeding to office. The value of this variable 
increases by one for each subsequent year until the governor leaves office or is reelected. 
Public Approval Ratings 
In the third pair of models, I measure the level of public approval of the governors 
in my study using the U.S. Officials’ Job Approval Ratings dataset compiled by Beyle, 
Niemi, and Sigelman (2002).22 This dataset contains information concerning the job 
approval ratings of governors as determined by surveys dating back to the 1940s. The 
information contained in the dataset includes the percentage of respondents who 
expressed a positive or negative opinion of the governor’s job performance and the date 
or dates on which the survey was conducted.  
Unfortunately, these opinion surveys are conducted infrequently in many states. 
As a result, there were relatively few instances in which any particular state’s citizens 
were surveyed shortly before the governor’s annual legislative address. Even surveys 
within a six-month window prior to each governor’s legislative address are uncommon. 
Of the 462 gubernatorial addresses analyzed for this study, only 225 of them were 
preceded by a job approval survey within the six months prior to the date of the address. 
For these 225 observations, I use the results of the last survey conducted within that six-
month window. I define each governor’s public approval rating as the percentage of 
                                                 
22
 The latest version of this dataset is available for download at http:// www.unc.edu/~beyle/ jars.html. 
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respondents expressing a positive opinion of the governor’s performance divided by the 
sum of the percentages of the respondents expressing a positive or negative opinion. 
Analyzing the Influence of Institutional Powers 
I test my hypotheses concerning institutional powers by estimating two models. 
The first model predicts the number of traditional economic development policies that 
governors propose in their legislative addresses. The other model predicts the number of 
entrepreneurial policies. The negative binomial regression results for the two models are 
presented in the appendix (see Table A.4) as a point of reference for the reader. However, 
the direct interpretation of these regression coefficients in relation to my hypotheses is 
rather complex because the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted as changes in the 
quantities of interest in my analysis. Therefore, I use computer simulations, as suggested 
by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000), to analyze my hypotheses. The simulation 
procedures were described in Chapter IV. 
In Chapter II, I hypothesized that during periods of divided government governors 
may use their institutional powers to persuade opposition members of the legislature to 
support their proposals. This strategy will be most viable when the number of legislative 
seats held by the opposition is only slightly greater than the number held by the 
governor’s party because the governor will only need to convince a few opposition 
legislators to support his policies. The discussion of this gubernatorial bargaining strategy 
leads to the following hypotheses:   
Hypothesis 20: During periods of divided government when there is a small 
difference in the number of seats held by the majority and minority parties, 
Republican governors with strong institutional powers will include a greater 
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number of traditional economic development policies on their legislative agendas 
than Republican governors with weak institutional powers. 
Hypothesis 21: During periods of divided government when there is a small 
difference in the number of seats held by the majority and minority parties, 
Democratic governors with strong institutional powers will include a greater 
number of entrepreneurial economic development policies on their legislative 
agendas than Democratic governors with weak institutional powers. 
The results of the simulations conducted to test these two hypotheses are plotted 
in Figure 5.1. I examined my data concerning partisan composition of the legislature to 
determine what difference in the number of majority and minority legislative seats should 
be considered a small difference. I found that during periods of divided government only 
25 percent of governors needed six or fewer opposition votes. Because such a narrowly 
divided legislature is so uncommon, the simulations in this section assume that governors 
need to obtain the support of six opposition party members to build a majority coalition 
in support of their proposals.  
The estimates plotted in the top panel of Figure 5.1 indicate that Republican 
governors with strong institutional powers are expected to propose approximately 2.9 
traditional economic development policies per legislative address. Republican governors 
with weak institutional powers, on the other hand, are expected to propose only 1.8 
traditional policies per address. Because the difference of about 1.1 policies per address is 
statistically significant at the 90 percent level, these findings provide support for my 
twentieth hypothesis.   
The estimates plotted in the bottom panel of the figure demonstrate that 
Democratic governors with strong institutional powers are expected to propose 
approximately 0.8 entrepreneurial policies per legislative address during periods of 
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narrowly divided government. Those governors with weak institutional powers, on the 
other hand, are expected to propose less than 0.5 entrepreneurial polices per address. In 
this case, however, the difference is not statistically significant.  
Figure 5.1: Predicted Number of Preferred Economic Development Policies 
Included in a Governor’s Legislative Address When the Votes of Six Opposition 
Members Are Required, Conditional on Strength of Gubernatorial Institutional 
Powers, 1997-2006 
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I do not expect governors to adopt this bargaining strategy when they need a large 
number of opposition votes. First, a governor’s bargaining resources are finite, which will 
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limit the number of deals that he can make with legislators. Second, the probability that a 
legislator’s demand conflicts with a deal the governor already has in place increases with 
each additional deal a governor tries to make.  Consequently, I assume that governors 
cannot obtain a large number of opposition votes in this manner. This assumption leads to 
two additional hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 22: During periods of divided government when there is a large 
difference in the number of seats held by the majority and minority parties, the 
strength of Republican governors’ institutional powers will have no effect on the 
number of traditional economic development policies they include on their 
legislative agendas. 
Hypothesis 23: During periods of divided government when there is a large 
difference in the number of seats held by the majority and minority parties, the 
strength of Democratic governors’ institutional powers will have no effect on the 
number of entrepreneurial economic development policies they include on their 
legislative agendas. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the results of the simulations conducted to test these two 
hypotheses. I examined my data concerning partisan composition of the legislature to 
determine what difference in the number of majority and minority legislative seats should 
be considered a large difference. I found that during periods of divided government, only 
25 percent of the governors needed twenty-six or more opposition votes to form a 
majority. Because so few governors needed such a large number of opposition votes, the 
simulations in this section assume that governors need to obtain the support of twenty-six 
opposition party members to build a majority coalition in support of their proposals. The 
simulation results plotted in the top panel of the figure indicate that when needing a large 
number of opposition votes, strong Republican governors propose approximately 2.2 
traditional economic development policies per address. Weak Republican governors in 
185 
the same circumstances are expected to propose only 1.3 traditional policies per address. 
The difference of 0.9 policies per address is statistically significant at the 90 percent 
level. These findings indicate that, contrary to my hypothesis, there is no apparent decline 
in the influence of Republican governors’ institutional powers as the number of 
opposition votes they require increases. 
Figure 5.2: Predicted Number of Preferred Economic Development Policies 
Included in a Governor’s Legislative Address When the Votes of Twenty-Six 
Opposition Members Are Required, Conditional on Strength of Gubernatorial 
Institutional Powers, 1997-2006 
0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
3
4
Traditional Policies - Republican Governors
R
e
la
tiv
e
 
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy Weak Institutional Powers
Strong Institutional Powers
0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
3
4
Entrepreneurial Policies - Democratic Governors
Proposals per Address
R
e
la
tiv
e
 
Fr
e
qu
e
n
cy Weak Institutional Powers
Strong Institutional Powers
 
186 
The estimates plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 5.2 demonstrate that 
Democratic governors with strong institutional powers are expected to propose almost 1.3 
entrepreneurial policies per legislative address during periods when they need a large 
number of opposition votes. Those with weak institutional powers, on the other hand, are 
expected to propose less than 0.8 entrepreneurial polices per address. The difference of 
0.5 policies per address is not statistically significant. These findings provide no support 
for my argument that the influence of Democratic governors’ institutional powers 
diminishes as the number of opposition votes required increases. 
Overall, my findings regarding these four hypotheses support the idea that the 
strength of a governor’s institutional powers influences his policy decisions. They do not, 
however, support my theory about how governors use these powers to advance their 
policies in the legislature during periods of divided government. I had argued that these 
institutional powers would provide them with bargaining resources to obtain the support 
of individual legislators within the opposition party. I also argued, however, that the 
number of votes that governors could obtain by this strategy would be limited because 
these bargaining resources are finite. I also suggested that conflicting demands by 
legislators would make it difficult for governors to make a large number of these political 
bargains. Consequently, I expected strong governors to propose a greater number of 
economic development proposals than weak governors during periods of narrowly 
divided government. I expected that this difference between strong and weak governors 
would diminish as the number of opposition votes they required increased. Although I 
find that strong governors tend to propose more policies than weak governors when they 
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need only a few opposition votes, I do not find any evidence that this difference 
diminishes as the opposition party’s advantage in the legislature increases.  
One explanation for my findings is that governors’ institutional powers provide 
them with bargaining resources that can be used to obtain a much larger number of votes 
than I had envisioned. Rather than allowing them to bargain for a handful of opposition 
votes, strong institutional powers enable them to bargain for dozens of votes. This 
explanation seems implausible for two reasons. First, it implies that a governor’s 
bargaining resources are unlimited and do not diminish as he makes additional legislative 
deals. Second, this explanation does not account for the effect that obtaining support from 
opposition legislators will have on the support provided by the governor’s own party 
members. Morehouse (1996 and 1998) finds evidence that bargaining for opposition 
support may erode a governor’s support within his own party (Morehouse 1996, p. 379; 
1998, p. 219-20). Even if a governor succeeds in obtaining a large number of opposition 
votes by bargaining, he may lose some of the votes of his own party members. This loss 
will necessitate bargaining for even more votes.   
An alternative explanation of my results is that strong institutional powers provide 
governors with resources that allow them to overcome constraints on agenda size. In 
measuring governors’ institutional powers, I focused on the powers that would be most 
useful in bargaining, such as line-item veto authority. I did not include measures of 
resources that would be useful in policy development, such as the size of a governor’s 
staff. Perhaps governors who have high levels of institutional bargaining resources also 
have high levels of policy development resources. These resources would permit them to 
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develop a greater number of policy proposals and expand their economic development 
policy agendas. Although further studies are needed to understand how institutional 
powers influence governors’ economic development proposals, this interpretation of my 
findings is consistent with the results of studies by other scholars. They find that states 
with institutionally strong governors tend to enact and implement a larger variety of 
economic development programs (Ambrosius 1989, p. 63; Elkins, Bingham, and Bowen 
1996, p. 167). 
Analyzing the Influence of an Electoral Mandate 
In this section, I estimate two models to test my hypotheses concerning 
governors’ electoral mandates. The first model predicts the number of traditional 
economic development policies that governors propose in their legislative addresses. The 
other model predicts the number of entrepreneurial policies. The negative binomial 
regression results for the two models are presented in the appendix (see Table A.5) as a 
point of reference for the reader. However, the interpretation of these regression 
coefficients in relation to my hypotheses is rather complex because the coefficients 
cannot be directly interpreted as changes in the quantities of interest in my analysis. For 
this reason, I use computer simulations, as suggested by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 
(2000), to analyze my hypotheses. The simulation procedures were described in Chapter 
IV. 
In Chapter II, I suggested that having an electoral mandate will provide a newly 
elected governor with political capital that can be used to overcome legislative resistance 
to his policy proposals. As a result, I expect that governors with electoral mandates will 
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propose larger numbers of their preferred economic development policies than those 
lacking mandates. This discussion of electoral mandates leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 24: Recently elected Republican governors will include a greater 
number of traditional economic development policies on their legislative agendas 
if they have a significant ability to claim an electoral mandate than if they possess 
little ability to claim a mandate. 
Hypothesis 25: Recently elected Democratic governors will include a greater 
number of entrepreneurial economic development policies on their legislative 
agendas if they have a significant ability to claim an electoral mandate than if they 
possess little ability to claim a mandate. 
The simulation results plotted in Figure 5.3 provide little support for these two 
hypotheses. The estimates plotted in the top panel indicate that recently elected 
Republican governors with an electoral mandate are expected to propose approximately 
2.7 traditional economic development policies per legislative address. Without a 
mandate, on the other hand, these governors are expected to propose only 1.9 traditional 
policies per address. Although the expected difference of 0.8 traditional proposals per 
address is substantively large, it is statistically insignificant.  
The estimates plotted in the bottom panel of the figure demonstrate that electoral 
mandates have no influence on the number of entrepreneurial economic development 
policies proposed by Democratic governors. They are expected to propose slightly less 
than 0.6 entrepreneurial policies per legislative address with or without an electoral 
mandate. The small predicted difference is not statistically significant.  
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Figure 5.3: Predicted Number of Preferred Economic Development Policies 
Included in a Recently Elected Governor’s Legislative Address, Conditional on 
Possessing an Electoral Mandate, 1997-2006 
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Although my estimates of the influence of electoral mandates on traditional and 
entrepreneurial policy proposals are both statistically insignificant, my simulation results 
suggest that an electoral mandate may affect the two types of policy proposals differently. 
This difference is apparent by examining Figure 5.3. The bottom panel of the figure 
demonstrates that my estimate of the influence of an electoral mandate on entrepreneurial 
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proposals by Democratic governors is not only statistically insignificant, but is nearly 
zero. Even if this difference between Democratic governors with and without a mandate 
was statistically significant, I would still conclude that an electoral mandate has no 
substantive effect in this situation. In the case of Republican governors proposing 
traditional policies, the simulation results presented in the top panel of Figure 5.3 reveal 
that the estimated effect of an electoral mandate is large (approximately 0.8 proposals per 
address). The probability distribution surrounding the estimate for Republican governors 
with an electoral mandate is very wide, however, which indicates that there is a great deal 
of uncertainty associated with the estimate. In this case, the lack of statistical significance 
is because the estimate is extremely uncertain, not because it is small. 
This difference raises an interesting question: Why would an electoral mandate 
have a large, although uncertain, influence on Republican governors’ decisions about 
traditional economic development policies, but have no influence on Democratic 
governors’ decisions about entrepreneurial policies? One possible explanation is that 
Democratic governors do not need to expend extra political capital to promote 
entrepreneurial economic development policies because these policies receive support 
from both parties. Although I had predicted that Democratic governors and legislators 
would have a greater preference for entrepreneurial policies than Republicans, my earlier 
analysis suggests that they have similar preferences for these policies. In Chapter IV, I 
found that Democratic and Republican governors tend to propose similar numbers of 
entrepreneurial policies. I also found that Democratic governors propose similar numbers 
of entrepreneurial policies under both unified and divided government. If there is not a 
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large partisan conflict over entrepreneurial economic development policies, then a 
Democratic governor with an electoral mandate may choose to use his political capital to 
promote other policy proposals that are subject to conflict.  
My earlier findings indicate, however, that there are partisan differences 
concerning traditional policies. In Chapter IV, I found that Republican governors propose 
a greater number of traditional economic development policies and that they tend to 
reduce the number of traditional policies they recommend when Democrats control the 
legislature. Republican governors with an electoral mandate may propose more 
traditional policies than those without a mandate because they expect the extra political 
capital to help them overcome Democratic resistance to their proposals.   
Analyzing the Influence of Public Approval 
In this section, I estimate two models to test my hypotheses concerning the 
influence of public approval on governors’ economic development policies. The first 
model predicts the number of traditional economic development policies that governors 
propose in their legislative addresses. The other model predicts the number of 
entrepreneurial policies. The negative binomial regression results for the two models are 
presented in the appendix (see Table A.6) as a point of reference for the reader. However, 
the interpretation of these regression coefficients in relation to my hypotheses is rather 
complex because the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted as changes in the 
quantities of interest in my analysis. Consequently, I use computer simulations, as 
suggested by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000), to provide a more straightforward 
interpretation of my results. The simulation procedures were described in Chapter IV. 
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In Chapter II, I argued that a high level of public approval is another source of 
political capital that governors can use to overcome legislative resistance to their 
proposals. Because a governor’s high public approval rating is a signal that he has public 
support for his policies, legislators will be more reluctant to oppose him than if he had 
low public approval. As a result, I expect that popular governors will propose more of 
their own preferred policies than unpopular governors. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 26: Republican governors with high public approval ratings will 
include a greater number of traditional economic development policies on their 
legislative agendas than Republican governors with low public approval. 
Hypothesis 27: Democratic governors with high public approval ratings will 
include a greater number of entrepreneurial economic development policies on 
their legislative agendas than Democratic governors with low public approval. 
I examined my dataset to determine what levels of public approval are unusually 
high or low because I had no preconceived idea about what constitutes high or low public 
approval. I found that the 25 percent of governors with the lowest public approval had 
ratings of 54 percent or lower. The 25 percent of governors who had the highest public 
approval had ratings at or above 69 percent. Because public approval above or below 
these two cutoffs was relatively uncommon, I used these two percentages to simulate 
governors with low and high public approval, respectively. 
The simulation results plotted in Figure 5.4 provide little evidence that public 
approval has any significant influence on the number of economic development policies 
that governors recommend to state legislatures. The estimates plotted in the top panel 
indicate that Republican governors with a high level of public approval are expected to 
propose approximately 2.2 traditional economic development policies per legislative 
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address. Those with low public approval are expected to propose about 2.1 policies per 
address. The difference is not statistically significant. 
Figure 5.4: Predicted Number of Preferred Economic Development Policies 
Included in a Governor’s Legislative Address, Conditional on Public Approval, 
1997-2006 
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The estimates presented in the bottom panel of Figure 5.4 indicate that 
Democratic governors with high levels of public approval are expected to propose less 
than 0.6 entrepreneurial policies per legislative address. Contrary to my hypothesis, I find 
that Democratic governors with low levels of public approval propose more 
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entrepreneurial policies than more popular governors (approximately 0.7 per address). 
The difference, however, is not statistically significant. 
My findings do not support my hypotheses about the influence of public approval 
on gubernatorial economic development proposals. The lack of an estimated effect does 
not necessarily indicate that public approval has no influence, but may instead be a result 
of the shortcomings in my data. At this time, the job approval dataset compiled by Beyle, 
Niemi, and Sigelman (2002) is the most comprehensive collection of public approval data 
regarding governors. Unfortunately, public approval surveys were conducted infrequently 
in many states. Because of the irregular timing of these surveys, there were many 
instances in which a state’s citizens were not surveyed during the period immediately 
prior to the governor’s legislative address. So that I could obtain a sufficient number of 
observations for my analysis, I used results from surveys in the dataset that were 
conducted as much as six months prior to a governor’s legislative address. In the cases 
where I had to use these observations from several months prior to a governor’s 
legislative address, my data may not accurately measure the governor’s public approval 
at the time of his address. Some of the gaps in my data may be filled in the future because 
the collection of these public approval ratings is an ongoing project (Beyle 2007). As 
more survey data become available in the future, scholars may be able to obtain better 
estimates of the influence of public approval on gubernatorial policymaking. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I tested several hypotheses concerning the influence of governors’ 
institutional and personal powers on the economic development policies that they 
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recommend to state legislatures. Although my analysis failed to support several of my 
hypotheses, I find evidence that governors use their powers to overcome some constraints 
on their policy choices. For example, my analysis demonstrates that governors with 
strong institutional powers propose a larger number of policy recommendations than 
weak governors. These findings indicate that governors’ institutional powers allow them 
to overcome constraints on agenda size. This result may suggest that scholars need to 
reconsider the relationship between legislative success and agenda size.  Presidential 
scholars have suggested that presidents should limit the number of items on their 
legislative agenda to increase their prospects of legislative success (Bond and Fleisher 
1990, p. 32; Edwards 1989, p. 201-2; Light 1999, p. 52-53). At the state level, Ferguson 
(2003) finds that a governor’s probability of legislative success decreases as the size of 
his legislative agenda increases (p. 170). Her finding assumes, however, that 
gubernatorial strength is held constant and that a governor’s decisions about agenda size 
are independent of the strength of his institutional powers. Ferguson’s (2003) theory 
assumes that strong governors will use their powers to increase the percentage of their 
proposals that are enacted by the legislature (p. 162-64). My findings, on the other hand, 
imply that strong governors expand their agendas and attempt to increase the number of 
proposals that are enacted rather than the percentage.  
I also find evidence that governors use the political capital that they receive from 
an electoral mandate to promote policies that are opposed by members of the opposition 
party, rather than policies that have more widespread support. This finding is very 
tentative, however, because there is much uncertainty surrounding my estimate of the 
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influence of electoral mandates on gubernatorial policy proposals. Overall, my results 
indicate that governors’ institutional and personal powers influence their proposals with 
regard to economic development policy. Further research is required, however, to 
understand how governors use their powers in developing and promoting their policy 
proposals. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, I analyzed the economic development policies that governors of all 
fifty states proposed in their major legislative addresses from 1997 through 2006. My 
central research question was: Why is there variation in the types of legislative proposals 
that are developed by governors? This study attempts to resolve a scholarly debate 
regarding the extent of a governor’s influence in the legislative process. A governor’s 
role as chief legislator is based on his ability to recommend legislation and then use his 
powers to have his proposals enacted and implemented. Many gubernatorial scholars 
contend that this legislative role allows governors to exert greater influence than other 
political actors on state public policies (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 73-74; Herzik 
1991, p. 25-26; Sanford 1967, p. 184). Other scholars argue that the ability of governors 
to exercise policy leadership may be overstated. They contend that the executive and 
legislative branches are coequal partners and make policy by bargaining and negotiating 
(Rosenthal 1990, p. 3 and 197). Others assert that factors outside of a governor’s direct 
control may constrain a governor’s policy choices and prevent him from proposing the 
policies that he prefers (DiLeo 1997, p. 106-7; Gross 1991, p. 15). My study assessed the 
influence of these constraints on gubernatorial agenda decisions. 
In Chapter II, I developed a theory of gubernatorial policymaking that is based on 
rational choice theory. I assumed that governors were self-interested political actors who 
make policy decisions that will enable them to achieve their personal and political goals. 
These gubernatorial goals include reelection, historical achievement, developing good 
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policy, and maintaining public support. Because voters hold governors accountable for 
their states’ economic performance, economic development policymaking provides 
governors with opportunities to pursue these goals. A governor may demonstrate his 
concern about the state’s economic conditions by proposing economic development 
policies to the legislature and then using his gubernatorial powers to have them enacted. 
This policymaking activity also allows him to claim credit for any subsequent 
improvement in the state’s economy 
I also assumed that constraints imposed by the political environment sometimes 
prevent governors’ from proposing the economic development policies that they prefer 
the most. For example, if a governor’s own party members do not control the legislature 
or if the state’s budgetary resources are inadequate to fund his proposals, then a governor 
may need to modify his economic development program if he wants to increase his 
probability of legislative success. 
According to my theory, governors may be able to overcome these constraints by 
using their gubernatorial powers. These powers include not only their institutional 
powers, such as their ability to veto legislation or make executive appointments, but also 
their personal powers, such as those provided by an electoral mandate or high public 
approval.  I assumed that these powers would sometimes provide governors with 
sufficient political capital to overcome legislative resistance to their economic 
development proposals. 
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Research Findings 
Governors exercise policy leadership by identifying their states’ important 
problems and then recommending legislation to correct those problems. In formulating 
their legislative agendas, governors have a great deal of latitude in choosing the specific 
policies that they recommend to state legislatures. This flexibility allows them to pursue 
multiple goals in some cases. For example, a governor can recommend policies that will 
not only stimulate his state’s economy, but will also meet the approval of important 
political actors, such as fellow members of his political party or important campaign 
contributors. 
I also find that the political environment imposes constraints on governors’ policy 
choices. The legislative branch is an important source of constraints. Governors 
recognize that their legislative proposals cannot become law without the cooperation of 
the legislature. Consequently, governors sometimes modify their proposals so that they 
can obtain the majority support within a legislature they require to pass legislation. 
Citizen preferences and the state’s prevailing political culture may also constrain the 
types of policies that a governor recommends. In some situations, however, governors 
may possess powers that enable them to bargain with legislators from a position of 
strength. When governors are more powerful, they can place more emphasis on their own 
policy preferences and make fewer accommodations to legislators’ preferences. 
In short, I find that the relationship between the executive and legislative branches 
of government at the state level is similar to the relationship between the two branches at 
the federal level. Although each branch has powers that can be exercised independently 
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of the other, policymaking relies primarily on the joint exercise of their shared powers 
(Fisher 1998, p. 6-7 and 14). At the state level, as at the federal level, we do not have a 
government of separated powers. Instead, we have what Neustadt (1990) refers to as a 
“government of separated institutions sharing powers” (p. 29). My findings do not 
support claims by some gubernatorial scholars and former governors that governors are 
necessarily the most influential political actors in a state (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 
73-74; Herzik 1991, p. 25-26; Sanford 1967, p. 184). My findings are more supportive of 
Rosenthal’s (1990) contention that in most states the executive and legislative branches 
are roughly coequal and make policy through a process that relies heavily on bargaining 
and negotiation (p. 3 and 197). 
Although my empirical results do not support all of the hypotheses that I derived 
from my theory, I find evidence that governors are rational actors who behave 
strategically when presenting their economic development policy proposals to state 
legislatures. For example, governors are more likely to include economic development 
policies on their legislative agendas when their states lag the rest of the nation in 
economic performance. Furthermore, governors of lagging states also tend to have more 
expansive economic agendas that include a larger number of traditional economic 
development policies than governors of states that are economic leaders. Similarly, my 
results show that governors recommend more entrepreneurial policies to stimulate 
business creation when their states are deficient in resources for business creation or are 
experiencing lagging business formation rates. 
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I also find that governors are strategic in their response to the constraints that are 
imposed on them by the political environment. For example, my results indicate that 
Republican governors have a stronger preference for traditional economic development 
policies than Democratic governors. During periods of divided government, however, I 
find that Republican governors tend to recommend fewer of these policies. This finding 
provides evidence that Republican governors recognize that Democratic legislators are 
not likely to support many traditional policy proposals. Morehouse (1996 and 1998) 
concludes from her studies of governors’ support within state legislatures that governors 
compromise with the opposition party when it controls the legislature, but she does not 
examine how they modify their legislative proposals (Morehouse 1996, p. 379; 1998, p. 
220). My findings illustrate that one way governors compromise is by proposing fewer 
policies that the opposition party finds objectionable. They also support claims by DiLeo 
(1997) and Gross (1991) that factors outside of a governor’s control may reduce his 
leadership ability by preventing him from proposing the policies that he prefers (DiLeo 
1997, p. 106-7; Gross 1991, p. 15).  
Some of my key findings concern which economic development policies 
governors propose in response to poor economic conditions in their states. I conclude that 
when a state’s economic performance is lagging the performance of other states – as 
evidenced by relatively high unemployment rates, relatively low wages, and relatively 
low firm creation rates – governors respond by proposing larger numbers of traditional 
economic development policies. They target entrepreneurial policies, on the other hand, 
specifically at improving poor rates of firm creation.  
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I was surprised to find that governors devote less space on their legislative 
agendas to economic development policy when their states’ economic conditions are 
declining than when they are improving. I had assumed that they would view economic 
decline as a problem and would respond by recommending more economic development 
policies to state legislatures. Although I cannot be certain why they behave in this 
manner, I suggest that their behavior may be related to the national business cycle. Other 
empirical studies have found that national economic conditions do not have as large of an 
influence on governors’ approval ratings and electoral prospects as state economic 
conditions (Howell and Vanderleeuw 1990, p. 164-65; Partin 1995, p. 88). When there is 
a national recession, many states may be experiencing economic decline, which may 
cause voters to view the economic decline as a problem that is best addressed at the 
federal level. This shift in responsibility may encourage governors to reduce the emphasis 
they place on economic development policy. When the national economy is expanding, 
on the other hand, interjurisdictional competition for new business facilities may lead 
governors to recommend more economic development policies in an attempt to gain an 
advantage over other states (Noto 1991, p. 253).  
When I examine the influence of governors’ party affiliation on their economic 
development proposals, I find that Republican and Democratic governors have different 
policy preferences. These differences are not as clear-cut as I had expected. Although I 
find that Republican governors have a greater preference for traditional economic 
development policies than Democratic governors, I find little difference in their 
preferences with regard to entrepreneurial policies. This is an important finding because 
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it contradicts Boeckelman’s (1996) finding that Democratic governors recommend more 
entrepreneurial policies than Republican governors. There is a gap of several years 
between the period studied by Boeckleman (1996, p. 343) and the period of my study. 
The difference between our results may indicate that the policy preferences of Republican 
governors changed during the period between our two studies. 
Other key findings relate to the constraints imposed on governors’ policy choices 
by divided government. I find that Republican governors recommend fewer traditional 
policies during periods of divided government than during periods when their own party 
members control the legislature. As I explained earlier, this finding provides evidence 
that governors recognize that they need the cooperation of the legislature to enact their 
policies. Consequently, they make fewer proposals that are not favored by the opposition 
party during periods of divided government.  
I had assumed that divided government would lead Democratic governors to 
compromise with Republican legislators by reducing the number of entrepreneurial 
policies that they proposed. I found, however, that divided government has no significant 
influence on Democratic governors’ entrepreneurial proposals. This finding, although 
contrary to my theory, supports my earlier finding that Democrats and Republicans have 
similar preferences for entrepreneurial policies. If Republican legislators have 
preferences for entrepreneurial policies that are similar to those of Democrats, then 
Democratic governors would have no reason to reduce the number of entrepreneurial 
proposals during periods of divided government.  
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My findings with regard to the influence of budgetary conditions on gubernatorial 
economic development proposals are mixed. I find no significant difference between the 
number of economic development proposals that governors recommend during periods of 
budget growth and budget decline. On the other hand, I find that governors are 
significantly more likely to recommend traditional economic development policies during 
periods of budget growth. I do not find any evidence that budgetary conditions influence 
governors’ recommendations regarding entrepreneurial policies. 
I also examine whether citizen liberalism constrains governors’ economic 
development policy decisions. As predicted, I find that governors of states with high 
levels of citizen liberalism recommend a greater number of entrepreneurial policies. I do 
not find that citizen liberalism has any influence on governors’ traditional economic 
development policy proposals. The difference may be explained by the role of site 
location consultants in lobbying state government officials on behalf of mobile business 
firms. These consultants encourage states to compete with one another by using 
traditional economic development policies to lower business costs in their states 
(Markusen and Nesse 2007, p. 12; Thomas 2007, p. 43). Site location consultants do not 
play the same role in decisions about entrepreneurial policies. Consequently, citizen 
preferences may have a greater effect on governors’ entrepreneurial policies because they 
are not competing with the consultants for influence.  
My findings with regard to state political culture are also mixed. I find that 
governors of traditionalistic states tend to propose more traditional economic 
development policies than those of moralistic or individualistic states. This finding is in 
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agreement with the findings of Boeckelman (1991) and Hanson (1991), who each found 
that traditionalistic states rely more heavily on traditional economic development policies 
than states with moralistic or individualistic political cultures (Boeckelman 1991, p. 57; 
Hanson 1991, p. 79). I find no evidence, however, that political culture influences 
gubernatorial decisions about entrepreneurial policies.  
My analysis provides limited evidence that interjurisdictional competition leads 
governors of states with high-cost business climates to try to lower business costs by 
recommending more traditional economic development policies. I find that governors of 
high-cost states tend to recommend more of these policies than governors of low-cost 
states, although the difference is not significant. My analysis shows, however, that one 
component of a high-cost business climate – high workers’ compensation expenses – has 
a significant influence on governors’ traditional policy recommendations. I find no 
evidence, however, that the business climates of neighboring states have any particular 
influence on governors’ decisions about traditional policies. 
I also investigate whether governors try to eliminate deficiencies in their states’ 
entrepreneurial resources by recommending more entrepreneurial economic development 
policies. My results show that governors use entrepreneurial policies to correct these 
deficiencies by providing resources, such as venture capital financing, that will stimulate 
business formation. This finding provides additional support for my earlier finding that 
governors target entrepreneurial policies at enhancing low rates of business formation 
rather than at generally poor economic conditions. I find no evidence, however, that 
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governors’ entrepreneurial proposals are influenced by the resources of their neighboring 
states. 
 In my study, I analyzed the influence of governors’ institutional and personal 
powers and investigated whether these powers allowed them to overcome constraints 
imposed by the political environment. First, I examined the influence of governors’ 
institutional powers, such as their veto authority and tenure potential. I hypothesized that 
governors would use these powers during periods of divided government to bargain with 
opposition legislators for their support. I further assumed that the resources provided by 
these powers would not allow them to obtain the votes of a large number of opposition 
legislators. Consequently, I expected that the influence of governors’ institutional powers 
on their policy proposals would be much less when they needed a large number of 
opposition votes than when they needed only a few.  I find that strong Republican 
governors tend to propose a significantly greater number of traditional economic 
development policies during periods of divided government than weak Republican 
governors. My results indicate, however, that the influence of their institutional powers is 
approximately the same when they need a large number of opposition votes as when the 
need only a few. Similarly, I find that strong Democratic governors tend to propose 
significantly more entrepreneurial policies during periods of divided government than 
weak Democratic governors. The differences between strong and weak Democratic 
governors, however, are not statistically significant. 
Although my findings support the idea that governors’ institutional powers allow 
them to overcome constraints imposed by the political environment, my results cannot be 
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interpreted to support my theory that they use these resources to bargain for individual 
votes. These findings are more consistent with an alternative explanation of the 
differences between strong and weak governors. When I measured governors’ 
institutional powers, I focused on the powers that would be most useful in bargaining, 
rather than measures that would be useful in policy development. If governors who are 
strong on the bargaining dimension are also strong on the policy development dimension, 
then my findings may indicate that strong governors are able to overcome constraints on 
agenda size. Although this interpretation of my findings is tentative, it is consistent with 
other scholars’ findings that states with institutionally strong governors tend to enact and 
implement a larger variety of economic development programs (Ambrosius 1989, p. 63; 
Elkins, Bingham, and Bowen 1996, p. 167). 
I also investigated whether governors use the personal power they derive from an 
electoral mandate to overcome legislative opposition to their economic development 
proposals. My findings suggest that having an electoral mandate affects governors’ 
traditional and entrepreneurial economic development proposals differently. During 
periods of divided government, Republican governors with an electoral mandate propose 
a substantially greater number of traditional policies than those lacking a mandate, 
although this difference is not statistically significant. I find no evidence, however, that 
possession of an electoral mandate has any influence on Democratic governors’ decisions 
regarding entrepreneurial policies. I interpret this difference as further evidence that there 
are strong partisan divisions with regard to traditional policies, but that governors and 
legislators of both parties tend to support entrepreneurial economic development 
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programs. My conclusions regarding mandates are tentative, however, because of the 
high level of uncertainty surrounding my estimates of their influence. 
I concluded by analyzing the influence of governors’ public approval ratings. 
Although I do not find that public approval has any significant influence on governors’ 
economic development proposals, I hesitate to conclude that public approval has no 
influence on governors’ policy recommendations. Despite using the best available data 
concerning governors’ public approval ratings, the data do not allow me to accurately 
measure most governors’ public approval ratings in close temporal proximity to their 
legislative addresses. Consequently, I consider my findings regarding this issue to be 
inconclusive. An analysis of the job approval data reveals, however, that these job 
approval surveys have been conducted with increasing frequency and in a larger number 
of states during recent years.23 Future studies concerning governors’ public approval 
ratings may not be affected as badly by gaps in the public approval data.  
Future Research on Governors and Economic Development Policy 
My study of gubernatorial economic development policymaking leaves many 
questions unanswered. Some of these questions concern governors’ decisions with regard 
to economic development policy. Other questions relate to the interactions that take place 
between governors and state legislatures as governors work for the ratification of their 
                                                 
23
 The dataset contains the results of 1,599 surveys conducted during the period from 1990 to 1999, which 
is an average of approximately 160 per year. For the period from 2000 to 2006, the dataset contains the 
results of 1,951 surveys, which is an average of approximately 278 per year. The dataset contains over 550 
survey results for 2005 and more than 760 for 2006. 
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proposals. There are also questions regarding the policymaking venues outside of the 
legislature that are available to governors.     
There are several directions in which scholars should proceed to study governors 
and economic development policy beyond my research study. An area of primary 
importance is the study of legislative responses to governors’ economic development 
proposals. My study focuses on the economic development policies that governors 
recommend to state legislatures within their major legislative addresses. A state’s 
governor, however, is only one of many actors who participate in the policy process 
(Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 19-24). Many of these other actors possess agenda 
setting, gatekeeping, or “veto” power which allows them to influence public policy 
decisions (Blomquist 1999, p. 213-14). At the state level, governors and legislatures share 
primary responsibility and authority for formulating and enacting public policy 
(Rosenthal 1990, p. 2). After a governor makes his recommendations, bills to implement 
them must be drafted and introduced to the legislature. Once the bills are introduced, then 
the governor or his legislative liaison staff members must work with legislative leaders 
and individual legislators to ensure that the bills progress through all of the stages of the 
legislative process to be enacted into law. Each step in this process provides legislators 
who oppose the governor’s proposals with opportunities to either amend them in ways 
that are unacceptable to the governor or to block them and prevent them from passing 
(Slavin and Adler 1996, p. 229-34). Even if a governor is successful at achieving the 
passage of legislation authorizing his economic development policies, his opponents may 
be able to prevent or reduce the appropriations required to implement them. This conflict 
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may even extend into the implementation phase as the legislature and governor both try 
to influence the agency or commission that is administering a particular economic 
development program (Rosenthal 1990, p. 167-68; Slavin and Adler 1996, p. 235).  
In my study, I considered the possibility that legislators belonging to the 
opposition party would oppose a governor’s proposals because of partisan differences. 
Partisanship, however, is not the only source of legislative opposition to a governor’s 
policy proposals. For example, governors have statewide constituencies, while the main 
constituencies of legislators are located within their districts (Rosenthal 1990, p. 52-54). 
Consequently, even legislators belonging to a governor’s own party may oppose his 
policy proposals if they do not help specific firms or industries that are located within 
their districts (Slavin and Adler 1996, p. 226-28). Similarly, a governor’s political party 
may be divided into ideological factions that limit the legislative support he obtains for 
his proposals (Beyle 1983, p. 206; Jewell 1969, p. 81-82; Ransone 1982, p. 168-69). 
Because legislative opposition to a governor’s proposals can arise at multiple points in 
the policy process for one of several reasons, there are many different ways that 
governors may fail within the legislative arena. Studies that examine why individual 
legislators support or oppose a governor’s economic development policies would enhance 
our knowledge of gubernatorial-legislative relations.  
Although my study focused on the decisions that governors make as they 
formulate their legislative proposals, they must make many more decisions as they guide 
their proposals through the legislative process. For example, in some situations governors 
may adopt an inside strategy in which they bargain with legislative leaders and other 
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legislators to support their proposals. In cases such as these, governors must decide what 
combination of threats and promises will allow them to obtain the votes they need to pass 
their proposals. In other situations, governors may adopt an outside strategy in which 
they attempt to influence legislators by building support for their policies among 
members of the public (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 73-74; Beyle 1983, p. 206; Beyle 
2004, p. 221; Morehouse 1976, p. 221; Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 188; Ransone 
1982, p. 148-56 and 159; Rosenthal 1990, p. 35-36, 67-68, and 108-9). In my study, I 
considered these issues only with regard to how they might affect the initial formulation 
of governors’ legislative agendas. For example, I made assumptions about how governors 
would use their institutional and personal powers to promote their economic development 
proposals in the legislature, and then tested the influence of these powers on the types of 
policies that they recommended. I did not examine how governors actually use their 
powers as their proposals advance through the legislative process because the scope of 
my study did not extend that far. Ferguson (2003) contends that scholars lack a clear 
understanding of which gubernatorial powers are most effective in the legislative arena 
(p. 172-73). Studies that examine how governors’ economic development policy 
recommendations progress through the legislative process would allow scholars to clarify 
this issue. 
 Scholars might also analyze whether the level of legislative success that a 
governor achieves in one session influences the types of policies that he recommends in 
the next session. Rosenthal (1990) suggests that a proposal may fail to pass during the 
first legislative session in which it is introduced. Therefore, governors should be prepared 
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to reintroduce failed measures in subsequent sessions (Rosenthal 1990, p. 104). 
Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating provides an example of this sort of persistence by a 
governor. In his 1998 and 1999 state of the state addresses, Governor Keating proposed 
enacting “right-to-work” legislation to prohibit employers from requiring their employees 
to join a union (Keating 1998, 1999). In his 2000 address, Governor Keating modified his 
proposal and asked the legislature to submit a referendum on the issue to the state’s 
voters (Keating 2000). Governor Keating was finally successful in 2001 when he again 
urged the legislature to allow voters to consider the issue (Keating 2001). The legislature 
scheduled a referendum and Oklahoma voters approved an amendment to the state 
constitution enacting Governor Keating’s right-to-work policy.24 In this situation, 
Governor Keating’s repeated decisions not to abandon the issue, along with his 
willingness to modify his policy proposal, eventually resulted in a major policy change. 
In other situations, however, a governor might decide that reintroducing a failed proposal 
is a waste of his resources that could be better devoted to another issue. Studies that 
examine how governors make these types of decisions would expand our knowledge of 
how governors formulate their legislative agendas.  
Another topic requiring further study concerns the existence of party-related 
preferences regarding different types of economic development policies. In his study of 
governors’ economic development proposals, Boeckelman (1996) finds that Republican 
governors had a greater preference for traditional economic development policies than 
                                                 
24
 I obtained information concerning the outcome of the referendum from two sources: the Initiative and 
Referendum Database maintained by the National Conference of State Legislatures, which may be accessed 
at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/elect/dbintro.htm, and the Oklahoma State Elections Board 
website, which may be accessed at http://www.state.ok.us/~elections.  
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Democratic governors, and that Democratic governors had a greater preference for 
entrepreneurial policies (p. 347). My analysis confirms his findings with regard to 
Republican governors’ stronger preferences for traditional policies, but contradicts his 
findings with regard to entrepreneurial policies. Boeckelman (1996) examined governors’ 
economic development proposals at a single point in time approximately four years prior 
to the period of my study (p. 343). It is possible that Republican governors’ preferences 
for entrepreneurial policies changed during the intervening years, which could explain the 
difference in our findings. Although my dataset covers a ten-year period, I merely pooled 
the data from all years and did not perform any time series analysis. In the future, I can 
extend my study by examining whether gubernatorial policy preferences change over 
time.  
When studying economic development policy in a legislative context, it is 
important to remember that legislatures are not limited to considering only gubernatorial 
proposals. Legislators may have their own economic development policy agendas and 
may introduce their own proposals that compete with the governor’s proposals for space 
on the legislative agenda. As a result, many policy proposals are initiated by legislators 
rather than governors (Rosenthal 1990, p. 199). For this reason, an exclusive focus on 
policies initiated by governors may ignore a large segment of state government economic 
development policymaking. Additionally, examining legislators’ policy proposals and the 
level of support that these proposals receive within the legislature will provide 
information regarding legislators’ policy preferences. This information could, in turn, 
help scholars to explain the varying levels of support that governors’ proposals receive 
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within the legislature. For these reasons, studies that focus on why legislators sponsor, 
cosponsor, or other otherwise support particular economic development bills will help 
advance our understanding of a state government’s role in economic development policy. 
It is also important to remember that governors may advance their economic 
development agendas by using unilateral tools, such as executive orders. I excluded 
governors’ unilateral economic development proposals from my analysis because my 
study focused on the formal legislative process. The use of these unilateral tools by 
governors has received relatively little attention within the scholarly literature. Studies of 
policymaking at the federal level, however, find that presidents use these tools to exert 
influence over public policies (see, for example, Howell 2003). These unilateral tools 
may also be important gubernatorial resources and scholars should analyze how 
governors use them in economic development policymaking. 
Another avenue for research is to examine the relationship between governors’ 
economic development policies and their policymaking activity with regard to other 
issues. My study focused specifically on governors’ economic development proposals. I 
examined how the economic and political environment influences governors’ decisions 
about including economic development on their legislative agendas and proposing 
traditional or entrepreneurial economic development policies. My study did not 
specifically consider the other policy issues that governors may discuss in their speeches, 
such as elementary and secondary education, criminal justice, health care, or 
transportation. These other policy issues compete with economic development for space 
on governors’ legislative agendas. Consequently, the attention that a governor pays to 
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economic development policy may depend not only on a state’s economic conditions, but 
also on the state’s needs with regard to these other policy areas. Analyzing why 
governors place these other policy issues on their legislative agendas will help scholars to 
understand how governors make tradeoffs between economic development and these 
other issues.   
The theoretical framework and methods that I develop in this dissertation can be 
used to analyze other gubernatorial statements regarding economic development policy, 
such as press releases, budget documents, and executive orders. Governors use these 
other forms of communication throughout the course of their administrations to present 
their views of the economic challenges confronting their states and to outline their 
solutions for solving economic problems. Scholars could use these statements to analyze 
how governors’ economic development policies evolve during the periods between 
legislative addresses. For example, the statements that a governor makes during the late 
stages of a legislative session could be compared to his state of the state address to 
determine if his policy positions have changed in response to legislative events or 
changes in the economy. 
The Internet has made it easier to obtain the text of legislative addresses and other 
gubernatorial policy statements. The enhanced availability of these data sources not only 
provides future scholars with abundant opportunities to study governors’ policy positions, 
but it is also stimulating the development of new methods for automating the collection 
and analysis of these data (see, for example, Hopkins and King 2007 and Laver, Benoit, 
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and Garry 2003). The theoretical framework that I developed in this study can be adapted 
to these new empirical methods. 
The study of state politics and policymaking is an important subfield within the 
study of American government. State governments have the primary policymaking 
responsibility within a number of major policy domains, such as education, 
transportation, and criminal justice (Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 24; Gray 2004, p. 2). 
Consequently, understanding how public policies are formulated within these domains 
requires analyzing policy processes at the state level. Furthermore, since the early 1980s, 
the federal government has devolved increased responsibilities to the states for activities 
which had previously been considered as functions of the federal government 
(Morehouse and Jewell 2003, p. 25). These changes have further enhanced the 
importance of understanding state politics and policy.  
Prominent state politics scholars have observed that many studies of state politics 
and policymaking have focused on narrow questions about specific aspects of state 
politics, rather than developing theories about political behavior in the states. They 
suggest that these theories are needed to place the narrow questions in a broader context 
(Clucas 2003, p. 388; Jewell 1982, p. 651). Scholars have also observed that state politics 
and policy studies are frequently hindered by the difficulty of assembling data from all 
fifty states (Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman 2002, p. 216). In recent years, however, scholars 
have begun to assemble a number of comprehensive datasets regarding important aspects 
of state political institutions and environments.  
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The debate concerning the relative influence of governors and legislators over 
state public policymaking remains unresolved. Some gubernatorial scholars contend that 
governors wield the greatest influence, while other scholars argue that neither branch is 
dominant (Bernick and Wiggins 1991, p. 73-74; Herzik 1991, p. 25-26; Rosenthal 1990, 
p. 3 and 197). Clearly, there is much left for scholars to learn about the role of the 
governor in the legislative process. There is, however, encouraging progress being made 
toward developing theories and collecting data that will foster the systematic 
investigation of gubernatorial-legislative relations.   
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
Address Includes One or More 
Traditional Proposals 
0.65 0.48 0 1 442 
Address Includes One or More 
Entrepreneurial Proposals 
0.41 0.49 0 1 442 
Number of Traditional Policy Proposals 
per Address 
1.78 2.11 0 12 442 
Number of Entrepreneurial Policy 
Proposals per Address 
0.85 1.44 0 13 442 
Relative Average Wage -7.93 14.40 -30.63 29.35 480 
Relative Unemployment Rate -0.49 1.12 -3.30 7.40 480 
Relative Firm Creation Rate -0.03 3.09 -6.31 12.11 480 
Annual Change in Average Wage 1.27 1.35 -2.43 6.24 480 
Annual Change in Unemployment Rate -0.16 0.81 -2.70 6.60 480 
Annual Change in Firm Creation Rate -0.13 1.39 -7.09 11.59 480 
Projected Change in General Fund 
Revenue 
-0.12 5.07 -28.47 21.76 480 
Relative State Tax Revenue 0.00 417.50 -1043.42 1400.65 480 
Relative Workers’ Compensation 
Expenditures 
0.00 133.98 -196.75 789.34 480 
Relative High Tech Employment 0.00 1.91 -2.76 5.39 480 
Relative Private Venture Capital 
Funding 
0.00 293.32 -490.24 2878.91 480 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures 0.00 93.23 -162.39 509.74 480 
Relative State Tax Revenue of 
Neighboring States 
-38.87 429.30 -1043.42 1322.19 480 
Relative Workers’ Compensation 
Expenditures of Neighboring States 
-6.82 59.99 -156.84 187.19 480 
Relative High Tech Employment of 
Neighboring States 
0.00 1.22 -1.93 3.71 480 
Relative Private Venture Capital 
Funding of Neighboring States 
11.46 194.16 -476.02 1675.19 480 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures of 
Neighboring States 
3.02 51.64 -70.22 173.34 480 
Citizen Liberalism -13.85 8.67 -30.15 7.97 480 
Continued on next page 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
     
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
Individualistic Political Culture 0.31 0.46 0 1 480 
Traditionalistic Political Culture 0.33 0.47 0 1 480 
Republican Governor 0.54 0.50 0 1 480 
Democratic Governor 0.36 0.48 0 1 480 
Republican Legislature 0.37 0.48 0 1 470 
Democratic Legislature 0.37 0.48 0 1 470 
Strong Powers 0.26 0.44 0 1 480 
Weak Powers 0.30 0.46 0 1 480 
Opposition Votes Needed 9.98 15.93 0 75 460 
Electoral Mandate 1.89 0.95 0 4 480 
Year in Current Term 1.47 1.11 0 3 480 
Public Approval 61.37 13.51   19.15   95.24 227 
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Table A.2: Logistic Regression Results Predicting the Inclusion of Economic 
Development Proposals in Gubernatorial Legislative Addresses, 1997-2006  
 
Traditional  
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Relative Unemployment Rate 0.404*** 
(0.128) 
-0.228* 
(0.120) 
Relative Average Wage -0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
Relative Firm Creation Rate -0.146*** 
(0.049) 
-0.051 
(0.047) 
Annual Change in Unemployment Rate -0.284* 
(0.155) 
0.187 
(0.147) 
Annual Change in Average Wage -0.001 
(0.089) 
-0.055 
(0.086) 
Annual Change in Firm Creation Rate 0.197** 
(0.085) 
0.170** 
(0.081) 
Projected Change in General Fund Revenue 0.039* 
(0.023) 
0.007 
(0.022) 
Relative State Tax Revenue -2.26 x10-4 
(3.82 x10-4) 
1.49 x10-4 
(3.66 x10-4) 
Relative Workers’ Compensation Expenditures 0.001 
(0.001) 
-5.09 x10-4 
(9.44 x10-4) 
Relative High Tech Employment 0.006 
(0.097) 
-0.182** 
(0.091) 
Relative Private Venture Capital Funding 3.26 x10-5 
(5.19 x10-4) 
-4.43 x10-4 
(5.62 x10-4) 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Relative State Tax Revenue of Neighboring 
States 
2.94 x10-5 
(4.41 x10-4) 
5.43 x10-4 
(4.03 x10-4) 
Relative Workers’ Compensation Expenditures 
of Neighboring States 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Relative High Tech Employment of Neighboring 
States 
0.535*** 
(0.181) 
0.272* 
(0.165) 
Relative Private Venture Capital Funding of 
Neighboring States 
-0.002*** 
(8.54 x10-4) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Continued on next page   
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Table A.2 (continued) 
  
 
Traditional 
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures of 
Neighboring States 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
Citizen Liberalism 0.008 
(0.028) 
0.062** 
(0.027) 
Individualistic Political Culture -0.068 
(0.412) 
-0.397 
(0.386) 
Traditionalistic Political Culture -0.051 
(0.369) 
-0.265 
(0.348) 
Republican Governor 0.181 
(1.400) 
1.198 
(1.342) 
Democratic Governor -0.465 
(1.410) 
0.613 
(1.355) 
Republican Legislature -0.117 
(0.441) 
0.600 
(0.437) 
Democratic Legislature -0.935 
(1.820) 
0.238 
(1.700) 
Republican Governor x Republican Legislature 0.347 
(0.611) 
-0.634 
(0.585) 
Republican Governor x Democratic Legislature 0.459 
(1.870) 
-0.540 
(1.751) 
Democratic Governor x Republican Legislature NA NA 
Democratic Governor x Democratic Legislature 0.677 
(1.870) 
0.140 
(1.753) 
Intercept 1.170 
(1.410) 
-0.265 
(1.353) 
N 432 432 
Null Deviance 559.2 on 431 df 586.1 on 431 df 
Residual Deviance 499.0 on 404 df 439.8 on 404 df 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (all two-tailed tests).  
Estimates are unstandardized maximum likelihood coefficients. 
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Table A.3: Negative Binomial Regression Results Predicting the Number of 
Gubernatorial Economic Development Proposals per Legislative Address, 1997-
2006  
 
Traditional  
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Relative Unemployment Rate 0.106** 
(0.061) 
-0.130 
(0.089) 
Relative Average Wage -0.003 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
Relative Firm Creation Rate -0.086*** 
(0.025) 
-0.069* 
(0.035) 
Annual Change in Unemployment Rate -0.147** 
(0.076) 
0.047 
(0.110) 
Annual Change in Average Wage 0.031 
(0.044) 
0.005 
(0.064) 
Annual Change in Firm Creation Rate 0.128*** 
(0.040) 
0.141** 
(0.056) 
Projected Change in General Fund Revenue 0.017 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.016) 
Relative State Tax Revenue 3.32 x10-5 
(1.95 x10-4) 
-7.93 x10-4*** 
(2.64 x10-4) 
Relative Workers’ Compensation Expenditures 8.84 x10-4** 
(4.43 x10-4) 
-1.13 x10-4 
(6.93 x10-4) 
Relative High Tech Employment -0.004 
(0.046) 
-0.135** 
(0.067) 
Relative Private Venture Capital Funding -1.99 x10-4 
(2.40 x10-4) 
-6.67 x10-4 
(4.42 x10-4) 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures 6.53 x10-4 
(8.64 x10-4) 
-5.86 x10-4 
(1.18 x10-3) 
Relative State Tax Revenue of Neighboring 
States 
1.09 x10-4 
(2.06 x10-4) 
-8.66 x10-5 
(2.83 x10-4) 
Relative Workers’ Compensation Expenditures 
of Neighboring States 
-9.58 x10-4 
(1.18 x10-3) 
1.44 x10-4 
(1.64 x10-3) 
Relative High Tech Employment of 
Neighboring States 
0.318*** 
(0.085) 
0.134 
(0.119) 
Relative Private Venture Capital Funding of 
Neighboring States 
-1.02 x10-3** 
(4.20 x10-4) 
-6.75 x10-4 
(5.64 x10-4) 
Continued on next page   
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Table A.3 (continued)   
 
Traditional 
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures of 
Neighboring States 
2.24 x10-4 
(1.96 x10-3) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Citizen Liberalism 0.009 
(0.013) 
0.059*** 
(0.018) 
Individualistic Political Culture 0.061 
(0.205) 
-0.085 
(0.267) 
Traditionalistic Political Culture 0.336* 
(0.180) 
-0.206 
(0.254) 
Republican Governor -0.661 
(0.597) 
1.220 
(1.240) 
Democratic Governor 1.260** 
(0.609) 
0.506 
(1.250) 
Republican Legislature -0.084 
(0.255) 
0.394 
(0.328) 
Democratic Legislature -1.630** 
(0.832) 
-0.310 
(1.500) 
Republican Governor x Republican Legislature 0.245 
(0.320) 
-0.539 
(0.422) 
Republican Governor x Democratic Legislature 1.250 
(0.860) 
-0.286 
(1.530) 
Democratic Governor x Republican Legislature NA NA 
Democratic Governor x Democratic Legislature 1.840** 
(0.864) 
0.611 
(1.530) 
Intercept 1.360* 
(0.604) 
-0.289 
(1.250) 
N 432 432 
2 x Log-likelihood -1488.81 -1038.3 
Null Deviance 570.3 on 431 df 457.8 on 431 df 
Residual Deviance 475.3 on 404 df 389.7 on 404 df 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (all two-tailed tests).  
Estimates are unstandardized maximum likelihood coefficients. 
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Table A.4: Negative Binomial Regression Results Predicting the Influence of 
Institutional Powers on the Number of Gubernatorial Economic Development 
Proposals per Legislative Address, 1997-2006  
 
Traditional  
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Strong Powers 0.223 
(0.282) 
0.149 
(0.387) 
Weak Powers -0.193 
(0.268) 
-0.406 
(0.399) 
Opposition Votes Needed 0.005 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.027) 
Republican Governor 0.451** 
(0.229) 
0.455 
(0.330) 
Strong Powers x Opposition Votes Needed -0.005 
(0.028) 
0.020 
(0.037) 
Weak Powers x Opposition Votes Needed 6.49 x10-4 
(2.13 x10-2) 
0.028 
(0.029) 
Republican Governor x Strong Powers 0.246 
(0.343) 
0.123 
(0.473) 
Republican Governor x Weak Powers 0.232 
(0.347) 
0.216 
(0.509) 
Republican Governor x Opposition Votes 
Needed 
-2.78 x10-4 
(2.04 x10-2) 
-0.027 
(0.031) 
Republican Governor x Strong Powers x 
Opposition Votes Needed 
-0.004 
(0.030) 
-0.011 
(0.041) 
Republican Governor x Weak Powers x 
Opposition Votes Needed 
-0.014 
(0.024) 
0.001 
(0.034) 
Relative Unemployment Rate 0.113* 
(0.061) 
-0.139 
(0.092) 
Relative Average Wage -0.010 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
Relative Firm Creation Rate -0.087*** 
(0.026) 
-0.079** 
(0.037) 
Annual Change in Unemployment Rate -0.152** 
(0.077) 
0.053 
(0.112) 
Annual Change in Average Wage 0.026 
(0.044) 
-0.020 
(0.066) 
Continued on next page   
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Table A.4 (continued)   
 
Traditional 
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Annual Change in Firm Creation Rate 0.131*** 
(0.040) 
0.168*** 
(0.057) 
Projected Change in General Fund Revenue 0.019 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
Relative State Tax Revenue -1.44 x10-4 
(2.05 x10-4) 
-6.32 x10-4** 
(2.85 x10-4) 
Relative Workers’ Compensation Expenditures 7.24 x10-4* 
(4.32 x10-4) 
-2.16 x10-4 
(6.94 x10-4) 
Relative High Tech Employment 0.011 
(0.047) 
-0.123* 
(0.068) 
Relative Private Venture Capital Funding -3.41 x10-5 
(2.52 x10-4) 
-6.00 x10-4 
(4.93 x10-4) 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures 2.15 x10-4 
(8.53 x10-4) 
-6.16 x10-4 
(1.20 x10-3) 
Relative State Tax Revenue of Neighboring 
States 
7.49 x10-5 
(2.16 x10-4) 
-2.66 x10-4 
(3.02 x10-4) 
Relative Workers’ Compensation Expenditures 
of Neighboring States 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
2.07 x10-4 
(1.64 x10-3) 
Relative High Tech Employment of 
Neighboring States 
0.358*** 
(0.088) 
0.162 
(0.127) 
Relative Private Venture Capital Funding of 
Neighboring States 
-8.01 x10-4** 
(4.36 x10-4) 
7.75 x10-4 
(6.01 x10-4) 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures of 
Neighboring States 
1.02 x10-4 
(1.98 x10-3) 
4.68 x10-4 
(2.88 x10-3) 
Citizen Liberalism 0.013 
(0.013) 
0.065*** 
(0.019) 
Individualistic Political Culture 0.211 
(0.202) 
0.018 
(0.268) 
Traditionalistic Political Culture 0.317* 
(0.176) 
0.023 
(0.254) 
Continued on next page   
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Table A.4 (continued) 
  
 
Traditional 
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Intercept 0.163* 
(0.270) 
0.403 
(0.382) 
N 423 423 
2 x Log-likelihood -1450.54 -1014.7 
Null Deviance 562.6 on 422 df 456.7 on 422 df 
Residual Deviance 467.1 on 391 df 381.3 on 391 df 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (all two-tailed tests).  
Estimates are unstandardized maximum likelihood coefficients. 
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Table A.5: Negative Binomial Regression Results Predicting the Influence of an 
Electoral Mandate on the Number of Gubernatorial Economic Development 
Proposals per Legislative Address, 1997-2006  
 
Traditional  
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Electoral Mandate 0.429 
(0.349) 
-0.092 
(0.475) 
Year in Current Term 0.277 
(0.317) 
-0.202 
(0.541) 
Republican Governor -0.157 
(0.807) 
0.785 
(1.450) 
Democratic Governor 0.955 
(0.823) 
0.045 
(1.470) 
Electoral Mandate x Year in Current Term -0.164 
(0.210) 
0.023 
(0.279) 
Republican Governor x Electoral Mandate 0.089 
(0.448) 
-0.328 
(0.661) 
Democratic Governor x Electoral Mandate .NA .NA 
Republican Governor x Year in Current Term -0.230 
(0.324) 
0.312 
(0.549) 
Democratic Governor x Year in Current Term -0.177 
(0.331) 
0.307 
(0.554) 
Republican Governor x Year in Current Term 
x Electoral Mandate 
-0.147 
(0.254) 
0.023 
(0.353) 
Democratic Governor x Year in Current Term 
x Electoral Mandate 
.  NA .NA 
Relative Unemployment Rate 0.125** 
(0.061) 
-0.131 
(0.090) 
Relative Average Wage -0.003 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
Relative Firm Creation Rate -0.090*** 
(0.025) 
-0.070** 
(0.035) 
Annual Change in Unemployment Rate -0.174** 
(0.077) 
0.039 
(0.110) 
Annual Change in Average Wage 0.038 
(0.043) 
0.015 
(0.065) 
Annual Change in Firm Creation Rate 0.120*** 
(0.040) 
0.120** 
(0.057) 
Continued on next page   
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Table A.5 (continued)   
 
Traditional 
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Projected Change in General Fund Revenue 0.018 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
Relative State Tax Revenue 9.41 x10-5 
(1.99 x10-4) 
-8.44 x10-4*** 
(2.73 x10-4) 
Relative Workers’ Compensation Expenditures 7.72 x10-4* 
(4.50 x10-4) 
-1.33 x10-4 
(7.08 x10-4) 
Relative High Tech Employment 4.63 x10-4 
(4.65 x10-2) 
-0.142** 
(0.067) 
Relative Private Venture Capital Funding -2.02 x10-4 
(2.36 x10-4) 
-6.65 x10-4 
(4.37 x10-4) 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures 5.57 x10-5 
(2.16 x10-4) 
-4.76 x10-4 
(1.20 x10-3) 
Relative State Tax Revenue of Neighboring 
States 
1.05 x10-4 
(2.07 x10-4) 
-7.82 x10-6 
(2.86 x10-4) 
Relative Workers’ Compensation Expenditures 
of Neighboring States 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-2.56 x10-4 
(1.65 x10-3) 
Relative High Tech Employment of 
Neighboring States 
0.326*** 
(0.085) 
0.133 
(0.120) 
Relative Private Venture Capital Funding of 
Neighboring States 
-1.01 x10-3** 
(4.19 x10-4) 
-7.13 x10-4 
(5.63 x10-4) 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures of 
Neighboring States 
-2.11 x10-4 
(1.96 x10-3) 
6.94 x10-4 
(2.84 x10-3) 
Citizen Liberalism 0.008 
(0.013) 
0.060*** 
(0.019) 
Individualistic Political Culture 0.069 
(0.206) 
-0.149 
(0.272) 
Traditionalistic Political Culture 0.336* 
(0.179) 
-0.197 
(0.253) 
Republican Legislature -0.063 
(0.255) 
0.377 
(0.329) 
Democratic Legislature -1.690** 
(0.827) 
-0.188 
(1.510) 
Continued on next page   
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Table A.5 (continued)   
 
Traditional 
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Republican Governor x Republican Legislature 0.218 
(0.319) 
-0.486 
(0.424) 
Republican Governor x Democratic Legislature 1.260 
(0.856) 
-0.427 
(1.540) 
Democratic Governor x Republican Legislature NA                NA 
Democratic Governor x Democratic Legislature 1.940** 
(0.861) 
0.489 
(1.540) 
Intercept 0.830 
(0.810) 
0.074 
(1.460) 
N 432 432 
2 x Log-likelihood -1479.77 -1034.2 
Null Deviance 583.2 on 431 df 463.0 on 431 df 
Residual Deviance 476.3 on 397 df 389.8 on 397 df 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (all two-tailed tests).  
Estimates are unstandardized maximum likelihood coefficients. 
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Table A.6: Negative Binomial Regression Results Predicting the Influence of Public 
Approval on the Number of Gubernatorial Economic Development Proposals per 
Legislative Address, 1997-2006  
 
Traditional  
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Public Approval 0.022 
(0.042) 
0.016 
(0.098) 
Republican Governor 0.941 
(3.280) 
3.080 
(7.440) 
Democratic Governor 1.830 
(3.330) 
2.680 
(7.470) 
Republican Governor x Public Approval -0.019 
(0.043) 
-0.030 
(0.099) 
Democratic Governor x Public Approval -0.042 
(0.043) 
-0.030 
(0.099) 
Relative Unemployment Rate 0.144* 
(0.087) 
-0.224 
(0.146) 
Relative Average Wage -0.009 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
Relative Firm Creation Rate -0.064** 
(0.032) 
0.001 
(0.052) 
Annual Change in Unemployment Rate -0.202** 
(0.098) 
0.101 
(0.166) 
Annual Change in Average Wage 0.055 
(0.054) 
0.009 
(0.093) 
Annual Change in Firm Creation Rate 0.141*** 
(0.048) 
0.126 
(0.080) 
Projected Change in General Fund Revenue 0.015 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
Relative State Tax Revenue 6.37 x10-5 
(2.48 x10-4) 
-1.04 x10-3*** 
(3.87 x10-4) 
Relative Workers’ Compensation Expenditures 7.24 x10-5 
(6.64 x10-4) 
1.56 x10-4 
(1.18 x10-3) 
Relative High Tech Employment -0.025 
(0.065) 
-0.259** 
(0.113) 
Relative Private Venture Capital Funding 2.63 x10-5 
(3.10 x10-4) 
-9.75 x10-5 
(6.38 x10-4) 
Continued on next page   
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Table A.6 (continued)   
 
Traditional 
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures 6.92 x10-4 
(1.04 x10-3) 
-4.66 x10-4 
(1.70 x10-3) 
Relative State Tax Revenue of Neighboring 
States 
-3.09 x10-5 
(2.60 x10-4) 
1.95 x10-4 
(4.15 x10-4) 
Relative Workers’ Compensation Expenditures 
of Neighboring States 
-1.84 x10-4 
(1.69 x10-3) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Relative High Tech Employment of 
Neighboring States 
0.235* 
(0.120) 
-0.148 
(0.204) 
Relative Private Venture Capital Funding of 
Neighboring States 
-8.73 x10-4 
(4.19 x10-4) 
-6.26 x10-4 
(1.17 x10-3) 
Relative Academic R&D Expenditures of 
Neighboring States 
2.26 x10-3 
(2.60 x10-3) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Citizen Liberalism 0.018 
(0.018) 
0.062** 
(0.030) 
Individualistic Political Culture -0.016 
(0.283) 
-0.631 
(0.446) 
Traditionalistic Political Culture 0.203 
(0.233) 
-0.631* 
(0.382) 
Republican Legislature -0.213 
(0.344) 
0.062 
(0.508) 
Democratic Legislature -1.430 
(1.260) 
0.844 
(2.220) 
Republican Governor x Republican Legislature 0.192 
(0.422) 
-0.330 
(0.648) 
Republican Governor x Democratic Legislature 0.973 
(1.300) 
-1.160 
(2.290) 
Democratic Governor x Republican Legislature                 NA                 NA 
Democratic Governor x Democratic Legislature 1.290 
(1.290) 
-1.120 
(2.260) 
Continued on next page   
 
 
 
233 
Table A.6 (continued)   
 Traditional 
Policies 
Entrepreneurial 
Policies 
Variable Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Coefficient 
(S.E.) 
Intercept -0.161 
(3.260) 
-1.050 
(7.420) 
N 225 225 
2 x Log-likelihood -810.4 -549.1.2 
Null Deviance 310.9 on 224 df 236.7 on 224 df 
Residual Deviance 251.9 on 194 df 194.4 on 194 df 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (all two-tailed tests).  
Estimates are unstandardized maximum likelihood coefficients. 
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